\u3ci\u3eThe Conference Proceedings of the 2003 Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) World Conference, Volume 5\u3c/i\u3e by Bowen, Brent et al.
University of Nebraska Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Faculty Books and Monographs
7-2003
The Conference Proceedings of the 2003 Air Transport
Research Society (ATRS) World Conference, Volume 5
Brent Bowen




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/facultybooks
Part of the Aerospace Engineering Commons, Science and Technology Studies Commons, and
the Transportation Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Books and Monographs by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact
unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bowen, Brent; Gudmundsson, Sveinn; Oum, Tae Hoon; and UNO Aviation Institute, "The Conference Proceedings of the 2003 Air














THE UNO A VIA TION MONOGRAPH SERIES
UNOAi Report 03-9
The Conference Proceedings of the 2003 Air










University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE 68182-0508
© 2003, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha
UNO Aviation Institute Monograph Series
Michaela M. Schaaf, Series Editor
Mary M. Fink, Production Manager
Amy L. Tegeder, Production Assistant
Host Organization
The University of Nebraska at Omaha, Dr. Nancy Belck, Chancellor
C"oh_ge of Public Affairs and Community Service, Dr. B. 3. Reed, Dean
School of Public Administration, Dr. Russell Smith, Director
Aviation Institute, Dr. Brent D. Bowen, Director
Funding Support
NASA National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program & NASA EPSCoR,
Ms. Diane DeTroye, Acting Program Manager
NASA Nebraska Space Grant & EPSCoR Programs, Dr. Brent D. Bowen, Director
Publication
The UNO Aviation Institute Monograph Series is published at the University of Nebraska
at Omaha, 6001 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182.
Published as a not-for-profit service of the Aviation Institute. Funded in part by a grant
from the NASA National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program.
The University of Nebraska does not discriminate in its academic, employment or
admission policies and abides by all federal, state, and regental regulations pertaining to
same.




The UNO Aviation Institute Monograph Series began in 1994 as a key component of the
education outreach and information transfer missions of the Aviation Institute and the
NASA Nebraska Space Grant & EPSCoR Programs. The series is an outlet for aviation
materials to be indexed and disseminated through an efficient medium. Publications are
welcome in all aspects of aviation. Publication formats may include, but are not limited to,
conference proceedings, bibliographies, research reports, manuals, technical reports, and
other documents that should be archived and indexed for future reference by the aviation
and world wide communities.
Submissions
Aviation industry practitioners, educators, researchers, and others are invited to submit
documents for review and possible publication in the monograph series. The required
information is listed in the Submission Form, found on the world wide web at:
www.unomaha.edu/-nasa/researchers/monograph.htna
Dissemination
The UNO Aviation Institute Monograph Series is indexed in various databases such as
National Transportation Library (NTL), Educational Research Information Clearinghouse
(ERIC), Transportation Research Information Services (TRIS), Aviation TradeScan, NASA
Scientific & Technical Reports (STAR), and the Library of Congress. The series is also
cataloged in the UNO Library, which is a member of the Online Computer Library Center
(OCLC), an international bibliographic utility. OCLC's Union Catalog is accessible world
wide and is used by researchers via electronic database services EPIC and FirstSearch and is
also used for interlibrary loans. In addition, copies have been provided to the University of
Nebraska - Lincoln and the University of Nebraska at Keamey Libraries. Copies are also
provided to the Nebraska Library Commission, the official archive of state publications.
Ordering
UNO Aviation Institute monographs are available from the UNO Aviation Institute, Allwine
Hall 422, 6001 Dodge Street, Omaha, NE 68182-0508. Order information is also available
on the world wide web at www.unornaha.edu/-nasa/researclaers/monograph.htm
University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute
Aviation Monograph Series
Recent monographs in the series include:
03-5 thru 03-10 The Conference Proceedings of the 2003 Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) World
Conference
03-4 Aerospace Workforce Development: The Nebraska Proposal; and Native View Connections:
A Multi-Consortium Workforce Development Proposal
03-3 Fifteen Years of Collaborative Innovation and Achievement: NASA Nebraska Space Grant
Consortium 15-Year Program Performance and Results Report
03-2 Aeronautics Education, Research, and Industry Alliance (AERIAL) Year 2 Report and Year 3
Proposal
03-1 The Airline Quality Rating 2003
02-7 The Aeronautics Education, Research, and Industry Alliance (AERIAL) 2002 Report
02-6 The Family Science Starter Kit: A Manual to Assist You in the Development of a Family
Aeronautical Science Program
02-5 Parme._hip and the Revital'_tzation of Aviation: A Study of the Advanced General Aviation
Transport Experiments Program, 1994-2001
02-4 The Proceedings of the NASA Aerospace Technology Symposium 2002
02-3 A Summary Enabling Technology for the Small Transportation Aircraft
02-2 The Airline Quality Rating 2002
02-1 Nebraska Imtiative for Aerospace Research and Industrial Development (NIARID): Final Report
01-6 thru 01-8 The Conference Proceedings of the 2001 Air Transport Research Society (ATRS) of the WCTR
Society
01-5 Collegiate Aviation Research and Education Solutions to Critical Safety Issues
A complete listing of monographs is available at wx*-_,.unonaaha.edu/-nasa,'researchers/naono_raph.htm
To Obtain Monographs
Complete this form and include a cheek or purchase order made payable to the Aviation Institute. Orders within the U.S. are
$7.50 (U.S.) per monograph, and international orders are $10.00 (U.S.) to cover the costs of printing, shipping, and handling.
Allow 4-6 weeks for delivery. Please forward this request to: Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha, 6001 Dodge
Street. Omaha. NE 68182-0589. Phone: 402-554-3424 or 1-800-3 FLY UNO; Fax: 402-554-3781 ; E-mail: nasa@unomaha.edu


















International Civil Aviation Organization
Bangkok, THAILAND
John Black
University of New South Wales
Sydney, NSW, AUSTRALIA
David Jarach
SDA Bocconi Business School
Milan, ITALY
Brent Bowen
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Omaha, NE, USA
Yeong-Heok Lee
Hankuk (Korea) Aviation University
SOUTH KOREA
Jean Bresson











National University of Singapore
Kern Ridge Crescent, SFNGAPOt_
Tae Oum










College Park, MD, USA
Respicio Antonio Do Espirito Santo Jr.
Fede.,_! U.-.ivcrsity of Rio de Jane/so











Embry Riddle Aeronautical University











University of British Columbia
Vancouver, BC, CANADA
Mark Hansen
University of California at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA, USA
Yimin Zhang
City University of Hong Kong
Hong Kong, CHINA
The Opening Address at the ATRS 2003 Conference, Toulouse, France
By
Professor Tae Hoon Oum,
President, Air Transport Research Society, and
UPS Foundation Chair in Transport and Logistics,
University of British Columbia, Canada
July 11, 2003
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen! It gives me a great pleasure to welcome all
of you to the ATRS World Conference being hosted jointly by Groupe ESC (Toulouse
Business School) and the ENAC (Ecole Nationale de Aviation Civile).
Today and tomorrow, in addition to the Opening and the Closing Plenary sessions, 112
papers will be presented on virtually all aspects of air transport and related topics.
2003 is a particularly challenging year to air transport policy makers, aviation executives
and researchers as most of the major network airlines are experiencing unprecedented
level of financial difficulties in the 100-year history of aviation. But I am reminded of
Mr. Georges Clemencau, the French Leader during the first World War. He said "our
country advances ONLY through crisis and in tragedy". Likewise, I am confident to
predict that air transport industry will also advance through these crises. Airlines are
succeeding in restructuring their service networks, and streamlining their operations to an
unprecedented level, and start to listen to what their customers and markets are telling
them more closely. Most major network carriers in the United States and Canada have
achieved a unit cost reduction of about 25% via their recent restructuring efforts. They
will be coming out of these crises with resounding success in order to serve the rising
demands for efficient and cost effective services. Now, I believe it is turn for the airports
and air traffic control systems to do a restructuring comparable to what airlines have been
rlnlncr in r.r_nt xr_are Ira thi_ r_a_rcl ] _m nnrtlrnlnrhl hnnn,y tn e_ rvann,J ra_n_re _.rl
presentations in this conference are focusing the airports and air traffic control systems.
As a final note, on behalf of the ATRS, I would like to express sincere appreciation to
Mr. Herve Passeron, Director of Groupe ESC-Toulouse, and Mr. Grrard Rozenknop,
Director of the ENAC, and above all, Professor Sveinn Gudmundsson for their
tremendous efforts to organize this conference so successfully. I also like to express our
appreciation to AirBus Industries, City of Toulouse, Toulouse Chamber of Commerce,
Aeroport Toulouse-Blagnac, and EQUIS for their active participation in this program and
for their financial supports.
I look forward to a stimulating conference in the next couple of days.
Thank you very much.
The Air Transport Research Society (ATRS)
World Conference
July 10-12, 2003 Toulouse, France
THE CONFERENCE
The ATRS held its World Conference in
Toulouse, France, in July 2003.
THE PROCEEDINGS
Once again,on behalf of the Air Transport
Research Society,the University of
Nebraska atOmaha Aviation Institutehas
agreedto publish the Proceedings of the
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monograph set.
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Abstract
The deregulation of US axfiation in 1978 resulted in the reconiiguration of airline
networks into hub-and-spoke systems, spatially concentrated around a small number of
central airports or 'hubs' through which an airline operates a number of daily waves of
flights. A hub-and-spoke network requires a concentration of traffic in both space and
time.
In contrast to the U.S. airlines, European airlines had entered the phase of spatial network
concentration long before deregulation. Bilateral negotiation of traffic fights between
governments forced European airlines to focus their networks spatially on small number
of 'national' airports. In general, these star-shaped networks were not coordinated in
time. Transfer opportunities at central airports were mostly created 'by accident'.
With the deregulation of the EU air transport market from 1988 on, a second phase of
airline network concentration started. European airlines concentrated their networks in
time by adopting or intensifying wave-system structures in their flight schedules.
Temporal concentration may increase the competitive position of the network in a
deregulated market because of certain cost and demand advantages.
This paper investigates to what extent a temporal concentration trend can be observed in
the European aviation network after deregulation. We will analyze the presence and
configuration of wave-system structures at European airline hubs as well as the resulting
transfer opportunities. We use OAG data for all European carders with scheduled
services between 1990 and 1999.
We conclude that a temporal concentration trend exists among European airlines.
European deregulation has resulted in the adoption or intensification of wave-system
structures by airlines. These wave-system structures as well as the overall traffic growth
have significantly stimulated the number of indirect hub connections. Airline hubs with
wave-system structures perform generally better than airline hubs without a wave-system
structure in terms of indirect connectivity given a certain number of direct connections.
Keywords: airline networks, wave-system structure, Europe, connectivity
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1. IN'I'RODUCTION
The European aviation market has gradually been deregulated by means of three
'packages' of deregulation measures (1987, 1990, 1992) (Button et al., 1998; Hakfoort,
1999). As a result of deregulation, the balance of power in the European air transport
regime has shifted from the governments towards the European airlines. Supported by the
Common European Market and experiences with deregulation of the US aviation market,
deregulation forced the EU Member states to reduce their strong involvement with
respect to the economic regulation of the European carriers with respect to intra-
E_ air services.
After the deregulation of the aviation market in the United States in 1978, airlines took
advantage of the possibilities of the liberalised market and reorganised their networks. A
number of 'trunkline'-c, amers reorganised their networks from 'point-to point' into 'hub-
and-spoke' networks (Reynolds-Feighan, 1998, 2000; Viscusi et al., 1998). This
r,_o_,,i¢.*i,,,, ,,,,.v ,.,1o,-,_ t.,_.,,_-, la',o ._a 1nor rding ....... ' ........ _ ........ v.._.... ,.,,,,, ,, ,_t ,=,, _uau x_ .,, aCCa_ to rkuynotds-rglglaan
(2001). Direct flights from medium airports to other medium airports were increasingly
replaced by indirect flights via a central airports or qmbs'.
Spatial concentration and temporal concentration are the two main features of the hub-
and-spoke network (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). The hubbing carrier concentrates its
network spatially around one or a small amber of hubs. Regarding temporal
concentration, the airline operates _synchronized, daily waves of flights through these
hubs (Graham, 1995; Reynolds-Feighan, 2000). The aim of such a wave-system structure
is to optimise the number and quality of connections offered by an airline. The flight
schedule optimisation through wave-system structures and spatial concentration can
result in certain demand and cost side advantages as well as entry deterrence. The
advantages of these hub-and-spoke systems have been extensively discussed elsewhere
(see e.g. Button, 2002; Hanlon, 1996; Pels, 2001).
On the other hand, some new and incumbent U.S. airlines continued operating 'point-to-
point' networks on a low-cost, no-frill, low-price basis. Low-cost carriers do not need the
cost advantages of hub-and-spoke networks because they have low marginal costs per
passenger. This is mainly the result of operating high density routes with high utilization
rates, high density seating, standardization of aircraft types and maintenance, electronic
ticketing, low levels of on-board service, use of under-utilized secondary airports and
flexible labor contracts (Dempsey & Gesell, 1997; Doganis, 2001; Reynolds-Feighan,
2001; Williams, 2001).
In contrast to the large amount of empirical studies regarding the changes in airline
network structures in the deregulated US air transport market, the number of empirical
studies with respect to changing airline network configurations in Europe is rather
limited. More knowledge of airline network behaviour in a deregulated European aviation
regime is important from a societal perspective because of a number of reasons.
• The structure of airline networks affects airport planning and development
including peaking problems at airports, uncertainty in airport traffic forecasting,
runway construction plans, terminal lay-outs and regional accessibility (de
Neufville, 1995).
It canbeexpectedthattheeffectsof deregulationontheEuropeanairline network
configurationswill be different from the U.S. aviation network since the
geographical,political andhistoricalcontextis quitedifferent from the European
context(seealsoBootsma,1997;Burghouwt& Hakfoort,2001).
From a scientific point of view, this study adds to the current body of knowledge
because:
• This paper tries to reduce the apparent gap in the literature. Most studies take the
airport-level as the object of analysis and do not analyze changes in network
structures over time at the airline level (for an overview of studies see Burghouwt
& Hakfoort, 2001).
• Most existing theoretical studies on airline network economics in a deregulated
market use a network dichotomy. Generally, two different networks are
considered as a starting point for analyses: the minimally connected network and
the fully connected network (see e.g. Berechrnan & De Wit, 1996). In reality
these two extreme network structures rarely exist (Pels, 2000, p. 70). The scale
from full hub-and-spoke networks to fully connected (point-to-point) is
continuous (Bootsma, 1997, p.4). By focusing on the spatial and temporal
organisation of traffic flows insight into the usefulness of these economic models
and their application to the European air transport system can be given.
• Most studies consider airline networks that are radially organized in space as an
equivalent for hub-and-spoke networks (e.g. Bahia et al., 1998; Burghouwt &
Hakfoort, 2001; Goetz & Sutton, 1997; de Wit et al., 1999). However, a radial
network is not an equivalent for a hub and spoke network as long as timetable
coordination is lacking. Hence, this paper acknowledges both the spatial and
temporal dimension to define airline networks.
This paper adds to the evidence by providing an analysis of the changes in temporal
dimension of airline network con.figurations in Europe between 1990 and 19991.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous studies and the
theoretical background of the paper. In section 3, we describe the methodology of the
weighted indirect connectivity index and the wave-structure analysis. Section 4 describes
briefly the OAG data used in this paper. Section 5 and 6 discuss the empirical results
regarding temporal concentration in the networks of the airlines. Section 7 concludes,
discusses the policy implications of the results and indicates themes for further research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Theoretical considerations on the temporal configuration of an airline network
1
This paper will not cover the spatial configuration of airline networks. We refer to Burghouwt et al.
(2003) for an empirical analysis of the spatial dimension of airline networks in Europe based on the
network concentration index.
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Temporal concentration and spatial concentration are the two main features of the hub-
and-spoke network (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). Therefore, we define an airline network
configuration as the spatial and temporal configuration of the network. The spatial
configuration can be defined as the level of concentration of an airline network around
one or a few central hub airports. This definition has been used to analyse the
geographical structure of airline networks in Europe between 1990 and 1999 (Burghouwt
et al., 2003).
Follo_4ng the thesis of Bootsma (1997) on airline flight schedule development, we define
the temporal configuration as the number and quality of indirect connections offered by
an airline or alliance by adopting a wave-system structure in the airline flight schedule.
A wave-system structure consists of the number of waves, the timing of the waves and
the structure of the individual waves. According to Bootsma (1997, p.53) a connection
wave is 'a complex of.... inex_ming and nn'l'on.lno_.v___Vflioht_,_,.o, o_*.,,_*.*c_*"°#*_"*Aout.,aK _-l_n4-t,t.tata ln11"_GO_g
flights connect to all outgoing flights [..]'.
Three elements determine the structure of such a connection wave:
1. The minimum connection time for continental and intercontinental flights
2. The maximum connection times
3. The maximum number of flights that can be scheduled per time period
Figure 1 presents an ideal type of connection wave for a European hinterland hub.
Connections have to meet the minimum connecting times (M). Then, a trade-offhas to be
made between the maximum acceptable connection time (T) for the airline and the
maximum number of flights that can be scheduled in a time period (A(t)+D(t)). The hub-
and-spoke concept favours adding a connection to the same wave. Since no airport has
unlimited peak capacity however, adding new flights to the edges of the waves involves
long waiting times which may not be acceptable for transfer passengers (Dennis, 2001).
However, in reality, such an ideal picture is not very likdy to exist. Bootsma (1997)
mentions the following disturbing factors:
• Some spokes may be located to close or to far away from the hub to fit in the
wave-system structure. These flights will be located off-wave.
• Strict schcxiuling may jeopardize fleet utilization.
• Environmental constraints and/or capacity constraints may be an obstacle for
airlines to fit all flights into the wave-system.
• In strong O-D markets, it may be attractive to schedule a number of flights off-
wave.
• The incoming and outgoing European wave can overlap because not all
connection are feasible because of the detour/routing factor
• We can add to this list the fact that an airline may simply not have chosen to
adopt or may not be capable of adopting a wave-system structure
Figure 1 Structure of the theoretical connection wave of a European hinterland hub.
A(t)=number of flights that still have to arrive at the hub at time t; D(t) = number of
flights that still have to depart from the hub at time t; C=wave centre; Mi=minimum
connection time for intercontinental flights; Mc = minimum connection time for
continental flights; T.=maximum connection time for intercontinental flights; Tc =
maximum connection time for continental flights.
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Bootsma (1997) makes a clear distinction between the actual temporal configuration of
the airline flight schedule (the wave-system structure) on the one hand and the effects of
the airline flight schedule on the number and quality of the indirect connections generated
by the flight schedule (indirect connectivity) on the other hand.
The resulting indirect connectivity of an airline hub will depend on a number of elements
in the airline flight schedule (Bootsma, 1997; Dennis, 1998; Rand Europe; Veldhuis,
1997). Firstly, the number of direct flights (frequency) from and to the hub determines
the maximum number of indirect connections following the formula n(n-1)/2, where n
denotes the number of spoke-airports in the network.
Secondly, the number of indirect flights will depend on the minimum connection time at
the airline hub (tact). The mct-window is required to allow passengers and baggage to
transfer between two flights as well as to turn around the aircraft itself. Indirect
connections not meeting the mct-criterion cannot be considered as a viable connection.
However, not every connection will be as attractive. An indirect flight with a waiting
time of five hours will not be as attractive as the same indirect flight but with a transfer
time of only 45 minutes.
Attractivity of an indirect connection depends on (Veldhuis, 1997):
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• Waiting time at the hub: attractivity declines when waiting time increases.
• Routing factor: the in-flight time for an indirect flight compared to the direct-
flight time. Some indirect connections (such as Hamburg-Oslo-Nice) are not
attractive for the average air traveller because the detour factor is too large.
• Perception: passengers perceive transfer time longer than in-flight time (Veldhuis,
1997).
• Fares: lower fares mav compensate for longer transfer and in-flight times.
• Flights of a certain airline may be attractive because the air traveller participates
in the loyalty programme of the airline.
• Amenities of the hub-airport involved in the transfer.
When quantifying the effects of the configuration of the air;line flight schedule in terms of
indirect connectivity, one should take into account the difference in attractivity of a
certain connection. However, since data on fares, airport quality and loyalty programmes
are very scarce and unreliable, we will concentrate on the role of waiting time and flight
_;"'° ;" *_'=..... (see also "-'-' --: i 997).uu,_, _ uJao la_la_,A v uldhl.u_,
Based on these theoretical considerations, we will use the characteristics of the ideal type
connection wave as the benchmark for our analysis. We will:
1. Evaluate the indirect connectivity of the airline flight schedule given the
presence or absence of a wave-system structure. We define indirect
connectivity as the number and effime_n%, n¢ fh,_ ;,,-1;,-,,,-, ...... ,,^--- _ ......... _ca. wr. WA,lUUL_'_,*_ItUJU_
generated by the existing flight schedule.
2. Analyse the presence of a wave-system structure empirically as well as the
determination of the number of waves at the airline hub, based on the
definition of a theoretical connection wave.
3. Assess the effects of the presence of a wave-system structure on the
indirect connectivity.
However, we will first review existing literature to identify the scientific relevance of our
research as well as the methodology used.
2.2 Literature review
A substantial amount of theoretical and empirical research has been carried out on airline
network configurations. Most of these studies on airline network configurations focus on
the spatial dimension of airline networks. The hub-and-spoke network is generally seen
as a spatially concentrated network or minimally connected network. In the hub-and-
spoke network, routes are deliberately concentrated on a few key nodes in the network.
However, as we stated before, an airline network needs both spatial and temporal
concentration of flights to qualify as a hub-and-spoke network.
Table 1 provides an overview of hub-and-spoke definitions of various authors to support
the argument of the definition-bias. Besides, most of the studies have a very limited
geographical scope. In the case of Europe, only the largest airlines and airports are
considered in these studies.
Table 1 Definition of the hub-and-spoke network according to various studies
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'[In Hub-and-spoke networks], passengers
change planes at a hub airport on the way
to their eventual destination
[..] in case of hub-and-spoke, the network
is designed as such, that routes are
deliberately concentrated at a limited
number of connection facilities called
hubs. Destinations from each of these hubs
are called spokes. [..]. In order to
maximize these connection possibilities,
the hub-carrier usually schedules its flights
in a limited number of time-windows.
HS-network entail the combination of
point-to-point with transfer traffic at a
central hub
In hub-and-spoke operations, [..] carriers
generally use one or more large airports
[..]. Flights are arranged in banks which
allow passengers continuing on to be
r'nnenlirlatad an ntlthnlmcl n._jio,hhts tel fllrther
destinations'
Airline networks that entail consolidating
of traffic from a diverse range of origins
and are destined to a diverse range of final
destinations at large, hub airports
Consolidation of operations around hubs
by airlines
[Airline HS networks aim] 'to carry
connecting passengers with both origin
and destination outside their home
Country/'
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Thus, only a small number of empirical studies has been carried out to measure temporal
concentration of airline networks. Let us briefly discuss the methodology and results of
the studies dealing with temporal concentration. We will then present an alternative to the
existing methodologies.
Bania, Bauer & Zlatoper (1998)
Bahia et al. provide a methodology for measuring the extent to which airlines operate
hub-and-spoke networks. They take into account the spatial concentration of the network
using the McShan-Windle index. Moreover, they take into account the possibility of
making transfers from one flight to another at the hub airports. However, they consider
every possible indirect connection as a viable connection, regardless of transfer time and
routing factor. As we have seen, transfer time at the hub and routing factor are essential
elements for the efficiency of the hub-and-spoke system. Therefore, we reject the Bahia-
methodology because of theoretical considerations.
Dennis (1998)
In his paper dealing with the competitive position of the main European hub airports,
Dennis distinguishes three factors that determine the success of a hub airport: markets
served, geographical location and transfer times/schedule coordination.
Firstly, independent from location and transfer times, the number of flights on two origin-
destination pairs served determines the number of indirect connections in comparison to
other hubs. Dennis defines the hub potential as the share of the product of the frequency
on the first and second leg of an indirect trip in a certain market at a certain airport in the
sum of this product for all airports. He concludes that London Heathrow, Franlffurt and
Paris Charles de Gaulle have the highest hub potential.
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Secondly,thegeographicallocation is important.Dennisstudiesthis aspectby computing
the total numberof passengerkilometres necessaryto connecteveryhub with all other
hubs in the system.Brusselsis most centrally located in Europe, evencorrectedfor
passengernumbers.Peripheralhubs Athens, Lisbon and Helsinki areworst locatedin
termsof totalpassengerkilometresnecessaryto connectall thehubs.
Thirdly, having a goodhub potential and geographicallocation would be sufficient to
operatea successfulhub.However,passengersarenot preparedto wait an infmite time.
Hence,transfersrequirethe concentrationof flight activity into a limited numberof peaks
or waves during the day in order to minimize waiting time. Dennis calculatedthe
performanceof the hubbing airline in generating an effective wave structure by
computing the number of connections possible for each airline at each hub between the
minimum connecting times and six hours as well as looking at the wave structure
graphically. In 1998, Luffiaansa at Frankfurt, Air France at Paris CDG and KLM at
Amsterdam scored best.
The methodology of Dennis works well in getting a first impression of an airline hub, but
does not result in insight into the level of timetable co-ordination since the effects of
waiting time on the quality of a connection are not taken into account.
Rietveld & Brons (2001)
Rietveld & Brons (2001) state that waiting time at a hub airport is dependent on three
factors: frequency, the minimal connection time (met) and the time table co-ordination by
the hub cartier. Knowing the met values for a certain connection, the frequency for the
flights concerned and the waiting time for that connection, the level of timetable co-
ordination can be derived. From the total number of operating hours per day and the
frequency on the most frequent leg of the connection (F2), an expected average waiting
time can be computed (Th). The deviation from the real waiting time minus the mct is
called alfa.
T
th = -,_, _ _-- (1)
a = 1- g (2)
The basic problem of the approach is the fact that the study assumes that the observed
frequency on the route is one of the determinants for the waiting time at the hub. This
seems to be a fight conclusion: average waiting time decreases as frequency decreases.
However, frequency is not the factor decisive for the waiting time (Th) at the hub. It is the
other way around: waiting time is decisive for the frequency. Airlines choose frequency
based on O-D demand and transfer demand. Both determine the wave-system structure
(time table coordination) including the number of waves (Bootsma, 1997). Ideally, every
destination is being served in every wave. However, markets with very strong O-D
demand may validate off-wave scheduling of these services. At the same time,
connection with insufficient demand may result in connections not served in every wave.
Without the time table coordination in the flight schedule/ wave structure, certain
frequencies would not be possible because of lack of O-D demand. The Rietveld &
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Brons-modelhasbeen based on the inaccmme assumptions creating a loop in the model.
The model measures the level of timetable coordination based on frequency that is the
result of the same timetable coordination because it asmmaes that frequency is only
generated by O-D demand. However, as stated before, frequency is the result of both O-D
and transfer demand which is partly the result of the wave-system structure adopted by
the airline.
Veldhuis, 1997
Veldhuis (1997) uses the concept of connectivity units (gnu) to measure the competitive
position of an airline or airport network. The frequency of a connection (direct or
indirect), the non-stop travel time, perceived travel time, maximum perceived travel time
and the transfer time are the inputs for the measure. The measure scales indirect travel
time to the travel time of an indirect flight, making comparisons possible between
indirect and direct connectivity.
The measure has been applied to various cases (see IATA_ 2002; Ve!dhuis, !_o9_7;
Veldhuis, 2002; Veldhuis & Kroes, 2002) and has proved its usefulness. Drawback of the
methodology is the fact that assmnptions have to be made on the valuation of time by air
passengers to make comparisons possible between indirect and direct connectivity.
We will use a somewhat simplified gnu-measure to assess the effects of the temporal
configuration of an airline's network_ It resembles to connectivity unit in weighing the
number of frequency l'or the quality of the indtrect connection. Our measure differs in the
sense that we do not aim at comparing indirect and direct connectivity.
Yet, the gnu-methodology or a similar measure does only give insight in the
consequences of a certain flight schedule on connectivity. Its basic handicap is the fact
that such as measm'e does not give information about the structure of the flight schedule
itself.
Bootsma, 1997
Bootsma uses the theoretical model of an ideal connection wave as the benchmark for the
analysis of the wave-system structure and for the analysis of the effects of the wave-
system structure on indirect connectivity (see also section 3.1 and 3.2). In contrast to the
studies discussed above, it is important to notice that Bootsma distinguishes between the
description of the temporal configuration of an airline network and the analysis of the
effects of a certain temporal configuration on indirect connectivity. We will make the
same distinction in this paper.
For the descriptive part of the analysis, Bootsma identifies the presence, timing and
number of actual waves by identifying local mamma in the actual daily distribution of
arriving and departing flights using the theoretical model of an ideal connection wave.
This methodology will be discussed and adapted in section 3.1.
For the measurement of the indirect connectivity of an airline's flights schedule, he
proposed a number of yardsticks, e.g. the number of indirect connections and the quality
of those connections. One problem with the approach is the fact that the analysis of the
quality of connections is very rough. A distinction is made between excellent, good and
poor connections, based on waiting time at the hub. A continuous approach, such as the
approach of Vddhuis (1997), might be more accurate. Moreover, Bootsma did not
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considerthe relevanceof the connections, such as backtracking. Finally, the study
consideredonly afewairline hubsempirically for the year1994.
In summary,a smallnumber of studies has analysed the temporal dimension of airline
networks. These studies analyse the structure of the airline flight schedule itself
(Bootsma, 1997; Dennis, 1998) or aim to assess the consequences of an actual flight
schedule for the level of (in)direct connectivity (Bootsma, 1997; Veldhuis, 1997, 2002;
Veldhuis & Kroes, 2002) or waiting time (Rietveld & Brons, 2001).
The methodology of Rietveld & Brons was rejected based on theoretical considerations.
The methodology of Dennis works well getting a very first glance of the connectivity of
an airline network or airport, but does not take into account the quality of an indirect
connection.
Bootsma offers a very valuable methodology for describing the structure of an actual
flight schedule. We will use a slightly adapted methodology to do the same. Both
Bootsma and Veldhuis have developed a measure (cnx and cnu respectively) to analyse
the effects of a certain flight schedule. We will use elements of both approaches for this
study (see section 3).
3. METHODOLOGY
In section 2 we stated that this paper has a two-fold aim. Firstly, a description of the
presence of a wave-system structure and the number of waves at an airline hub will be
given. Secondly, an analysis of the effects of the wave-system structure on indirect
connectivity will be performed. The first question can be answered using the theoretical
wave-system structure developed by Bootsma (1997) (section 3.1). The second question
will be answered using a simplified connectivity measure (section 3.2).
3.1 A methodology for the identification of the wave- system structure
Recalling figure 1 and Bootsma (1997, p.61), the time windows for departing and
arriving intercontinental (ICA) and departing and arriving European (EUR) flights can be
determined:
• ICA-arriving window: [C-Ti+0.5Te, C-Mi+0.5Me] (3)
• ICA-departing window: [C+Mi-0.5Me, C+Ti-0.5Tc] (4)
• EUR-arriving window: [C-0.5Tc, C-0.5Mc] (5)
• EUR-departing: [C+0.5Mc, C+0.5Tc] (6)
V_rhere_
Ti is the maximum connecting time involving intercontinental flights;
T¢ is the maximum connecting time for connecting European flights;
Mi is the minimum connecting time involving intercontinental flights;
M_ is the minimum connecting time for connecting European flights;
C is the wave centre.
Bootsma (1997) has defined standard maximum connection times for different types of
connections: the quality thresholds (see table 2). Minimum connection times are unique
for every hub airport and can be derived from the Official Airline Guide (OAG). For the
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sake of simplicity of the wave-structure analysis, we have chosen a minimum connection
time of 40 minutes for all flights and a maximum connection time of 90 minutes for all
flights for the analysis performed in section 6. The analysis shows that this choice does
not influence the results significantly 2.
Table 2 Connection quality thresholds









Source: Bootsma, 1997, p.68
Given the theoretical definition of an ideal connection wave, the actual wave-system
structure can be identified. This can be done by creating artificial wave centres every x-
........... y. ,, u_,taJ_z mz u_ttm_ a_t_y Ul._Zettt:_ ia wiav_ _itXUt:tUl-t_ a[ thai [ilIle of
the day for that wave-centre, is determined by counting the number of flights within the
departure and arrival windows for the specific wave-centre.
We have illustrated the procedure for the network of LuRhansa at Munich (figure 2). We
have created artificial wave centres every 6 minutes of the day. Maximum connection
time is 90 minutes for all flights. Minimum connection time has been set on 40 minutes.
Hence, flights have to arrive between t=C- 45 and t=C-20. Flights have to depart between
t-=C+20 and _+45 to fit into the artificial wave. A wave-centre of a wave can be
identified when the wave-centres for incoming and outgoing flights coincide almost
completely.
At LuRhama's hub Munich, we can identify a clear wave-system structure with three
connection waves: morning, afternoon and evening. The wave centres for departures and
arrivals overlap. Local maxima differ significantly from the following local
resulting in a clear peak-pattern in the flight schedule.
2For the analysis performed in section 5 (see also section 3.2) unique minimum connection times for every
airport have been applied.
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The research of Bootsma shows that this methodology is a helpful approach for
identification of the presence of a wave-system structure, the number of waves and the
timing of the waves. The approach needs a numerical or graphical representation to
capture the :local maxima' (Bootsma, 1997, p. 60).
For a large number of airline hubs, identification of 'local maxima' per airline hub
becomes very time-consuming. Therefore, we will first evaluate the effects of airline
flight schedules on indirect connectivity (section 3.2). Only airline hubs with significant
indirect connectivity will be analysed to identify the characteristics of the wave-system
structure. Airports without significant indirect connectivity are not being considered as
competitive hubs for the transfer market.
3.2 Evaluation airline flight schedule effects: indirect connectivity
For the purpose of this paper, we propose a combination of the Bootsma (1997)-
methodology and the approach of Veldhuis (1997) for analysis of the indirect
connectivity as the result of a certain airline flight schedule.
In section 2, we stated that the number of direct frequencies, the minimum connection
times and the quality of the connection determine indirect connectivity.
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WI= weighted indirect connection
TI= transfer index
RI= routing index
Mi,j= minimum connection time for connection j at airport i
T= maximum connection time for connection j
Th= transfer time at the hub
IDT= actual in-flight time indirect connection
DTr= estimated in-flight time direct connection based on great circle distance
R = routing factor
The weighted connectivity of an indirect connection depends both on the quality of the
connection at the hub (TI) as well as the quality of the indirect flight compared to the
direct flight (RI). Both are defined as being a linear function of the flight time and
transfer time respectively.
3 Only intra-line, same day transfer connections (on a Wednesday) were considered in this paper. Furore
research should include transfer connections between flights of alliance partners
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The transfer index (TI) equals 1 when the transfer time Th equals 0. The transfer index
(TI) equals zero when the transfer time Th exceeds the maximum connection quality
threshold Tpoor (table 2). We have not chosen to set the TI-index at 1 when Th equals the
minimum connection time in order to include differences in minimum connection times
between airports.
The routing or circuity index (R_I) equals zero when the routing factor exceeds a certain
limit. The maximum routing factor for distance is typically 1,25 (Bootsma, 1997).
However, since we take in-flight time as the input for the routing factor instead of Great
Circle Distance, we should allow some time for take-off and landing. Therefore, we have
added 0.15 points to the maximum routing factor. This results in a maximum routing
factor of 1.4.
The routing of circuity index (RI) equals 1 when total in-flight time for an indirect
connection equals O. This is an impossible situation because of time needed for take-off
and landing but it takes into account the negative impact of a transfer on the attractivity
of a certain connection.
We have taken the weighted average of TI and RI. We have made the assumption that
passengers perceive transfer time 2.4 times as long as in-flight time. This factor is based
on preliminary research of Lijesen (2002). Future research should further distinguish
between perception of in-flight versus transfer time for leisure and business passengers.
The WI-index can be aggregated in different ways. We have used:
WNX= (WI)
Where
WNX= Total number or weighted indirect connections
4. DATA
The data set used consists of OAG/ABC data for the years 1990 - 1999. The OAG/ABC
data set contains variables based on published information on scheduled flights. Variables
include airline, flight number, departure time, arrival time, departure airport, destination
airport, flight frequency, airplane type and seat capacity for each flight and the number of
stops during the flight. The data are based on a representative week of July of each year.
For our analysis, we took all flights departing and arriving on Wednesday.
The OAG/ABC 4 data suffer from a number of limitations. First, OAG data only provides
insight into scheduled flights and not into realized demand or supply. Load factors,
weather conditions, technical problems and congestion can lead to differences between
the two. Given that we are interested in the structure of the aviation network, we do not
consider this to be much of a problem. Second, the OAG data only registers scheduled
services. We have deleted full height flights from the data set and consider passenger
flights (including the so-called 'combi' flights) only. Finally, the original data set only
lists direct flights.
4 For a detailed description see Burghouwt & Hakfoort (2001)
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Minimum connection times were derived from the Official Airline Guide of 1999 for the
analysis presented in section 5.
5. AIRLINE FLIGHT SCHEDULE EFFECTS: INDIRECT CONNECTIVITY
Using the methodology described in section 3, we will discuss the outcome of the flight
schedule coordination in terms of indirect connectivity. To do so, we will use the WNX
index of indirect connectivity. WNX is the number of indirect connections weighted by
transfer time and routing factor.
5.1 Indirect connectivity
Fj_...we 3 shows the _ in,daY fnr th_ tnp A1 ]_lwnpCr ._pn hubs in ten-me nf ir!dlr_
connections in 1999. In 1999, Frankfurt, Paris CDG, London Heathrow and Amsterdam
dominated the market for indirect connections.
K.LM at Amsterdam significantly improved its position as a hubbing carrier during the
period of analysis. The carrier added an extra wave structure to the daily wave structure
system, achieving a competitive frequency at Schiphol without a large investment in
aircraft (see also section 6) (Caves, 1997). Air France started hub operations at Paris
Charles de Gaulle in March 1996 with five waves a day (Dennis, 2001) with another 6th
wave added by 1999 (figure 4). This resulted in an increase of the WNX values by a
factor 7.
In contrast, BA at London Heathrow faced a relative decline in its competitive position
for transfer traffic compared to the other major hub. From a first position in 1990, BA at
London i-ieathrow moved to a third position in 1999.
We can observe some new hubbing strategies among the national carriers. Alitalia made
use of the newly constructed airports of Milan Malpensa to increase indirect connections
significantly compared to the hub position of the old airport Milan Linate. Malpensa
overtook Rome Fiumicino's position as the primary hub for Alitalia (Dennis, 2001).
British Airways started to build up hub operations at London Gatwick because of
capacity problems at Heathrow that prevent the carrier from implementing a wave
structure at that airport. BA reorganized their schedules from and to Gatwiek in order to
allow connections within 26 minutes in Gatwicks North Terminal (Caves, 1997).
However, as we will see in section 6, the wave-system structure is still very weak
compared to wave-system structures of hubs such as Paris CDG and Frankfurt.
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Figure 3 Number of weighted indirect connections (WNX) in 1990 and 1999 for the
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Source." OAG/ ABC; own calculations. Note that WNX value for Alitalia (AZ) at Milan
(MXP) are values for Malpensa in 1999 and Linate in 1990. WNX values for Oslo are for
Fornebu in 1990 and Gardemoen in 1999. See appendix for carrier and airport codes.
Munich saw it indirect connectivity increase by a factor seven as a result of LuRhansa's
policy to shift some of the service from Frankfurt because of capacity restrictions and the
opening of the new airport in 1992. Sabena intensified its Brussels hub, mainly on the
intra-European market. However, both Munich and Brussels suffer from the fact that
most of the connections have a large routing factor, resulting from the fact that they are
orientated towards intra-European indirect connections. Intra-European indirect
connections are not as attractive as intercontinental connections because of the large
transfer time compared to in-flight time. This factor has slowed down the growth of the
indirect connectivity.
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Figure 4 Wave-system structure of Air France at Paris CDG in 1990 (left) and 1999
(righO
tYi'
: i:i. i :;[
_, :Z.
Source: OA G/ AB C
At the lower level of the airport hierarchy, regional hub strategies have merged. Dennis
(2001) argues that the introduction of regional jets, such as the Embraer 145 and the
Candadair Regional Jet, has facilitated the _owth of these niche hubs. Regional Airlines
implemented a wave structure system at Clermont-Ferrand. Air France started regional
hub operations at Lyon. However, the weighted number of indirect connections generated
by these carriers remains very small compared to the large hubs. They can only be
successful when located far enough from the large hubs (Lyon, Clermont-Ferrand,




Being an overall airline hub does not mean being an airline hub in all market segments. A
clear market division can be observed between the different airline hubs. For the 15 main
European airline hubs, we have analysed the competitive strength in terms of the number
of weighted indirect connections in eight geographical submarkets for the year 1999:
1. From Europe to Europe (EUR-EUR)
2. From Europe to
3. From Europe to
4. From Europe to
5. From Europe to






Asia and the Pacific (EUR-APA)
Africa (EUR-AFR)
From Europe to Middle East (EUR-MEA)
Between non-European submarkets (directional)
Analysing the submarkets, we can divide the airline hubs roughly into four categories: the
allround hubs, the specialized hinterland hubs, the European hubs and the directional or
hourglass hubs (figure 5 and table 3).
The "allround" hubs
Only a few 'allround' hubs can be distinguished (figure 5). Allround hubs are hinterland
hubs: hubs with a high degree of indirect connectivity from hinterland Europe to all
geographical submarkets. Allround hubs are also directional or hourglass hubs for an
airline. They do not only offer hinterland connections but also 'hourglass' connections
between different continents.
The European allround hubs are Frankfurt (LH), London Heathrow (BA), Amsterdam
(KL), Paris CDG (AF) en Ziirich (SR). Amsterdam and London Heathrow perform poor
in the Eastern-European market. London Heathrow has also a bad position in the
Southamerican market mad is somewhat biased to the North American market. About 30
% of its indirect services from European airports are directed towards this market.
London Gatwick could be considered as an aUround hub. However, its Asia-Pacific
market is very poorly developed.
Specialized hinterland hubs
A number of airline hubs has a bias towards one or a number of intercontinental
submarkets, such as Brussels, Madrid, Milan Malpensa, Munich, Paris Orly and Dublin.
Moreover, they do not provide significant service to all of the submarkets nor do they
have large numbers of hourglass connections. We call these hubs specialized hinterland
hubs.
Most of the geographical biases seem to be related to historical relations with the area
considered. Others are based on geographical proximity. Munich and Vienna are clearly
biased towards the Eastern European market for their transfer traffic, which is related to
the geographical location of both hubs (Allett, 2002). Madrid devotes a large share of
indirect connectivity to Latin American destinations whereas Brussels and Paris Orly
have a comparatively large share of indirect connectivity direct towards Africa. Aer
Lingus' hub Dublin has a bad position in a geographical sense (RI=0,1) for intra-EU
traffic but strongly orientated towards North America.
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Airline hubs such as Copenhagen, Rome Fiumieino, Stockholm Arlanda, Helsinki,
Barcelona, Oslo, Lisbon, Clermont-Ferrand, Lyon and Hamburg offer a number of
indirect connections but these are mainly intra-European (over 70% European). This kind
of transfer traffic seems to be the most vulnerable one. On the one hand, more and more
indirect intra-European services will be replaced by direct, point-to-point services
because of the introduction of regional jets and the growth of low-cost carriers as well as
the construction of the high-speed rail network. On the other hand, European hubs suffer
from large routing factors because of the short in-flight time compared to the transfer
time at the hub airport.
Directional or hourglass hubs
21
These are the airports offering indirect connections between different continents.
Austrians hub Vienna is the only hourglass hub in Europe. It mainly offers connections
between other continents and Eastern Europe. However, the absolute number of these
connections is small compared to the directional connections of the allround hubs.
Figure 5 Share of different geographical submarkets in total number of weighted indirect
connections (WNX) for the primary European hubs. Note that only submarkets with
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Source: OAG/ABC; own calculations. See appendix for carrier and airport codes
6. WAV l?.-_V_Tl:?._dI _T1/ITCTIT1/I_
In section 5 we have analysed the weighted number of indirect connections of airline
hubs. We have seen that only a few airline hubs are highly competitive in the indirect
market. Small airline hubs play an insignificant role outside the direct O-D markets.
Therefore, for the analysis of the airline flight schedule itself, we will only consider
airline hubs with a WNX value of 10 and higher in 1990 as competitors in the indirect
market. This resulted in a sample of 62 airports. Subsequently, we have analysed the
sample on the presence of a wave-system structure using the methodology of section 3.1.
Have European airline adopted flight schedules characterised by a wave-system structure,
one of the characteristics of hub-and-spoke networks?
6.1 The presence of wave-system structures in airline flight schedules
Hub-and-spoke networks need both spatial and temporal concentration of flights.
Burghouwt et al. (2003) have concluded that most airline networks, especially national
airline networks, were already heavily concentrated in space in the regime of bilateral
regulation. Only a few regional airlines demonstrate spatial concentration strategies. A
22
development towards temporal concentration into wave-system structures can be
observed however.
Based on the sample of 62 airline stations, we can conclude that European airlines have
increasingly adopted wave-system structures or intensified the existing structures (table
4). The number of airline hubs (those airline stations with a wave-system structure)
doubled during the period of analysis. A number of airlines intensified the wave-system
stnaemre by adding more waves or increasing the quality of the wave-system structtme
(table 5). Only one airport was 'de-hubbed': Lufthansa's Cologne. After the German
Government moved its headquarters to Berlin, the importance of Cologne/Bonn airport
decreased ad did the role of the airport in the network of Lutthansa.
Table 4 Presence and quality of wave-system structures for a sample of 62 airline




















Source: OAG/ ABC; own calculations
Table 5 Presence of wave-system structures5 (wss) and number of waves, 1990 and 1999
for primary European hubs (WNX> I O)
!Quality of wave-i




Air France Paris CDG ,:._t igood
Air France Lyon iabsent _good
Air France Marseille _bsent iabsent
Air France Paris Orly iabsent :Ivery poor
Finnair Stockholm Arlanda iabsent iabsent
i
Finnair Helsinki iabsent ivery poor
Finnair Turku iabsent iabsent
t
Alitalia Rome Fiumicino !very poor _aoor
Alitalia Milan Linate iabsent iabsent
Alitalia Milan Malpensa iabsent ilimited
BA Birmingham iabsent iabsent
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R_gional Airlines Cle:mont-Ferrand ::absent ::very good
Tyrolean Vienna iabsent !very poor
Wideroe's Bodo iabsent iabsent




Air France has adopted a six-wave system at Paris CDG, reconfiguring the airport in a
real traffic pump (figure 4). Alitalia has done the same at Milan Malpensa with a four-
wave system. Lutthansa, as stated before, moved some of its hub operations from
Frankfurt to Munich. The three waves at Munich fit exactly in the wave-system structure
at Frankfurt in order to increase synergies between the two hubs. Regional Airlines, Air
France, Fneria set up wave-system struetm_ at Ciermont-Ferrand, Lyon and Barcelona
respectively. Crossair implemented a wave-system structure at Basel.
Some airlines intensified their hub operations during the period of analysis. KLM added
two extra waves to its three-wave system (figure 6). Swissair consolidated all its
intercontinental operations around Zfarich (Burghouwt et al., 2002) and added four waves
to its hub operations at this airport. Austrian made its operations at Vienna more efficient
and added an extra wave to the wave-system structm'e.
Figure 6 Flight schedule structure of KLM at Amsterdam, 1990 (left) and 1999 (righO
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Four major exceptions to the temporal concentration trend exist. The majority of the
airports (40 airline stations) did not have a wave-system structure in 1999.
Firstly, the major British hubs lack flight schedule coordination. British Airways was not
able to implement a wave-system at Heathrow, Gatwick (figure 7), Birmingham or
Manchester. Capacity shortages at these airports make it extremely difficult for the airline
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to implement a schedule structure. However, the high frequencies still generate quite a
large number of connections and high transfer efficiency in the case of Gatwick.
Figure 7 Flight schedule structure of British Airways at London Gatwick, 1990 (left) and
1999 (right)
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Secondly, the southern European airports show no or limited wave-structures, except
from Milan Malpensa and Barcelona. Their geographical position makes it difficult to
compete with the traffic flows into northern Europe (Bootsma, 1997). Instead, the home
carriers of these airlines seem to focus on O-D traffic and some indirect connections in
the domestic and Latin-American market.
Thirdly, a number of smaller airports such as Oslo (SAS/Braathens), Stockholm Arlanda
(SAS) (figure 8), Helsinki (Finnair), London Stansted (Ryanair) and Dublin (Aer Lingus)
are not hub airports in a strict sense. The network of the home carriers is to some extent
centred around these airports, but a clear schedule structure is lacking. The carriers do no
have specific schedules to facilitate transfers although a number of connections is
generated 'by accident'. They focus on O-D traffic and/or traffic feed to the major hubs.
Figure 8 Flight schedule structure of SAS at Stockholm Arlanda, 1990 (left) and 1999
(right)
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6.2 The impact of wave-system stt_ctures on indirect connectivity
We have seen that a number of European airlines have adopted wave-system structures in
their flight schedules. Another group of carriers did not implement or did not fully
implement such a wave-system structure in the flight schedule. If airlines implement a
wave-structure, do these wave-system structures indeed improve significantly the total
weighted indirect connectivity of a hub airport?
Wave-system structures indeed seem to have a positive impact on the total indirect
connectivity of a hub airport. Wave-system structures have the objective to maximize the
number of connecting opporttmities within a limited time frame given the number of
direct flights. Hence, the ratio between a given number of direct connections on the one
hand and the number of indirect connections at the airline hub on the other hand should
theoretically be larger for airports with a wave-system structure than for airports without
a wave-system structure.
In figure 12, we have ranked the top 50 airline stations according to the number of daily
direct flights in 1999. As can be expected, the ratio between the weighted number of
indirect connections (x-axis) increases when the number of direct flights increases due to
the quadratic nature of hub-spoke traffic. Every new direct connection results in a
multiplicity of new indirect connections. Therefore, airlines offering more direct flights
from an airport will show a larger ratio between indirect and direct connectivity.
However, the increase in the ratio is far from constant. Increases in this ratio seem to be
heavily influenced by the presence and quality of the wave-system structure. Airline hubs
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with afull wave-systemstructurehavegenerallya largerratiobetweenindirect anddirect
flights than carrierhubs with a poorly developedwave-systemstructure or without a
wave-systemstructure.
KLM's hub atAmsterdamSchipholfor example,is comparableto Alitalia at Rome FCO
in termsof thenumberof directflights (figure 10).However,KLM managesto offer alot
more indirectconnectionsperdirectflight thanAlitalia. KLM operatesa well-developed
wave-systemstructureat Amsterdamwhereasthe wave-systemstructure of Alitalia at
Rome is somewhatless efficient becauseof the smaller waves and may-off wave
connections(figure 9). Moreover,minimumconnectiontimesat Amsterdamare smaller
thanatRomeresultingin morepossibleconnectionsfor everyarriving flight.
The resultof a poorly developedwave structuresystemis the slow increaseduring the
day of the total numberof weightedindirect connectionsas in the caseof Alitalia at
Rome Fiumicino (figure 10). Well-developedwaves offer a carrier large stepwise
increasesof the numberof weightedindirect connectionsas in the case of KLM at
AmsterdamSchiphol.
Figure 9 Wave-system structure of KLM at Amsterdam (left) and Alitalia at Rome
Fiumicino (righO in 1999
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Figure 10 Cumulative number of daily direct flights for Alitalia at Rome Fiumicino and
KLM at Amsterdam in 1999 per time unit (left) and the cumulative number of weighted
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indirect connections for Alitalia at Rome Fiumicino and KLM at Amsterdam in 1999 per
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Another example is the situation of SAS at Copenhagen and BA at London Gatwick.
SAS operates a full wave-system structure at Copenhagen whereas such a system is
lacking at Gatwick. Both airports are comparable in terms of the number of direct daily
flights. However, the number of weighted indirect connections is much larger for
Copenhagen than for Gatwick as a result of the wave-.system structure (figure 11, 12).
The same holds true for the hub of Regional Airlines at Clermont Ferrand (with a wave-
system structure) compared to Air France at Marseille without such a wave-system
structure (figure 11, 12).
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Figure 11 Cumulative number of weighted indirect connections for British Airways at
London Gatwick and SAS at Copenhagen (left) and the cumulative number of weighted
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7. Conclusions and discussion
After the deregulation of the U.S. aviation market, airlines adopted hub-and-spoke
networks to benefit from cost and demand side economies as well as to deter entry. The
question rises if European airlines followed the same network strategy after deregulation
of the EU aviation market.
The hub-and-spoke system can be considered as a network with two principal
characteristics. On the one hand, spatial concentration of traffic around one or a few hub
airports and on the other hand, temporal concentration of flights in a number of daily
connection waves. Airports cannot be considered as real hubs as long as airlines have not
implemented a clear wave-system structure. Previous research shows that the networks of
major European airlines were already concentrated in space around a limited number of
central airports at the beginning of deregulation. This can be explained by the system of
bilateral air service agreements, that originally required airlines to only operate from their
national home base (nowadays modem asa's allow to operate from any point in the
national market).
What about the temporal configuration of airline networks in Europe?
A trend towards increasing temporal concentration can indeed be identified. Major
European airlines implemented or intensified their wave-system structures at the major
hubs during the period of analysis (1990-1999). Especially the major airlines and some
niche-carriers have followed this hub-and-spoke strategy.
Most of the smaller airlines as well as the new entering low-cost airlines are focused on
O-D traffic and do not play a significant role in the market for transfer traffic. An
explanation for the difference between large and small carriers might be the fact that
large hub-and-spoke networks have a very large demand and cost advantage in terms of
the number of city pairs served compared to smaller airlines hubs. According to Oum et
al. (1995), a new entrant has to compete at the entire HS network of the incumbent hub
cartier and operate out of its own hub in order to compete successfully. This would be a
very costly and risky undertaking. Therefore, small airlines will focus on O-D and hub-
hub markets unless their hubs are sufficiently separated from the major hubs as in the
case of R6gional Airlines and Crossair.
The increase in wave-system structures has stimulated the number of connecting
opportunities at hub airports. We have shown that airports with wave-system structures
offer generally more indirect connections than airports without a wave-system structure,
given a certain number of direct flights.
Between 1990 and 1999, the adoption of wave-system structures by airlines and the
overall growth of frequencies have resulted in a significant increase of indirect
connections, especially for the major hubs (due to the network economies of hub-and-
spoke networks). Being an airline hub does not mean being an airline hub in all
submarkets. We have distinguished aUround, hinterland, European and directional hubs.
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We have restricted our analysis to transfers within one airline. Future research should
also take into account transfer, opportunities between partners of the same alliance.
European airline networks were already concentrated in space around a limited number of
home bases before deregulation. The regime of bilateral regulation bounded airlines to
their national airports. These radial networks were not an equivalent for hub-and-spoke
networks since most transfer, connections were created 'by accident'. With the
deregulation of the EU air transport market from 1988 on, a second phase of airline
network concentration started. European airlines concentrated their networks in time by
adopting or intmsi""_mg wave-system structures in their flight schedules m c.¢ntral
airports. Temporal concentration may increase the competitive position of the network in
a deregulated market because of certain cost and demand advantages.
The second phase of network concentration in Europe has changed the context in which
airport planners operate. Hub-and-spoke networks have stimulated the amount of transfer
trafflc_ at hllh-airport_ Transfer tra_ftS__cis foo)!oose since it can easily divert to other hub
airports. Hub-and-spoke networks and the freedom of entry and exit in deregulated
markets induce therefore the volatility of future airport traffic volumes and change the
requirements for airport terminal lay-out (de Neufville, 1995). Within this constantly
changing and uncertain arena, research on more flexible approaches to strategic airport
planning in Europe will be needed.
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Appendix: carrier and airport codes
code airline code airport code airport
AF Air France AMS Amsterdam
AY Finnair ARN Stockholm Arlanda
AZ Alitalia BCN Barcelona
BA British Airways BGO Bergen
BD British Midland BHX Birmingham
BU Braathens S.A.F.E. BRU Brussels
El Aer Lingus BSL Basle
FI Icelandair CDG Paris Charles de Gaulle
FR Ryanair CFE Clermont-Ferrand
FU Air Littoral CGN Cologne
IB Iberia DUB Dublin
IJ Air Liberte DUS Dusseldorf
IW AOM FCO Rome Fiumicino
JK Spanair FRA Frankfurt
KL KLM GVA Geneva
LH Lufthansa HAM Hamburg
LT LTU HEL Helsinki
LX Crossair LGW London Gatwick
OS Austrian Airlines LHR London Heathrow
SK SAS LIN Milan Linate
SN Sabena LIS Lisbon
SR Swissair LTN London Luton
TP TAP Air Portugal LYS Lyon
U2 Easyjet MAD Madrid
UX Air Europa MAN Manchester
VM Regional Airlines MRS Marseille
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With the increasing trend of charging for externalities and the aim of encouraging the
sustainable development of the air transport industry, there is a need to evaluate the social
costs of these undesirable side effects, mainly aircraft noise and engine emissions, for
different airports. The aircraft noise and engine emissions social costs are calculated in
monetary terms for five different _ airports, ranging from hub airports to small
regional airports. The number of residences within different levels of airport noise
contours and the aircraft noise classifications are the main determinants for accessing
aircraft noise social costs. Whist, based on the damages of different engine pollutants on
the human health, vegetation, materials, aquatic ecosystem and climate, the aircraft
engine emissions social costs vary from engine types to aircraft categories. The results
indicate that the relationship appears to be curvilinear between environmental costs and
the traffic volume of an airport. The results and methodology of environmental cost
calculation could input for to the proposed European wide harmonised noise charges as
well as the social cost benefit analysis of airports.
Keywords: environmental costs, airport operation, European Commission policy
1. INTRODUCTION
Over theyears,increasingattentionhasbeenpaid to the sustainabledevelopmentof the
aviation sector. More and more, environmental and social concerns are posing a severe
limitation to the growth of the air transport industry. Although the global economic
downturn and political turmoil has caused a decline in the number of flights and
passengers over the past two years, these concerns remain valid.
It is now widely recognised that the costs of these externalities must be internalised and
paid for by the aviation industry and its users [EC, 1999, 2001]. Two of the most
important extemalities generated from commercial flights are noise nuisance and aircraft
engine emissions. From these two, noise nuisance has the largest impact on the
community surrounding airports, while engine emissions have both local and global
impacts.
Noise causes both nuisance and health effects, for instance sleep deprivation. More and
more airports in the world, often forced by governments, have applied different types of
noise management measures that range from noise abatement procedures to limits on the
total noise allowed. Among these measures are night flight restrictions, night quotas, and
noise charges and penalties. In 1999, only 10 out of the 27 enlarged European Union
countries, Norway and Switzerland have some forms of noise charges [Lu, 2000]; in
2003 all 27 countries have noise related charges [Boeing, 2003].
Aircraft en_ne emissions have extensive impact on human health, vegetation, materials_
ecosystem and the climate. Aircraft exhaust pollutants and CO2 emissions cause damage
during landing and take-off (LTO), ground stages and during cruise mode of flights. The
latter is kno_n as the only direct human-made source of pollution in the upper
troposphere and lower stratosphere and results in global warming. Compared to the
introduction of noise management measures, there are fewer airports applying engine
emissions mitigation measures. In 1999, engine emissions charges are in place only at
some Swiss and Swedish airports [Morrell and Lu, 2000]. In 2003, no other airports have
introduced these charges [Boeing, 2003]. These charges are targeted only at local
emissions; the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) is working on measures
targeting on the emissions during cruise mode [ICAO, 1996, 1998].
This paper provides a framework in which the environmental cost of airports is assessed.
The environmental cost consists of noise and emissions costs. The noise social cost
depends heavily on the density of the population surrounding the airport, whilst, engine
emissionsvaryaccordingm thenumberof flights and the aircraR types used at an airport.
The calculationof environmental costs can bc used in various types of analyses. The
methodology can s__erveas a common basisforthe determinationof unitnoise charges in
the noise chargecalculationformula proposed by the European Commission [EC, 2001 ].
Furthermore, the resultscan bc used to assessthe environmental impact of airport
expansion plansand trafficforecasts.The environmental costscan alsobe compared with
the socialand economic benefitsof an airportin order to assessthe relationshipbetween
the airportand the surroundingl_gion,as to when growth of the airportwould lead to
more environmental costthanitwould yieldeconomic benefit.
This paper presentsthe methodology forcalculatingthe noise and emission socialcosts.
The empirical analysis is carriedout for three British airports(London-Hcathrow,
London-Gatwick and Londoll-Stansted airports) and two Dutch airports (Amst_ 'dam
Airport Schiphol and Maastricht Airport). Various applications of the environmental cost
results axe addressed and investigated. Conclusions are discussed in the final section.
2. NOISE SOCIAL COST ESTIMATION: METHODOLOGY AND MODEL
The hedonic price method, which is applied here for calculating the aircraft noise social
cost,, is based on the household equilibrium marginal willingness to pay. According to Lu
and Morrell [2001] the hedonic price method is the most widely used method for the
evaluation of noise social costs. It is used to extract the implicit prices of certain
characteristics that determine property values. Examples are location, attributes of the
ncighbom'hood and community, as well as environmental quality [JohanssoR, 1987;
Nelson, 1980, 1981]. For this approach, however, it is necessary to assume that each
individual has the same utility function, in order to obtain the unique price estimation for
noise impacts [Pearce and Edwards, 1979].
By using the hedonic price method, the annual total noise social cost C,
the following formula:
is derived l_om
C. = _ I_n,P_(N_ - No)H , (I)
i
Where I_ is the noise depreciation index (NDI) expressed as a percentage; P_ is the
annual average house rent in the vicinity of the airport and Im_P_ is the annual noise
social cost per residence per A-Weighted decibel (riB(A)). The noise level above the
ambient level is _, where Not is the average noise for the i-th section of the
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noise contour; N O is the background noise or the ambient noise. This is finally
multiplied by H,., the number of residences within the i-th zone of the noise contour.
The NDI or the percentage reduction of house price per dB(A) above background noise,
is derived from various studies using regression functions. The annual house rent Pv is
converted from the average house value in the vicinity of the airport by the mortgage
interest rate and the average house lifetime.
It should be noted that the noise level versus annoyance curve is in a form of non-linear
relationship, the higher the level of noise, the increasingly greater annoyance [Finegold et
al., 1994; Schultz, 1978]. Therefore, I_IP v in the formula (1) is adjusted by the noise
versus annoyance function in order to reflect the real noise nuisance imposed on the
residents surrounding the airport.
After calculating the aggregate noise social cost, the question leads to how to allocate this
total external cost to individual flights. The principle of this process should be based on
the real impact of noise nuisance on the residents, generated dynamically from each
specific flight. The factors influencing the noise impact include aircraft types, engine
types, time of a day, flight paths as well as landing and take-off procedures. According
to the availability of the data during the research period, a simplified approach for
deriving the marginal noise nuisance, caused by each specific engine/aircraft combination
flight was developed [Lu, 2000; Swan, 1999].
3. ENGINE EMISSIONS SOCIAL COST ESTIMATION: METHODOLOGY
AND MODEL
Differences in aircraft operation and engine types, emission rates and airport congestion
are considered as important parameters influencing the damage level of pollutants. The
air pollution at ground level resulting from the landing and take-off of flights is
distinguished fi'om the cruise level impact, the latter of which is not taken into account in
the present paper.
The calculation of the engine emissions social cost is the opposite approach from
calculating the noise costs. First, the social costs for individual aircraft movements with
specific engine type and standard flight modes are derived, applying the unit social cost
for each pollutant. Second, the annual social cost could be determined by summing
across the annual aircraft movements and emissions inventory.
F#, the amount (kilograms) of the jth pollutant emitted during the ith flight mode, can be
derived from the following formula:
F o = t, fie_ (2)
Where t i is the time spent during the ith mode (hours); f_ the fuel flow during the ith
mode (kg/hr); e# the emission indices of the jth pollutant during the ith mode (kg
pollutant/kg fuel). Equation (3) shows the calculation of C,,, the social cost per flight
for the kth engine/airoratt combination (C/flight):
6 5
j=l i=1
Where a, is the weight for each mode (depending on the damage multiplier factor, for
example 10 for cruise; 1 for the other phases of flight and ground movement, which
U j is the unit social cost for the jth pollutant (_/kg). Five operational modes are
calculated separately, which are take-ofl_ climb-out, approach, taxi/idle and cruise.
Finally the annual emissions social cost, Ce, is computed as follows:
C, =ED, Ca, (4)
Where D, is the total number of the annual aircraft landings for the kth engine/aircraft
combination.
The unit social costs, U j, are determined by Lu [2000] and are based on an extensive
review of the literature [Levinson, et al., 1998; Eyre, et al., 1997; Perl, et al., 1997;
Mayeres, et al., 1996]. In the literature, environmental costs are estimated in monetary
terms; they are based on the relationship between pollution and damages on human
health, vegetation, buildings, climate change and global warming. This method traces the
links between air emissions and adverse consequences, considered as the best proved
method for evaluating the social cost of emissions [Small and Kazimi, 1995].
Pollutants taken into account are HC, CO, NOx, SO2, CO2 and N20. Since, except for
Nox [Archer, 1993], there is no definite conclusion [IPCC, 1999; Peper, 1994] on the
damage of pollutants emitted during cruises, only Nox is taken into account.
4. CASE STUDIES: DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS
Three British airports (London-Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted airports) and two Dutch
airports (Amsterdam Airport Schiphol and Maastricht Airport) are taken as the case
studies for the empirical analysis. Based on the aircraft noise classification used at
Heathrow Airport, aircraft types are categorised into 7 categories, with a representative
aircraft type being selected for each of the categories, as shown in Table 1. The various
aircraft types for different categories are listed in Appendix A.
TABLE 1 Aircraft categorisation
Category Aircraft Representive aircraft
1 Propeller aircraft Jetstream 31
2 Chapter 3 jets: short haul B737-300
3 Chapter 3 jets: wide-body twins A310-200
4 Chapter 3 jets: 2 ndgeneration wide body multi-engines B747-400
5 Large chapter 2/3 jets: 1st generation wide-body B747-100F/200/300
6 2 _ generation twin jets: narrow body twins* B737-200QN
7 1st generation jets: narrow body multi-engines B727
Note: including Chapter 2 and hushkitted versions.
Table 2 presents the aircraft movements by category in 200i at these five airports.
Heathrow has the highest number of aircraft movements, followed by Schiphol, Gatwick,
Stansted and Maastricht.
TABLE 2 Aircraft movements by category
Aircraft category Heathrow Gatwick Stansted Schiphol Maastricht
1 0.9% 5.4% 10.3% 3.8% 78.4%
2 69.8% 74.1% 69.7% 78.6% 16.2%
3 16.3% 13.8% 2.0% 6.2% 0.0%
4 10.1% 1.9% 1.8% 6.4% 0.0%
5 2.4% 2.9% 0.7% 4.6% 0.0%
6 0.1% 1.7% 15.2% 0.4% 2.7%
7 0.4% 0.2% 0.3% 0.0% 2.7%
Total movements 463,568 252,453 169,578 456,700 59,248
Source: UK CAA, 2002a,b,c; Schiphol Group, 2001 and Maastricht Airport, 2003.
Tables3 and 4 show the number of residences within each noise contour zone, which is
calculated using the flea mix and nmnber_,of mov_--ments in 2001. Different noise
measurements are used in these two countries: Leq is used in the UK; Kosten Unit (KU)
in the Netherlands. Heathrow has more than 100 thousand of residences living within 57
Leq noise contour;, Schiphol also have around 122 thousand of residences live within the
20 Ku noise contour in the vicinity of the airport. The 57 Leq and the 20 Ku noise
contours are the lowest noise levels measured. Although Maastricht has the least aircraft
movements (Table 2), there are more residences affected by noise nuisance than those at
Gatwick and Stansted (Tables 3 and 4).
TABLE 3 Residences within noise contour at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted
airports*
Leq level (dBA)** Heathrow Gatwick Stansted
>72 653 22 13
69-72 2,304 22 13
66--69 6,391 87 17
63--66 14,522 217 130
60--63 23,087 435 391
57---60 57,565 1,478 435
Total 104,522 2261 1,000
Source: UK CAA, 2002a,b,c.
Note:
* The average persons per household (2.3), from the UK statistics office, are applied for
converting affected population into residences.
** 51 Leq is used as the background noise level for the calculation in the next section. Note the
number of residenee._ within the......... nni_:e r_ntn, lr g7 tn _1 l_q _= 1,.lr_rm,w Th,_ _._,-h._;,-._,.._ v._
these would lead to higher noise social costs.
TABLE 4 Residences within noise contour at Sehiphol and M_utrieht _'ports
















Total 122,630 Total 13,287
Source: Schiphol Group, 2002; Maastricht Airport, 2002.
Note: * 10 KU is used as the background noise level for the calculation in the next section. Note
the number of residences within the noise contour 20 to 10 KU is unknown. The
inclusion of these would lead to higher noise social costs.
The average NDI value concluded from a number of research papers is within 0.60-
0.62% with Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) as a noise descriptor 1. KU used in the
Netherlands ranges from 20 to 65 KU, which is 1.5 times the range compared to NEF's
20-50. Therefore, the NDI value is adjust to 0.40% for the calculation of noise social
costs at Dutch airports. On the other hand, based on the narrower range of the Leq
system, the NDI value is set at 1.00% for the UK airports. The average housing prices at
the airport area are listed in Table 5. Table 6 presents the unit social costs for each of the
pollutants from engine emissions.
TABLE 5 Housing prices in 2001






Source: UK CAA, 2002a,b,c; Schiphol Group, 2002 and Maastricht Airport, 2002.
TABLE 6 Unit social costs of pollutants from engine emissions
6/kg HC CO NOx SO2 CO2 N20
Social cost 3.49 0.07 9.69 51.71 0.02 1.03
Source: Derived from the data listed in Lu [2001] and converted to the 2001 value.
I NEF (Noise Exposure Forecast), one of the cumulative noise event measures, reasonably varying between
20-50, was mostly used in the United States prior to the development of the L_ index.
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5. CASE STUDIES: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The social costs calculation is based on the annual airport movements, the current fleet
mix and the number of the residences annoyed, which means that the cost level varies as
the endogenous or exogenous parameters are changed. For example, if airlines reduce
the number of flights to an airport, or change the types of engines for some aircraft types,
the annual number of movements from the airport will be lower and different levels of
emissions are generated. The con-esponding environmental cost is different in order to
ac,cm'ately and dynamically reflect the real social cost of aircra_ emissions. Furthermore,
if _e cb, a,*-a,_-fsfi_ :m *,he x_ity of the aL-iaort changed, the cost l_'el would vary
correspondingly. For instance, the more noise insulation investment (recycling the
charges collected), the less annoyance the residents would incur. In this case, even with
.t._ Sz,-d_ fi_bei" __r _:_t.._ .1. .... --_._.1 _ _: ..... : ...... _--.1__ _: .......... , J __ a__ ,uol_ nua_itutzt; ox tu_L,Jmy.ut_, u,_ t,_L._J v_u be rcuuctm.i.LIU ixupott wottttt
5.1 Noise social costs
The calculation results of equation (1) for noise social costs at the current aggregate noise
level are presented in Table 7. The noise social costs for different aircraft categories at
Heathrow vary from E28 per landing for Jetstream to _3,007 for B747-100F/200/300/SP,
with the weighted average of _7774 per landing (or _7387 per movement). The average
noise social cost at Schiphol, although having similar aircraft movements to Heathrow,
appears to be _7377 per landing, less than half of that at Heathrow. On the contrary,
Maastricht, with least aircraft movements, but situated in a more densely populated area,
has higher noise social costs than Gatwick and Stansted.
52 Engine emissions social costs
l--he social cost of engine emissions has been calculated on the basis of assumptions on
engine types and emission rates. These assumptions are necessary because of limitations
in data availability and because further complexity in terms of using every actual
aireratiJengine combination would not result in significantly greater aeemaey. Therefore,
substituting the related parameters and data in equations (2), (3) and (4) [ICAO, 1995],
the average social cost per landing for each aircraft type is shown in Table 8. As the
impacts of engine emissions are less airport-specific, the social costs for individual
aircraft types are assumed the same for all five airports.
TABLE 7 Noise social cost by aircraft category (f/landing)
Category Aircraft type Heathrow Schiphol Gatwiek Stansted Maastricht
9
1 Jetstream 31 28 14 1 1 14
2 B737-300 510 265 19 11 259
3 A310-203 831 431 31 17 422
4 B747-400 1,975 1,024 74 41 1,003
5 B747-100F/200/300 3,007 1,560 113 63 1,528
6 B737-200QN 2,035 1,056 76 43 1,034
7 B727 2,194 1,138 82 46 1,115
Weighted average 774 377 25 16 111
TABLE 8 Engine emissions social cost by aircraft category
Category Representative aircraft type Engine emissions cost (6/landing)







The figures in Table 8 include not only the social cost at the ground level resulting from
the standard LTO procedures, including take-off, climb-out, approach and taxi-idle
modes, but also the costs of the emissions from 30 minutes' cruise either prior to landing
or following take-off. The engine emissions social costs rang from _743 to E4,839
depending on aircraft types.
It should be noted that NOx is the only cruise emission included, due to the higher
uncertainties of other emissions. If other pollutants were incorporated, the cost would be
higher. Furthermore, the same unit social costs for each pollutant is applied to both
ground level and cruise. However, it has been argued that the damage in the upper
atmosphere might be 10 times higher than at ground level [INFRAS and IWW, 1995].
Therefore, the values presented in Table 8 could be considered as a conservative (lower)
estimation.
5.3 Environmental costs
The environmental costs here are defined as the aggregation of both noise and engine
emissions social costs. From Tables 7 and 8, the environmental costs for five airports are
presented in Table 9 and Figure 1. The annual environmental social cost is calculated to
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be _7645million for Heathrow, followed by Schiphol (£471 million), Gatwick (_161
million), Stansted ((782 million) and Maastricht (_?11 million).
TABLE 9 Average and annual environmental cost comparison
Heathrow Schiphol Gatwick Stansted Maastricht
Average noise cost (_rlanding) 774 377 25 16 111
Annual noise cost (million E) 179.5 86.0 3.1 1.3 3.3
Average emission cost (E/landing) 1,004 842 626 477 126
Annual emission cost (million E) 465.6 384.7 158.1 80.8 7.5
Average environmental cost (E/landing) 1,779 1,219 651 492 237
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FIGURE 1 Average environmental cost comparison
Comparing the enviromental cost with the traffic volume of an airport, the results for
these five akports indicate that the relationship appears to be curvilinear between annual
enviromental costs and aircraft movements (Figure 2). This implies that the marginal
environmental cost is increasing as aircraft movements increase. In other words, adding
a certain amount of traffic to a hub airport would cause more environmental damages
than that at a regional airport. Note that this comparison is only valid when the
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FIGURE 1 Relationship between environmental costs and aircraft movements
6. APPLICATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS
Next to showing the degree of the environmental impacts at various airports, several
applications of this result and methodology are presented and discussed in this section.
First of all, the methodology of calculating aircraft noise social costs can be used to
determine the proposed European wide noise charge levels. Furthermore, the
environmental costs valued in monetary terms can form the input of cost-benefit analysis
of an airport or an airport system.
This section provides a brief overview of how the results can be applied. However,
complete analysis of these applications is beyond the scope of this paper and requires
further research. All these applications focus on the influence of an airport on the region
and are to be seen from the perspective of a region.
6.1 European wide harmonised aircraft noise charges
One of the main objectives of the EU common transport policy is to promote the
sustainable development of transport activities [EC, 1999]. The use of economic
instruments is considered to be an efficient and effective way of improving the
environmental performance of an airport [ICAO, 1996, 1998; OECD, 1998]. The EC's
proposal for potential harmonised noise charges provides the possibility to modulate
aircraft noise charges as a function of its environmental impact [ANCAT, 1998; EC,
2001]. This formula for calculating noise charges, C, is as follows [EC, 2001]:
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where:
C=C.'IO 1o +C e.lO 1o (5)
Ca and Cd are the unit noise charges at departures and arrivals for the considered
airport. They reflect the relative importance of noise emissions at arrivals and
departures for the impacted population.
La and La are the certificated noise levels at approach, and flyover and lateral
measurement points.
Ta and Td are noise thresholds at departures and arrival corresponding to
categories of relatively quiet aircraft for the considered airport.
While the certificated noise levels and the noise thresholds are known, no common and
transparent method has been developed for calculating the unit noise charges, namely t.._
and Cd, at each of the European airports. The methodology of calculating noise social
costs can be applied here by deriving the marginal noise impacts of different aircraft
categories into a separate departure and arrival index.
Our method has taken into account various theoretical and practical aspects. Firstly, the
caleulation is based on both the certificated noise levels and the number of residences
affected by noise, which is derived from the noise contours around airports. This implies
that the methodology has fulfilled the condition that "noise charges should be
proportional to the incremental nuisance for human beings caused by individual aircraft
separately at arrival and departure' [EC, 2001]. In addition, the same approach could be
practically applied to any airport, each with their own traffic and operational
characteristics. Finally, for a pre "hminary analysis, the data needed to calculate the unit
charges can be easily obtained for the majority of the European airports.
6.2 Cost-benefit analysis of an airport or an airport system
In the context of sustainability, an airport can only exist if it generates more social and
economic benefits to the region or nation than its damages on human beings and the
environment. Furthermore, an airport is operating most efficiently when its marginal
social benefit is equal to its marginal environmental cost. Any movement beyond this
threshold would result in more environmental damage than its generated benefit to the
society. The same applies to an airport system. An airport system consists of a few hub
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andregionalairportsin a geographicallyclose area2. If the hub airport has reachedits
threshold,anyadditionalflight wouldbebetterallocatedto otherairports.
Sofar, themethodhasnot beenfully developedfor quantifying the economicbenefits
generatedfrom anairportfor theregion. However, the existingresearchindicatesthat an
airport would generateapproximately some 1,000 to 1,100 jobs per one million
passengers[ACI, 1998]. This figure,however, doesnot include the socialbenefit of an
airport(suchasaccessibilityof theregionandpublic obligation).
The following analysisis done by comparing the economic benefits of an airport,
resulting_om employmentfor theregion, and their environmentalcostsfor both noise
and engineemissions. However, the precise added value of an airport should be
evaluatedby taken into accountall possible influences of an airport on the local
communitiesand the nation. Moreover, other factors, such as external safety and
congestion,wouldalsoresultin environmentalcosts.
Basedon theestimationof thetotal economicbenefitsof the casestudyairportsandtheir
environmentalcosts,Figure 2 shows the marginal economic benefit and marginal
environmentalcostin relationto aircraftmovementsby using a regressionanalysis.This
regressionanalysishasbeendoneon all 5 airports, two of which are main hubs and three
are other airports. It can be argued that a main hub airport and a different type of airport
have significantly different characteristics, which makes a general analysis impossible.
Due to the size of the sample, it is not feasible to split it and perform a separate analysis
on the hubs and on the other airports. Notably, the analysis only serves as an illustration
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2 A good example is the London airport system, with five airportsin the greater London area. Those are
London-Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton and City airports.
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FIGURE 2 Economic benefit versus environmental cost
This figure shows that the marginal environmental cost is increasing as aircraft
movements increase, while the mm'ginal economic benefit is decreasing. The tentative
results appear that the two curves intersect at approximately 450,000 movements per
year. This is the level at which an airport is operating most efficiently with its marginal
economic benefit equal to the marginal environmental cost. By expanding this analysis
to inc!_ more airports and favors, policy makers would be able to determine the
equilibrium of an airport system and to evaluate any investment or expansion of an
airport.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With the European Communities' policy of strengthening market incentives to improve
environmental performance [EC, 1999], and the EC's proposal for a potential harmonised
noise charges [ANCAT, 1998, EC, 2001], the assessment of the real social costs of those
externalities is vital for those policies. The methodologies developed in this research
paper for evaluating the social costs of both aircraft noise and engine emissions have
been applied for different sized airports, each with their own traffic and operational
characteristics.
Of all five airports, Heathrow Airport has the highest noise and engine emissions social
cost which is the result of its large number of aircraft movements and high population
affected by noise. With also high volume of aircraft movements and population,
Schiphol, however, has lower noise and engine emissions social costs than Heathrow.
Maastricht has higher noise costs than Ccatwick and Stansted, but the least engine
emissions costs. The environmental cost, aggregation of noise and engine emissions
costs, is calculated to be 61,779 per landing for Heathrow, followed by Schiphol
(61,219), Gatwick (6651), Stansted (6492) and Maastricht (C237).
The calculation of environmental costs in monetary terms can be applied in a variety of
analyses. The method can be used in determining the proposed European unit noise
charges. The environmental costs can serve as an input for cost-benefit analysis of an
airport and an airport system.
15
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Abstract
This paper presents cost effective measures to reduce C02 emissions in the air freight sector. One
door-to-door transport chain is studied in detail fIom a Scandinavian city to a city in southern
Europe. The transport chain was selected by a group of representatives from the air freight sector
in order to encompass general characteristics within the sector.
Three different ways of shipping air cargo are studied, i.e., by air freighter, as belly freight (in
passenger aircrafts) and trucking. C02 emissions are calculated for each part of the transport
chain and its relative importance towards the toad amount C02 emitted during the whole
transport chain is shown. It is confirmed that the most CO: emitting part of the transport chain is
the actual flight and that it is in the take-off and climbing phases that most fuel are burned. It is
also known that the technical development of aircraft implies a reduction in fuel consumption for
each new generation of aircraft. Thus, the aircraft manufacturers have an important role in this
devdopment
Having confirmed these observations, this paper focuses on other factors that significantly affects
the fuel consmnption. Analysed factors are, e.g., optimisation of speed and altitude, traffic
JL.L[O,,I.JL_IL_f_,,,IL/J_,,,L.III_ Ik,aIJJUL_lh._l..l,,JJJ. U.LI _tU.e_._ _LtVUJ,.I.6,L. I_L.tt., q.a,,J._L.I,._,,,LW..,.,I_, e,.._.t.lu_v,4L.m.Lt, j_ alaw, twoL _,*,,_t_,lJt.Qa_t,.¢_, t.a,a.t._, _t.sA
goods and improving the load factor. The different factors relative contribution to the total
emission levels for the transport chain has been estimated.
Keywords: CO2, Air freight, Transport chain, Fuel consumption, Environment, Greenhouse
effect
Introduction
Global warming is perhaps the most challenging task for our society to solve. In the Kyoto
Protocol, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has
most of the industrial countries agreed to reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases by 5 %
from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. If this target shall be realised, it is likely that governments will
put economic or legal pressure on the polluters. The aviation's share of the global CO: emissions
are still only 2-3 percent but it contributes to about 12 % of the worlds annual transport related
CO2 emissions. Compared to the other means of transport is the air freight sector more exposed to
fuel price fluctuations. If there will be economic means of control in order to reduce the CO2
emissions from the transportation sector it will influence the competitiveness of the air freight
sector in a negative way.
Fuel efficiency has traditionally been one of the most important issues for the aviation industry
and impressive achievements has been made. Large resources are invested by aircraft
manufacturers and research organisations to increase the fuel efficiency even more in the future.
Due to the market forces is this development in full progress. There are, however, other parts in
the transportation chain that can be improved. Many of these measures can be realised with better
planning and improved information tools. Another barrier is the resistance against behavioural
changes. The cost of these measures are often impossible to measure as the price for the
transportation companies will be in terms of, e.g., lowered customer service levels. However,
compared to the resources invested in technological improvements of the aircrafts fuel efficiency
these behavioural and logistical measures are estimated to be low
This paper aims at identifying cost effective measures to reduce CO2 emissions in the air freight
sector. One door-to-door transport chain is studied in detail from a Scandinavian city to a city in
southern Europe. With this method can the environmental "hot-spots" in the transport chain be
identified.
In spite of the fact that other factors, e.g., NOx, vapour and particulates are more aggressive
greenhouse gases than CO2 is CO2 used as measurement for the global warming potential in this
study. This is done as the primary scope of this paper is not to calculate the exact GWP for the
transport chain, but to identify possible reduction possibilities. In most cases are the emissions of
CO2 in the transportation chain proportional to the emissions of NOx and the other greenhouse
gases. In the cases where there might be a counter effect, e.g., decreased fuel consumption
implies higher levels of NOx it will be discussed.
Emission calculations are made in the PIANO-Harp model in cooperation with the Department of
Aviation Environmental Research, FOI - The Swedish Defence Research Agency. Information
about the logistic and terminal related issues was obtained by interviews of airport and air
transport company personnel.
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Description of the transport chain
One door-to_oor _am'po_ chain is _,_;_ m detail from *.he o'.'ty of Uddevalla in Sweden to
Barcelona in Spain. The transport chain was selected by a group of representatives from the air
freight sector in order to encompass general characteristics within the sector. The same group
defined the cargo characteristics for this study to 1000 kg and 9.6 m3. The transport chain
represent transportation by truck, by freighter and by belly-hold in passenger aircrafts.
The first segment of the transport chain is a truck transport in Sweden from Uddevalla to
G6teborg_ _The truck has a maximum load weight of 26 ton and consumes 35 litres of diesel oil /
100 km (2.86 km / 1). The load factor is assumed to be 70 %
The second segment is an air freight transport from Gfteborg to Frankfurt, Germany in a MD-11,
freighter version.
The third segment of the transport chain is from Frankfurt to Barcelona, Spain. There are no
flights with freighters on this route; there are only passengers' flights that take the cargo by belly-
hold. One of the most common aircraft operating this route is the Airbus 310.
Table 1: Summary of CO2 emissions from the studies transport chain
Route Transport
mode
Uddevalla- Truck 26 ton
Gfteborg





























81 60 4 0.05 64
981 83 431 0.44 32 100
981 83 531 0.54 29 600
1 193 99 706 0.59 19 300
1 193 99 908 0.76 18 600
2 492 2 340 102 0.04 2 100
127 0.052 340 2 000
The calculations show that the fuel consumption increases if more cargo is loaded on the aircraft.
However the environmental efficiency increases in terms of lowered CO2 emissions per
transported ton cargo if the load rate increases and more cargo is transported in the same aircraft.
It is also clear that a freighter is more efficient than belly cargo. This is however dependent on
which allocation method that is used for the calculations. It can be argued that cargo transported
in a passenger aircraft should only be allocated the emissions from burning the extra amount of
fuel consumed due to the extra weight of the cargo. This allocation model is called the marginal
method. To highlight the methodological dilemma on how to allocate the total emissions from an
aircraft transporting both passengers and cargo are the calculations above complemented with
calculations on what the outcome would be when three different allocation methods are used; by
weight, by volume and by the marginal method.
CO2 ru rl'rED BY SELECTED CARGO FROU UDDEVALLA TO BN;LCELONADEPI_IDING ON
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Figure 1: CO 2 from the studied transport chain, with the three allocation methods and 2 different load factors.
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The difference in results are significant and it stresses the importance of transparency when
showing results from an emission analysis of a transport chain. It must be clearly defined what
allocation method that is used and for what purpose the study is performed.
If the emissions of CO2 from air freight is compared to trucking it is clear that the truck shows the
lowest figures. However, if a comparison is made in only the section Frankfm't - Barcelona for
the selected cargo with the marginal allocation method, some interesting figures come out to
light. It can be noted that in this segment with an 80% load factor with the marginal method there
are 75 kg of CO2 produced per extra transported ton of cargo on an A310 passengers' aircraft on
this route. On the other hand for the same segment using a truck with 80% load factor there are
55 kg of CO2 emitted. There is a difference of only 20 kg of CO2. With 60 % load factor on the
mack is the corresponding figure 69 kg. What method to use in different analyses is a classical
issue in LCA (Life Cycle Assessment) methodology and is not discussed in this paper.
Some of the points that can be highlighted from the calculations are:
• In the phases taxi out, take off, climb out and climb 2 are about 50% of the total CO2
produced for the shorter route (981 kin) and about 35 % for the longer (1193 kin).
* The phase ofenfise produces abut 40% respective 55 % of the CO2.
• The rest of the trip which is deseerrt 2, approach, landing and taxi in, produces about 10%
of the C02.
The 8 minutes of taxi for the MD-11 produces about 800 kg of C02. Depending on air
traffic, congestions on the airports, bad weather, and any kind of delays, the taxi times
generally raise. According to some average taxi times (LFV, 2001) there is an average of
26 minutes for the phases of taxi out and taxi in, which implies about 2 500 kg of CO2.
Measures t- reduce CO,. emissions
There are two main areas of processes in this logistic chain, there are activities outside and within
the airports. The first one, includes the delivery of goods from the sender to the trucking
company if there is one, the transportation of the goods, and aRer this the delivery to the airport
terminal. The same would be on the other end of the transport chain, the pick up of goods from
the airport terminal, is done directly by the receiver or by a trucking company, which later will
deliver these goods to the receiver.
The second area is the one in which all the activities are held inside the airport. Flights between
origin and destiny airports, including loading and unloading of goods, handling and manoeuvring
of the cargo, all the technical inspections and activities related to the maintenance of the aircrafts,
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This paper is structured on what can be done in the different segments.
Area 1
Beside the obvious measures of ensuring a high load factor on the distribution vehicles can the
transport company and their customers affect the emissions of CO2 by supplying the air freight
transporters with accurate information and time to plan the loading of the aircraft. This will
reduce the risk of unbalanced and delayed freighters.
Latest acceptance time
The Latest Acceptance Time is the deadline that air transporters have to receive cargo from the
customer. In modem logistics, where the forwarders offer their customers a high service level,
there has been a trend towards short lead times and late acceptance time. It has become an
important com2etition factor. Together with an increased security level on air traffic after
September 11_ this has put more stress on the terminal personnel. Nowadays some air
transportation companies have 1 hour of Latest Acceptance Time for cargo but the ideal time
needed in order to do an efficient balance and distribution is of 2 to 4 hours before departure. The
shorter the Latest Acceptance Time, the less time to organize and distribute the cargo in an
optimal way in the aircraft. The only way to correct this unbalance in the air is to compensate it
by increased power on the engines. For the MD-11 studied in this paper there can be savings of
up to 4 - 5 % of the total fuel consumption. These figures varies from aircraft to aircraft but the
principle is the same.
Other reasons for unbalances are, e.g., the shape of the cargo or the container, special quality
demands on the cargo, inaccurate information from the customer about the volume or weight of
the cargo ....
Delays
The delays of air transportation causes extra emissions due to fuel burned unnecessarily. The
delays can occur due to e.g., weather conditions, mechanical problems, late delivery of cargo. To
give an idea of the impact of these delays in the amount of emissions produced, it is estimated
that German airports in 1999 burned 50,770 tons of fuel due to delays which corresponds to about
two percent of the fuel bum of the entire Lufthansa Group fleet..
To get passengers and cargo to their destinations as punctually as possible and to avoid further
delays,pilotsoftenflyfasterthan the optimised cruisespeed (seesectionAircraftCruisespeed),




Handling at the airport
Airport operations in Sweden adds an extra 1.2 kg CO2 per passenger (LFV, 2001 ). This
represents about 1-3 % of the total emitted CO2 depending on the flight routs. No data was
available for the air freight sector separately but considering the facilities needed to supply
service for passengers compared to handling the cargo it can be assumed that the additional CO2
emissions for cargo handling at the airport is less than 1%.
Auxiliary power units (APUs) are engine-driven generators contained in the aircraft (usually in
the tail) that provide the aircraft with necessary energy during the time the aircraft is at the gate.
Part of the generated energy is used for air conditioning. As an alternative at airports, the required
energy can be supplied by ground-based equipment that gains significant net saving of carbon
British Airways estimates that the amount of fuel used by an APU is less than 1% of the total
fuel used by an aircraft.
Taxi times
The minimization of taxi times reduces the CO2 emissions. The taxi phases in most of the cases
can be optimised by reducing its times and distances. It's been noticed that the normal taxi time
can vary between 8 and 26 minutes, which means that there is a big area of opportunities to
reduce the CO2 emissions. In the case of the freighter MD-11, for a load factor of 80%, the
difference between making a taxi time of 8 and 26 minutes means 1,850 kg or about 5 % of CO2
produced. This amount could be eliminated by having the appropriate systems for planning a
shorter taxiing, by encouraging the control tower and the logistics personnel to make the shortest
taxi routes for every, operation. This taxi plan can be done in a more efficient way by designing
appropriately from the beginning the airport, runways and the location of the gates and cargo
terminals.
Tankering
Tankering is the extra quantity of fuel loaded into the airplane before the departure obeying to
unexpected flight circumstances, l'-ae obvious reason for this is safety, l-ae pilot decides this
amount basing this decision on his experience, load of the aircraft, weather conditions,
destination, etc. Other factors that can affect fuel costs and decisions on tankering include the
following:
• Genuine high fuel costs because of expensive distribution infrastructure and local taxes
• Fuel availability at some remote airports
• Government-imposed fuel pricing
• Monopoly distribution of fuel, which can involve cross-subsidies from large to small airports
and expensive manpower practices
• Concern over fuel quality (e.g., water content) at particular locations
• When limited aircraft turnaround time allows insufficient time for refuelling, an aircraft may
have to tanker to minimiTe the risk of losing slots. Problems in this area are enhanced at
congested airports, where there may be limitations in runway and/or terminal capacity.
This extrafuel implies extraweight for the aircraft, which requires more fuel. Estimates from
British Airways suggest that additional fuel bum as a result of tankering is on the order of 0.5
percent of total aircraft fuel consumption.
Aircraft
One obvious factor that dramatically influence the CO 2 emission is the technical standard of the
aircraft. The oldest models in use consumes about twice as much fuel per passenger km as the
most modem once. This development is ongoing and the aviation industry is continuously
working on increasing the fuel efficiency. The forecasts is that fuel efficiency will improve about
40-50% more by the year 2050 (IPCC, 1999).
Flight altitude
Even though the fuel consumption increases a couple of percent (4 % for a 1500 km flight in a
Boeing 737-800) when changing altitude from 37000 ft to 31000 i_, the total global warming
potential (GWP) is likely to decrease due to less influence of NOx in ozone perturbations. Klug et
al. (1996) claims an 80 % increase in GWP for flying on this altitude due to larger influence by
NOx and vapour.
Aircraft Cruise Speed
A number of fuel-conscious airlines developed the concept of a long-range cruise (LRC) speed
schedule. LRC was introduced as a compromise between maximum speed and the speed that
provides the highest mileage in terms of kin per kg of fuel burned in cruise (maximum range
cruise, or MRC speed), taking some account of costs associated with flight time. LRC is defined
as the fastest speed at which cruise fuel mileage is 99 percent of fuel mileage at MRC. At the
time LRC was introduced, it was not possible to fly at lower speeds, closer to MRC, because of
the stability needs of the auto throttle and/or the autopilot. At speeds close to MRC, the auto
throttle would continuously "hunt" which could give rise to an increase in fuel burn.
Figure 7.6 shows the relationship between the difference in block time and the difference in fuel
consumption for various cruise speed schedules such as constant Mach number, LRC, MRC, or
ECON for the Boeing 747-400. Block time is the time between engine start at the airport of
origin and engine stop at the airport of destination and thus block fuel is the fuel burned in this
time. The data presented suggest that reduction of fuel use by further speed optimisation is likely
to be small.
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Figure 2: The effect of cruise speed dependent on block fuel and block time. ( ICAO, 1999).
Table 2: Projected fuel efficimcy improvement in 2010
from accelerat_l implem_mfion of CNS/ATM systems.
(ICAO Journal, 2001).
Improved Air Traffic Management
There are congestion problems in some air routes. This occurs mainly because the distribution of
the routes crossing the air spaces is not updated and some of them are "great-circle mutes". It
often happens that the aircrafts do not fly in the shortest way to the destination, because they are
obliged to follow the assigned mute. Previous studies have calculated that inefficiencies in
European Air Traffic Control, resulting in circuitous routings and sub-optimal flight levels, cause
an increase in fuel bm-n and hence impact on the environment of between 6-12 percent (AEA,
2001). The solution for an improved global air navigation infrastructure is often known as the
concept of integrating communications, navigation, and surveillance/air traffic management
(CNS/ATM) systems. ATM systems will therefore be developed and organized to overcome
shortcomings previously discussed and to
accommodate future growth. Region Fuel NO r CO _ llC ]
Asia/PaciF, c 6 t, i i- • 9 1
Europe lo t0.... 14 ....1
Ammca/Cm'bbean S 8 ' " S-....)
North America 10 9 16 ]
_Global 9 8 15-16 !
The inefficiencies that exist in aircraft operations around the airport terminal mean that aircraft
spend significantly longer on the ground with their engines running than is necessary.. It is
estimated that at Heathrow alone there could be a saving in fuel burn of 90,000 tonnes per annum
through the introduction of advanced surface movement guidance and control system (A-
SMGCS) and related ground management systems, such as improved surface management. This
saving is roughly equivalent to one day of fuel bum across the whole ECAC area (Arthur D
Little, 2000).
The projected fuel efficiency improvement in 2010 from accelerated implementation of
CNS/ATM worldwide is predicted to be about 9 percent.
Discussion
This paper aims at identifying cost effective measures to reduce the emissions of CO2 in the air
freight sector. It shows the results of an analysis of CO2 emissions for a transport chain based on
air freight. The calculations confirms that the most CO2 emitting part of the transport chain is the
actual flight and that it is in the take-off and climbing phases that most fuel are burned. It is also
known that the technical development of aircraft implies a reduction in fuel consumption for each
new generation of aircraft. The forecasts is that fuel efficiency will improve about 40-50% more
by the year 2050. Thus, the aircraft manufacturers have an important role in this development.
There are also other strategies for mitigating the environmental impact of emissions from aviation
that could achieve environmental benefits through reduced fuel burn. These strategies include:
optimising aircraft speed, reducing additional weight, increasing the load factor, reducing
nonessential fuel on board, limiting the use of auxiliary power units, and reducing taxiing.
Airlines are already under strong pressure to optimise these parameters, largely because of
economic considerations and requirement within the industry to minimise operational costs. The
potential reduction in fuel bum by further optimisation of these operational measures is in the
range of 2-6 percent. Improvements in air traffic management could help to improve overall fuel
efficiency by 6-12 percent. Other important factors identified are tankering and latest acceptance
time which reduction potential are estimated to be about 5 % of the fuel consumption for a trip.
Most of the measures suggested are estimated to be comparably cost effective compared to the
investments that are made to reduce the fuel efficiency of the aircraft and should be regarded as a
complement. Reliable data on costs for introducing these measures are lacking due to e.g.,
confidentiality, and vague connections between the direct costs and reduced market
attractiveness due to lowered customer service level., these measures can be realised with better
planning and improved information tools. Another barrier is the resistance against behavioural
changes. These issues are suggested to be addressed in future research.
The analysis of the transport chain also shows the importance of choosing allocation method
when emissions from a passenger aircraft with belly-freight shall be split between the passengers
and the cargo. The result of a the study differs with a factor 3 between the different allocation
methods.
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Abstract
An assessment and operationalization of the concept of sustainable air transport system is
recognised as an important but complex research, operational and policy task. In the scope
of the academic efforts to properly address the problem, this paper aims to assess the
sustainability of air transport system. It particular, the paper describes the methodology for
assessment of sustainability and its potential application. The methodology consists of the
indicator systems, which relate to the air transport system operational, economic, social and
environmental dimension of performance. The particular indicator systems are relevant for
the particular actors such users (air travellers), air transport operators, aerospace
manufacturers, local communities, governmental authorities at different levels (local,
national, international), international air transport associations, pressure groups and public.
In the scope of application of the methodology, the specific cases are sele_-ted to estimate
the particular indicators, and thus to assess the system sustainability under given
conditions.
Keywords: Air transport system, sustainability, dimensions of performance, indicator
systems, assessment
1INTRODUCTION
What is a sustainablesystem?According to the numerousdefinitions,this shouldbe the
systemwhoseabsoluteconsumptionof the non-renewablenergyresources(fossil fuels)
and emissionof greenhousegasesdo not increaseover time. Accordingto thesecriteria,
transport systemcan be consideredas an unsustainablesystem(Daly, 1991; Whitelegg,
1993).However,sincetransportsystemalsoactsasa strongdriving forceof the economic
developmentand social welfare, the above strict and direct approachto sustainability,
particularly for the long-termdevelopment,needsto be redefined,at leastby taking into
account also the systempositive effects in addition to the negativeimpacts. In such a
context, sustainabilityof transport systemcould be consideredas growth of the positive
differencebetweenthe positive effectsandnegativeimpacts.Suchdevelopmentseemsto
be able to be achievedby establishinga balance(i.e., 'trade-off') between the system
effects and impacts. However, the numerousconceptualand practical problems might
emergeasbarriers. One of the most important conceptual barriers seems to be a rather
difficult consistent estimation of the system full effects mainly due to the diversity of
approaches and methodologies. The main practical problem seems to lay in difficulty to
globalise policies intended to promote the concept of sustainable development primarily
due to the heterogeneity of performance of the system components and necessity for
permanent compromising the interests of particular actors involved (ATAG, 2000: 2000a;
DETR, 2000, 2001; EC, 1997; ECMT, 1998; Hewett and Foley, 2000; Levison et al., 1996
WCED, 1987).
This paper makes an academic effort in applying the methodology to assessment of the
sustainability of air transport system (Janic, 2003). This methodology has been based on
definition of the indicator systems of sustainability reflected the system operational,
economic, social and the environmental dimension of performance 1 (FAA, 1996). The
indicator systems for each dimension of performance contained the individual indicators
and their measures have been defined with respect to sometimes the very confronted
objectives of the various actors involved such as users (air travellers), air transport
operators, aerospace manufacturers, local communities, governmental authorities at
different levels (local, national, international), international air transport associations,
pressure groups and public. By using the relevant inputs based on the structure of the
indicator systems and particular measures, an assessment of the current level of
sustainability of the air transport system with respect to particular indicators and measures
is carried out (EC, 1999).
In addition to this introductory section, this paper consists of four sections. Section 2
describes the concept of sustainable air transport system. Section 3 deals with the
sustainability indicators assumed to be relevant for particular actors. Section 4 contains
estimation of the particular indicators for different cases thus illustrating an application of
the methodology. The last section contains some conclusions.
i This is an analogous definition to the definition of sustainable society, which is supposed to possess three essential
dimensions of performance: economic, social, and environmental (Agenda 21 of the UNCED (United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development) Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil/1992).
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2 THE CONCEPTOF SUSTAINABLE AIR TRANSPORT SYSTEM
2.1 Basic principles of sustainability
In the fight of the refined definition of sustainability, air transport system is considered to
be sustainable if the net benefits of its operations increase with increasing of the system
output either in the absolute (total) or relative terms (per unit of output). The net benefits
are represented as the sum of differences between the positive effects ("benefits") and the
negative impacts ("costs") at different geographical scales such as global (intercontinental),
regional (national/continental), and local (community) scale (INFRAS, 2000).
2.1.1 Sustainability at global scale
At global scale, growth of economy and air transport demand have been strongly driven by
each other with the evident negative consequences in terms of the absolute increase in
energy (fossil fuels) consumption and global emission of greenh,,_o g_. lm wach a
context, several options (scenarios) is thought to be useful to drive the system towards
sustainable development, i.e., to setting up of trade-offbetween the positive effects and the
negative impacts, as follows (Janic, 2003):
• Constraining the system growth at global scale, which would include setting up an
absolute limit to growth of the air transport demand and consequently to growth of the
associated negative impacts;
• Setting up a cap on the impacts, which would limit the system energy conmmlption,
associated air pollution, and thus indirectly its growth (Hewett and Foley, 2000);
• Decoupling growth of the system demand and the economic growth, which would
include weakening of the strong links between the air transport demand and GDP
(Gross Domestic Product). This has seemed to be able to be carried out by stimulating
people to change their habits in the long-term (EC, 1999); and
Trading-off between global effects and impacts, which as a compromise scenario would
provide mechanisms for the faster growth of the system long-term global positive
effects than the negative impacts.
2.1.2 Sustainability at regional scale
At a regional (national, continental) scale, particularly in the U.S. and Western Europe, the
growth of air transport demand been additionally driven by local forces such as
liberalisation of air transport market(s), increasing of the system productivity and
diminishing of airfares. Such growth has been confronted with the limited capacity of
airports and ATM (Air Tmftic Management)/ATC (Air Traffic Control), which has
increased congestion and ultimately compromised the expected efficiency and effectiveness
of service. Under such circumstances, a balance between the system growth and the
associated negative impacts seems to be able to be achieved by three scenarios as follows
(Janic, 2003):
• Affecting regional demand-driving forces, which would, as a controversial scenario,
include affecting the factors influencing market liberalisation and competition,
productivity, and airfares in a way to discourage further growth of air transport demand
(Boeing, 2001 ).
• Constraining the infrastructure expansion, which as "do nothing" scenario in terms of
constraining the further expansion of the air transport infrastructure under conditions of
growing demand could lead to a widespread and severe deterioration of the efficiency
and effectiveness of service. In turn, such development might deter both existing and
prospective users (EUROCONTROL, 2001).
• More efficient utilisation of the available infrastructure, which could lead to
improvements of utilisation of existing airport and ATM/ATC infrastructure by using
innovative technologies and operational procedures, modification(s) of the airline
operational practice, and co-operation with other transport modes (particularly railways)
(Arthur, 2000).
2.1.3 Sustainability at local scale
At local scale, the positive effects and the negative impacts of growth of individual airports
need to be balanced according to the following scenarios (Janic, 2003):
• Constraining the airport growth, which would include constraining the available land
for an airport physical expansion, which in turn would compromise its further growth 2.
• Management of the airport growth, which, at an airport, would include provision of the
higher rates of increase of the total local benefits than the costs of the associated
impacts (BA, 2001).
2.2 Dimensions of the system performance
Definition of the indicator systems of sustainability of the air transport system can be
carried out with respect to the operational, economic, social, and environmental dimension
of performance 3. The particular dimensions of performance have been dependent on each
other, but the operational dimension has mostly influenced the other three. Figure 1
illustrates a generic scheme of these relationships (Janic, 2003).
The operational dimension is the basic one, which relates to the characteristics of the
system demand, capacity, effectiveness, safety and security of service (Janic, 2003).
The economic dimension relates to the system operating revenues, costs and productivity
(Hooper and Hensher, 1997).
The social dimension relates to the social effects such as the system direct and indirect
contribution to employment and GDP at local and regional scale (Button and Stough, 1998;
DETR, 1999; 2000). In addition, contribution to globalisation and internalisation of
business and leisure activities (international trade, investments, tourism) could be taken into
account.
The environmental dimension relates to the system physical impacts on the people's health
and environment in terms of the local (airport) and global (airspace) air pollution, airport
noise, aircraft accidents, congestion, generation of waste and land use (Janic, 1999).
2 For the first time, at Amsterdam Schiphol airport the government has limited by law the maximum annual number of
aircraft movements aiming at controlling the noise. Consequently, in 1998 the maximum number of aircraft movements
has been restricted to 380 000 with possible annual increase of 20000 until 2003 (Boeing, 2001: Offennan and Bakker,
1998).
3 Some studies consider only three dimensions of air transport system performance: economic social and environmental
(INFRAS, 2000).
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Figure I Dimensions of performance of air transport system and their linkage
2.3 The actors, their objectivesand preferences
According to the structure of air transport system, the following main actors may be
involved in dealing with the sustainability as follows (ATAG, 2000; INFRAS, 2000):
• Users of services such as air travellers and shippers of fi-eight and mail constituting the
air transport demand;
• Air transport operators providing the system services by using the related
infi'astructure, facilities and equipment such as airports, Air Traffic Management
(ATM)/Air Traffic Control (ATC), and airlines;
• Aerospace manufacturers producing the aircratt, ATM/ATC, and airport facilities and
equipment;
• Local community members (population) livingin the vicinity of airports;
• The governmental bodies playing the role in the institutional regulation of the system
operations at local (community) and central (national) level;
• Aviation organisations co-ordinating the system development at global (international)
scale;
• Lobbies and pressure groups articulating the interests of people who may be for or
against an expansion of the system infrastrucan'e; and
• Public temporarily interesting in the specific aspects of the system operations.
Figure 2 shows a simplified structure of the air transport system used for development of
the indicator systems as the methodology for assessment of its sustainability. Sustainability
of the air transport system may have different meaning and contents for the particular
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Figure 2 Simplified structure of air transport system used for assessment of sustainability
The users - air travellers and shippers of freight and mail usually prefer frequent, easily
accessible, low cost, punctual, reliable, safe and secure services.
The air transport operators prefer services according to their business objectives in terms
of the profitability, safety and security on the one hand, and the users' preferences on the
other.
The aerospace manufacturers prefer smooth selling of their reliable, safe, and profitable
products to the system operators.
Local community members usually tend to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of
air transport system at their local scale. The employment opportunity and use of efficient
air connections to other distant communities (regions) can be considered as the obvious
benefits. The costs are regarded as exposure to the airport noise, air pollution, and risk of
injury, loss of life and damage of property due to the aircraft accidents.
Local and central government(s) are mostly interested in the system overall benefits and
externalities. Direct benefits may include the system contribution to the local and national
employment and GDP. Indirect benefits may embrace contributions to internalisation and
globalisation of manufacturing, trade, investments and tourism. Externalities may be of
interest while creating local and global policies to protect the people's health and
environment.
6
International m,iation organisations such as ICAO, IATA, ECAC, AEA and ACI provide
the framework and guidelines for co-ordinated (sustainable?) development of the system at
both regional (national) and global (international) scale.
Different lobbies and pressure groups organise campaigns against global harmful effects of
the polluting systems on the people health and environment. In such scope, they also intend
to prevent further contribution of the air transport to global warming by strong opposition,
sometimes together with local community people to the physical expansion of the system
infrastructure- airports.
Public uses media such as radio, TV, Intemet and newspapers to get information about the
system. This interest is strengthening in the cases of launching innovations (aircraft,
airports), severe disruptions of services and air ac_dents, and changes of airfares. In
general, the information about the system should be available to public at any time.
3.1 General
The indicator systems of sustainability of air transport system have been defined to measure
the effects ("benefits") and impacts ("costs") in either absolute or relative monetary or non-
monetary, terms, as functions of the relevant system output (Janic, 2003). In such a context,
the system has been assumed to be sustainable if the measure of an indicator reflected the
relative effects has increased and the other one reflected the relative impacts decreased (or
been constant) with increasing of the relevant system output, and vice versa. Figure 3













Figure 3 Relationships between the sustainability indicators and the system output
4 Setting up a limit on the particular indicator may have two-fold effect. For example, if the cost indicator is limited to
Ic/_, the output will be able to rise maximally m O(Ia=o). Such constrained output will affect a benefit indicator, which
will be allowed to rise maximally to lb[O(lc,_)]. Consequently, setting up the eritea-ia on indicators should always include
balancing (i.e., trading-off) betwe_ the effects and impacts.
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3.2Structureof theindicatorsystems
Different actorsmight use different indicator systems for assessmentof the system
sustainability with respect to the particular dimensions of the system performance and their
specific preferences. The indicator systems consisted of the individual indicators and their
measures have been valid for given period of time (day, month, year) (Janic (2003).
3.2. I Indicators for users - air travellers
The indicator system for users-air travellers have consisted of eight individual indicators
related to the airports and airlines operated at different scales as follows:
i) Operational indicators
The indicators of the operational dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Punctuality of service has been measured by the probability that a flight has been on
time, and the average delay per fligh ts (Headley and Bowen, 1992; USDT, 2001). Users
have usually preferred the former measure to be as high as possible and the latter one as
low as possible with increasing of the number of flights.
• Reliability of service has been measured as the ratio between the realised and the total
number of flights (USDT, 2001). The measure has been preferred to be as high as
possible and to increase with increasing of the number of flights.
• Ratio of lost damaged baggage has been expressed as the proportion of the lost (or
damaged) baggage compared to the total number of passengers served. This measure
has been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the
number of passengers.
• Safety has been measured as the ratio of the number of deaths (or injuries) per unit of
output - RPK (RPM) (RPK- Revenue Passenger Kilometer; RPM - Revenue
Passenger Mile). The users have always preferred this measure to be as low as possible
and to decrease with increasing of RPK (RPM).
• Security has been measured as the ratio between the number of detected illegal
dangerous devices and the total number of passengers screened. It has been preferred to
be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the number of passengers.
i0 Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Economic convenience of service has measured by the average airfare per passenger
preferred by users to be as low as possible 6.
iii) Social indicators
The indicators of the social dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Spatial convenience of service has been measured by the number and diversity of
destinations and flights at an airport with respect to type of destination, connectivity
(non-stop, one-stop or multi-stop) and trip purpose (business, leisure). In general, users
prefer this measure to be as high as possible.
5 Usually, delays are categorized as the arrival and departure delays, which may be shorter or longer than 15 minutes
(EUROCONTROL, 2001 a; USDT, 2001).
6 Some airfares charged by low-cost air calTiers in Europe and the US may represent the exceptions from this general rule.
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iv,) Environmental indicators
The indicators of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Comfort and healthiness at airports have been measured by the number of passengers
per unit of the available space and the average queuing time (Hooper and Hensher,
1997; Janic, 2001). Configuration and size of seats in the economy class 7 and the
quantity of fresh air delivered to the passenger cabin per unit of time have been used to
measure the passenger comfort while onboard. The airport measures have been
preferred to be as low as possible and to decline with increasing of the number of
passengers served. The measures of comfort and healthiness while onboard have been
preferred to beas high as possible.
3.2.2 The indicator system for airports
The indicator system for airports has consisted of eleven indicators related to an or a set of
airports in a given region 0anic, 2003).
i) Operational indicators
The indicators of the operational dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Demand has expressed the number of passengers and the number of Air Transport
Movements (ATM) s, which has been preferred to be as great as possible within the
available capacity.
• Capacity has been measured as the maximum number of passengers and maximum
number of ATM. Both meamnes have been preferred to be as high as possible and to
increase in line with growing demand (Janic, 2001).
• Quality of service has been measured by the average delay per ATM or per passenger
occurred whenever the demand has exceeded the capacity. The measure has been
preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of demand (Janic,
2001).
• Flexibility of using the available capaci_ has measured by the ratio between the
number of substituted flights by other transport modes and the total number of flights 9.
This ratio has been preferred to be as higher as possible and to increase with increasing
of the number of flights.
ii) Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Profitability has been measured by the operating profits (the difference between
operating revenues and operating costs) per unit of the airport output-ATM or
passenger x° (Doganis, 1992). This measure has been preferred to be as high as possible
and to increase with increasing of the output.
7Configuration of the economy class seats at long haul flightshas recently merged as a matterof concern due to eases of
passenger deathscausedby DVD (Deep in Vein Disease).
An Air TransportMovement (ATM)is either arrivalor departure.
9For example, threeEuropean 'super' hubs, Frankfurt,Paris CDGand Amsterdam Schiphol are connected to High Sped
Rail Network. Partialsubstitutionof short-haulflightshas already taken place there (EC, 1998; HA. 1909: IFRAS_2000).
If the air-railsubstitutionwere carried out withoutfilling in freed slots by long haul flights, congestion and associated
local and global air pollution, andnoise would be reduced. Under such circumstances, this indicator could be classified as
an environmental indicator.
l0Inmany eases,the commonunit called 'Workload Unit' or 'WLU' has been used as an equivalent for one passenge_ or
100 kg of baggage (Doganis,1902)
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Labour productivity has been expressed by the number of ATM, passengers or WLU
per employee (Doganis, 1992; Hooper and Hensher, 1997). This measure has been
preferred to be as high as possible and to increase with increasing of the number of
employees.
iii) Social indicators
The indicators of the social dimension of performance have not been identified.
iv) Environmental indicators
The indicators of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Energy inefficiency has been measured by the quantity of energy consumed per unit of
the airport output - ATM or a passenger. This measure has preferred to be as low as
possible and to decrease with increasing of the output.
• Noise efficiency has been expressed by the area in square kilometres determined by the
equivalent noise level in decibels - dB (A) (DETR, 2000; 2001). This indicator has been
preferred to be as small as possible and to diminish with increasing of the number of
ATM.
• Air pollution efficiency has been measured by the air pollutants per an event - LTO 11
cycle (EPA, 1999; ICAO, 1993a). This measure has been preferred to be as low as
possible and to decrease with increasing of the number of LTO cycles.
• Waste efficiency has been measured by the quantity of waste per unit of the airport
output - ATM or passenger (BA, 2001). The measure has been preferred to be as low as
possible and to decrease with increasing of the airport output.
• Land use efficiency has been measured in terms of the area of land used for
accommodating air transport demand. The measure has been preferred to be as low as
possible and to increase with increasing of the volume of demand.
3.2.3 The indicator system for Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air Traffic Control (ATC)
The indicator system for Air Traffic Management (ATM)/Air Traffic Control (ATC) have
consisted of eight indicators, which might be quantified for a part (ATM/ATC sector) or for
the whole system (airspace of a country or a wider region - continent) (Janic, 2003).
i) Operational indicators
The indicators of the operational dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Demand has been measured as the number of flights demanded to pass through a given
ATM/ATC airspace (Janic, 2001). This measure has been preferred to be as great as
possible.
• Capacity has been measured by the maximum number of flights served in a given
airspace per unit of time (Janic, 2001). This indicator has been preferred to be as great
as possible and to increase with growing demand.
• Safety has been measured by the number of aircraft accidents or the number of Near
Midair Collisions (NMAC) per unit of the ATM/ATC output - controlled flight. Both
measures have been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing
of the number of flights.
l J ICAO has recommended LTO cycle - Landing/Take-Off cycle as a standardised format for quantifying air pollution at
airports (International Civil Aviation Organisation, 1993a)
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Punctuality of service has been measured by the proportion of flights being on time and
the average delay per delayed flight due to the ATM/ATC restrictions. While former
measure has been preferred to be as high as possible and to increase, the latter measure
has been preferred to be as lower as possible and to decrease, with increasing of the
number of flights.
i!) Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Cost efficiency 12 has been measured by the average cost per unit of output - controlled
flight The measure has been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with
increasing of the number of flights (Janic, 2001).
• Labour productivity has been reflected the number of controlled flights per an
employee. This measure has been preferred to be as high as possible and to increase
with increasing of the number of employees.
iii) Social indicators
The indicators of the social dimension of performance have not been identified.
iv) Environmental indicators
The indicators of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Energy efficient3, has been measured by the extra fuel consumption per flight due to
deviations _om the prescribed (fuel-optimal) trajectories dictated by the ATM/ATC. It
has been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the
number of flights.
• Air pollution efficien_ has been measured by the average quantity of pollutants per
flight caused by the extra fuel consumption. The indicator has been preferred to be as
low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the number of flights.
3.2.4 The indicator system for airlines
The indicator system for airlines has embraced eleven indicators, which could be quantified
for an individual airline, airline alliance or the whole airline industry of a given region
(country or continent) (Janic, 2003).
0 Operational indicators
• Airline size has been expressed by the volume of RTK or RTM (RTK (RTM)--Revenue
Ton-Kilometre (Mile)), the number of flights, the number of passengers and/or the size
of the resources used in terms of the number of aircraft and staff (Janic, 2001). The
above measures have been preferred to be as great as possible and to increase over time
and under conditions of sufficient demand.
• Load factor has been measured as the ratio between the total RTK (RTM) - Revenue
Ton-Kilometre (Mile) and ATM (ATK)--Available Ton-Kilometre (Mile). This measure
has been preferred to be as great as possible and to increase with increasing of the
airline output (Janic, 2001).
L, The 'cost" is considered to be more relevant indicator than the 'profitability' because the most ATM/ATC providers
charge their services on the cost-recovery principle. For example, EUROCONTROL member States and ATM providers
from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, etc. fully recover their costs by charges (LNFIL_,S, 2000).
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• Punctuality, reliability and safety of service have been measured and preferred
analogously as that of users (Janic, 2001).
ii) Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Profitability has been measured by the average profits (difference between the
operating revenues and costs) per unit of output - RTK (RTM). This measure has been
preferred to be as great as possible and to increase with increasing of the airline output.
• Labour productivity has been measured by the average quantity of output - RTK (RTM)
- per employee. The preference for this measure has been to be as great as possible and
to increase with increasing of the number of employees.
iiO Social indicators
None of these indicators has been identified.
iv) Environmental indicators
The indicators of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Energy and air pollution efficiency have been measured by the average quantity of fuel
and associated air pollution, respectively, per unit of output - RTK (RTM), distance
flown or the number of flying hour). Both measures have been preferred to be as low as
possible and to decrease with increasing of output.
• Noise efficiency has been measured by the proportion of the aircraft of Stage 3 and 4 in
an airline fleet. This measure has been preferred to be as great as possible and to
13
increase with expansion of the airline fleet (BA, 2001; ICAO, 1993b).
• Waste efficiency has been measured by an average quantity of waste per unit of the
airline output - RTK (RTM). This measure has preferred to be as low as possible and to
diminish with growing of the airline output (BA, 2001).
3.2.5 The indicator system for aerospace manufacturers
The indicator system of the airspace manufacturers has consisted of eight indicators as
follows (Janic, 2003).
i) Operational indicators
The indicators of the operational dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Aircraft innovations have been measured by technical productivity the cost efficiency
(RAS, 2001). The former measure preferred to be as high as possible has been
expressed as the product between the aircraft speed and capacity product (ton-
kilometres (miles) per hour). The latter preferred to be as low as possible has been
expressed by the average operating cost per unit of capacity-ATK (ATM) (ATK-
Available Ton Kilometre; ATM-Available Ton Mile) (Arthur, 2000; Janic, 2001).
• Innovations of ATM/ATC and airport facilities have been measured by the cumulative
navigational error of an aircraft position, and the capacity of facilities used for
processing demand at airports, respectively. The former measure has been preferred to
13 Once an airline fleet is completely modernized by replacing all aircraft of Stage 2 by the aircraft of noise category 3
and 4, this indicator will become irrelevant.
12
be as small as possible andthe latter one as high as possible (Arthur, 2000; Janic,
2ooD.
Reliability of structures has been measured by the rate of failures of the particular
components per unit of time. Due to the safety and operational reasons, this measure,
has been preferred to be as high as possible.
i 0 Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Profitability has been measured by the average operating profits (the difference
between operating revenues and costs) per unit sold. This measure has been preferred to
be as great as possible and to increase with increasing of the number of units.
• Labour productivity has been measured by the average number of units produced per
employee. The measure has been preferred to increase with increasing of the total
number of employees.
iii) Social indicators
The indicators of the social dimension of performance have not been identified.
iv) Environmental indicators
The of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Energy air pollu_'on and noise eflfici_o, have been measured by the absolute or
relative decrease in the fuel consumption, air pollution or noise per unit of engine
power or the aircraft operating weight. These measures have been are preferred to be as
low as poss_le and to decrease with increasing of the engine power and/or aircraft
operating weight.
3.2. 6 The indicator system for local community
The indicator system for the local community has
sustainability as follows (Janic, 2003):
consisted of four indicators of
i) Operational indicators
The indicator system of the operational dim_ion ^c_...r ...... 1..... • ,.._.. ;a_,_...a
ii) Economic indicators
The indicator system of the economic dimension of performance has not been identified.
iii) Social indicators
The indicator system of the social dimension of performance has comprised only one
indicator as follows:
• Social welfare has been measured by the ratio between the number of people employed
by air transport system and the total number of employed people within the local
community. This measure has been preferred to be as high as possible and to increase
with increasing of employment within the local community (DETR, 1999).
iv) Environmental indicators
The indicator system of the environmental dimension of performance has consisted of three
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indicatorsasfollows:
• Noise disturbance has been measured by the total number of noise events - ATM -
during given period of time (day, month, year) and by the hnumber of complaints per
noise event - ATM. Both measures have been preferred to be as low as possible and to
decrease with increasing of the number of ATM.
• Air pollution has been measured as the ratio between the quantity of air pollutants from
air transport system and the total air pollution from all other local sources. This
indicator has been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of
the total air pollution.
• Safety has been measured by the number of aircraft accidents per ATM, which has
affected the local community people in terms of damaging their property, injuries or
loss of life. This measure has been preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease
with increasing of the number of ATM.
3.2. 7 The indicator system for (local and central) governments
The indicator system for the local and central government has consisted of seven indicators
as follows (Janic, 2003):
0 Operational indicators
The indicators of the operational performance have not been identified.
ii) Economic indicators
The indicators of the economic dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Economic welfare has been measured by the proportion of GDP of air transport sector
in the total GDP. This measure has been preferred to be as great as possible and to
increase with increasing of the total GDP.
• lnternalisation/globalization has been measured by the proportion of trade in terms of
the volume and/or value of export and import by air transport in the total regional
(country) trade, and by the ratio between the number of air trips and total number of
trips (business/leisure) in a given region (country). These measures have been preferred
to be as great as possible and to increase with increasing of the volume (value) of trade
and the total number of trips, respectively.
• Externalities have been measured by the average expense per unit of the system output-
RPK (RPM) due to either preventing or remedying the particular impacts such as noise,
air pollution, air incidents/accidents, and sometimes congestion (DETR, 2001; EC,
1997; Janic, 1999; Levison et. al, 1996; Yang-Lu, 2000). This measure has been
preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the system output.
iii) Social indicators
The indicators of the social dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Overall social welfare has been measured as the ratio between the number of
employees within air transport sector and the total number of employees in a region
(country). This measure has been preferred to be as high as possible and to increase
with increasing of the total employment.
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iv) Environmental indicators
The indicators of the environmental dimension of performance have been as follows:
• Global energy efficiency has been measured by the average amount of fuel consumed
per unit of the system output-RTK (RTM). This measure has been preferred to be as
low as possible and to decrease with increasing of the system output.
• Global noise disturbance has been measured by the total number of people exposed to
the air transport noise during given period of time (year). The measure has been
preferred to be as low as possible and to decrease over time.
• Global air pollution has been measured by the total emissions of air pollutants per unit
of the system output - RTK (RTM) (EC, 1998b). This measure has been preferred to be
as low as possible and to diminish with increasing of the system output.
• Global land use has been measured as the ratio between the land used for air transport
infrastructure and the total land used for infrastnacture of the whole transport system of
a given region (country). This measure has been preferred to be as low as possible and
to u_l_ta_ w,ua-ttt_l_,gt_ ul rut; i_ttr..a ol litUtl _K;qUll-t_l lot U'_IlSpOl'[ lllll'astl_Cl_l/'e.
4 AN APPLICATION OF THE METHODOLOGY
Fifty-eight indicators and sixty-eight measures have been defined in the scope of the
indicator _ysterns co_rr_esponded to seven groups of actors - users-air _'avellers, the system
operators - airports, airlines and ATM/ATC, airspace manufacturers, local community
members, and local and central government. For particular actors twenty-six selected
indicators are estimated in order to illustrate existence of the sustainability of air transport
system. Their list is given in Table 1.
Table 1: Indicators estimated for assessment of the sustainabi!ity of air transport system
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Data for estimating the particular indicators and their measures are extracted from different
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Figure 4a Punctuality of some U.S. airlines: period
1999-2000 (Compiled from USDT, 2001)
Figure 4a illustrates punctuality of
American and Southwest Airlines
(U.S). As can be seen, at both airlines
the average delay per delayed flight
has increased with increasing of the
number of delayed flights. As well,
the average delay of a Southwest
flight has been longer than the average
delay of an American flight,
independently on the number flights
carried out. Consequently, users might
have better perception of punctuality
of American than Southwest Airlines,
but in general, they both have been
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Figure 4b Reliability of some U.S. airlines: period
1999-2000 (Compiled from USDT, 2001 )
Figure 4b illustrates reliability of two U.S.
airlines, American and Southwest, as
proportion of the cancelled flights
dependent on the total number of flights
carried out per month. As can be seen, in
give_ example, at American this
proportion has varied between 2% and 6%
and generally decreased with increasing
of the number of flights. At Southwest, it
has varied betwom 0.5% and 2% and has
been nearly constant with increasing of
the number of flights. As well, Southwest
has pea-formed greater number of flights
than American. From the above example,
number of flights have also tend to
provide a higher reliability of services,
which according to the users' perception
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Figure 4c Liost and damaged (mishandled)
baggage at U.S. domestic schedule services:
period 1990-1999 (Compiled from USDT, 2001 )
Figure 4c illuswates a ratio of mishandled
(lost and damaged) baggage in
dependence on the total number of
domestic passengers served at the U.S.
airports. As can be seen, this ratio has
varied betwg_n 5 and 6.5% and decreased
with increasing of the number of
passengers up to about 460 million.
Above this number, the ratio has start_ to
increase with increasing of the number of
passengers, which has indicated
worsening of the performance. From the
users' prospective, according to the
variations of this indicator, the system has
been sustainable under condition of rising
of the number of passengers to a certain
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Figure 4d Security at U.S. airports - period 1980-
1999 (Compiled from BTS, 2001)
Figure 4d illustrates security at the
U.S airports expressed by the
probability of being exposed to the
threat of illegally carried dangerous
devices in dependence on the number
of passengers screened per year. As
can be seen, this probability has
decreased with increasing of the
number of screened passengers. This
has indicated the system long-term
sustainability with respect to this
indicator. Nevertheless, one has to be
cautious with this measure since also
the very low risk has hidden a virtual
threat with a potential to materialize
into the events with serious
consequences such as, for example,
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Figure 4e Economic convenience of the U.S. air
transport system (Compiled from BTS, 2001 )
Figure 4e illustrates economic
convenience of air transport services
for users of the U.S. air transport
system expressed by changing of the
average airfares and Consumer Price
Index (CPI) during the observed
period. As can be seen, two periods
have been evident: ftrst, it has been
the period between 1960 and 1982
when the index of airfares had been
above the index of CPI; second, it ahs
been the period from 1983 on, when
the index of CPI has been below than
that of airfares. The main forces of
such change have consisted of the
positive developments in the U.S.
aviation market after deregulation
(1978) on the one hand and an overall
socio-economic progress on the other.
In addition, in an absolute sense,
airfares have been more or less
permanently decreasing, particularly
after the year 1983, which might
illustrate the long-term system
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Figure 5a Profitability of Amsterdam Schiphol airport:
period 1990-2000 (Compiled from Schiphol Group,
2000)
Figure 5a illustrates profitability of
Amsterdam Schiphol airport
(Netherlands). The profitability as the
difference between revenues and costs
in terms of EURO per WLU (Work
Load Unit) has been related to the
total annual number of WLU
accommodated at the airport. As can
be seen, this profitability has increased
with increasing of the number of
WLU at a decreasing rate. In given
exa_m_ple_ e.xJ_ence nf the lnng-t .e!ma_
airport sustainability has been
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Figure 5b Labour productivity at Amsterdam Schiphol
airport- period 1990-2000 (Compiled from Schiphol
Group, 2000)
Figure 5b illustrates labor productivity
at Amsterdam Schiphol airport
(Netherlands). This productivity in
terms of the number of WLU per
employee has been related to the total
number of WLU accommodated at the
airport per year.
As can be seen, during the observed
period, this productivity has generally
increased with increasing of the
number of WLU, but at a d_easing
rate, which has turned into zero after
the number of WLU has increased
over 45 million per year. Such
development has indicated how
sustainability of the system has
vanished with respect to this indicator
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Figure 5c Noise efficiency at Frankfurt Airport - period
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Figure 5d Air pollution efficiency at Zurich airport:
period 1997-2000: (Compiled from Zurich Airport, 2001 )
Figure 5c illustrates noise efficiency
at Frankfurt airport (Germany)
expressed by the area of land
covered by the equivalent constant
sound level Leq (= 62, 67 and 75
dB(A)) in dependence on the annual
number of ATM (Air Transport
Movements). As can be seen, for
given number of ATM, for larger
Leq this area has been smaller, and
vice versa, which has been
intuitively expected. As well, the
area of land affected by given L_q
has decreased with increasing of the
number of ATM. Both measures has
indicated that the area around the
airport exposed to the given level of
noise has generally squeezed despite
increasing of the traffic volume.
This certainly has been achieved by
replacing noisier with quieter
aircraft and modifications of the
operational procedures at and
around the airport. Consequently,
according to this indicator the
airport has been developing in a
sustainable way.
Figure 5d illustrates air pollution
efficiency of Zurich airport
(Switzerland) expressed by the
quantity of Nox per LTO cycle in
dependence on the number of LTO
cycles carried out. As can bee seen,
this efficiency has been achieved by
decreasing of this emission despite
increasing of the number of LTO
cycles, primarily through
modernization of the aircraft fleet.
However, this emission has started
to increase when the number of
LTO cycles has exceeded 150
thousands, primarily due to more
intensive use of the larger aircraft.
This has clearly indicated
















• I _r_tturt _: _-_ I
"_L w = -o.0oo3 PA=+ 0.0198 PA + 0.1852!
i_ _9=_20o_I R"=o,i. i
W = 0.0274 PA
R== 0._447
4o 60
t I i li
80 100 120 140
Annual number of passenge_ - millions
Figure 5e Waste efficiency at European airports
(Compiled from Fraport, 2001; BAh,,2001 )
Figure 5c illustrates waste efficiency
in terms of the quantity of waste per
passenger in dependence on the
annual number of passengers
accommodated at Frankfurt Main
(Germany) and three London
airports (Heathrow, Stansted,
Gatwick) (UK).
As can be seen, this quantity has
decreased at Fraakfmt Main and
inc_as_ at London airports with
increasing of the annual number of
passengers, which has indicated
their sustainable and unsustainable
development, respectively, with
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Figure 6 Safety in European and U.S. airspace
(Compiled from EC, 1999a; DETR, 2000; BTS, 2001)
Figure 6 illustrates safety of the air
traffic control system in terms of the
number of air proximities and level
busts dependent on the annual
number of aircraft movements in the
airspace of Europe and U.S. As can
be seen, in both regions, this
indicator has generally decreased
with increasing of the number ot
aircraft movements, but the rates of
decrease have been different.
Nevertheless, both systems have
been developed in a _le way
according to this indicator, i.e.,
flying has been less and less with a
risk of air proximities with
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Figure 7a Punctuality of Major ten U.S. air carriers:
period 1988- 1999 (Compiled from USDT, 2001 )
Figure 7a illustrates punctuality of
the ten major U.S. airlines. It has
been expressed as the proportion of
the delayed ATM (Air Transport
Movements) in dependence on the
total number of ATM carded out per
year during the period 1988-1999.
As can be seen, generally, the
proportion of cancelled flights has
generally increased at an increased
rate with increasing of the number
of the number of ATM, which has
implied lack of the system
sustainable development with
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Figure 7b Reliability of Major ten U.S. air carriers: period
1988-1999 (Compiled from USDT, 2001 )
Figure 7b illustrates reliability of the
ten U.S. major airlines in terms of
the proportion of cancelled flights
dependent on the total number of
flights carried out per year. All
reasons for cancellations, from bad
weather to technical failures, have
been included. As can be seen,
similarly as punctuality, this
proportion has increased at an
increasing rate with increasing of
the totals number of flights. Such
relationship has implied a lack of
sustainability of the system
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Figure 7c Labour productivityof Lufthansagroup: period
1991-2000 (Compiled from Lufthansa, 2000)
Figure 7c illustrates productivity at
Lufthansa Group (Germany)
expressed as RTK per employee in
dependence on the average annual
number of employees. As can be
seen, productiviW has decreased
until the number of employees has
reached about 63 thousands but after
that it has increased despite the
number of employees has continued
to rise. On the one hand this has
happened due to the airline
improvements. On the other, the
strong force has been intensification
of the long-haul intercontinental
flights. Consequently, according to
this indicator the group has changed
its long-term trend of development
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Figure 7d Fuel efficiency at BritishAirways: period
1974-2000 (Compiled from BA, 2001 )
Figure 7d illusLmtes efficiency of
fuel consumption at British Airways
during the period 1974-2000. It has
been expressed in terms of grams of
fuel consumed per RPK (Revenue
Passenger Kilometer) in dependence
on the total annual volume of RPK.
As can be seen, this consumption
has generally decreased at a
decreasing rate with increasing of
the volume of RTK, which has also
meant decreasing of the associated
air pollution. Such undoubtedly
long-term sustainable development
has been achieved because the
airline has permanently modernized
its fleet on the one hand and been
provided with more effective
services by ATM/ATC during














TP = -0.0076F + 30.668t - 3107 t A380 IIR2 = 0.7557 ] B747-400
B747-200 II _
DC10.30 i_ _ A340-300
_/i B77_200
-320B
1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
Year
Figure 8a Aircraft technical productivity (Compiled from
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Figure 8b Aircraft eefficiency (Compiled from FAA,
1998)
Figure 8a illustrates the main steps in
progress in development of the
aircraft technical productivity in
terms of the number of TKM/h (Ton
Kilometers per Hour). As can be
seen, this productivity has been
increasing over time thanks to both
airlines and their requirements as
well as to capabilities of aerospace
manufacturers. Aider DC 3, the rise
of technical productivity has been
primarily achieved by developing the
larger aircraft and much less by
increasing of the aircraft operating
(cruising) speed. A culmination of
development of this productivity will
certainly be reached after
introducing A380. The development
of aircraft capacity has
simultaneously included
development and upgrading of
engines (jet engines after DC3) in
terms of their fuel and air pollution
efficiency on the one hand and
sophisticated avionics on the other.
Consequently, the system has
recorded the long-term sustainable
development.
Figure 8b illustrates development of
aircraft efficiency in terms of the
average cost per seat mile dependent
on the aircraft capacity (the number
of seats). As can be seen, this cost
has decreased at a decreasing rate
with increasing of the aircraft size
thus indicating the larger aircraft as
being more efficient in relative
terms. If development of bigger
aircraft has been an objective in
terms of sustainability, then such


















AF--C= 6E-06 AOW = - 0.0029 AOW + 0.9583
I_ = 0.444
I I I I
150 200 250 300 350
AOW-A_cr_Opea_ WetS-ms
Figure 8c Fuel efficiency (Compiled from
EUROCONTROL, 1998)
Figure 8c illustrates the aircraft fud
efficiency in terms of the average
fuel consumption per unit of time
and per unit of weight dependent on
the aircraft operating weight. As can
be seen, this consumption has
decreased at a decreasing rate with
increasing of the aircraft weight,
which has implied higher relative
fuel efficiency of the larger aircraft
up to the weight of about 250 tons.
For heavier aircratt, this advantage
has disappeared and they have even
shown to be less fuel-efficient.
Cnn_ea_aen_tly Using l_m'gt2r ah'crafi
up to a certain size has seemed to be
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Figure 8d Noise efficiency (Compiled from HA, 1999; FI,
2000; 2001 )
Figure 8d iUustrates the aircraft
noise efficiency expressed as the
level of noise in terms of EPNdB
(Equivalent Persistent Noise in
Decibels) per unit of the airt.Taft
maximum take-off weight in
dependence of this weight. As can
be seen, the relative level of noise
has decreased more than
proportionally with increasing of the
aircraft maximum take-off weight
for both aircraft arrivals and
departures. The arrival noise has
been slightly higher than the
departure noise. Again, if
development of bigger and
relatively quieter aircraft has been
an objective, the progress has been
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Figure 9 Noise disturbance (Compiled from MA, 1999)
Figure 9 illustrates noise disturbance
at Manchester Airport (UK). This is
expressed by the average number of
complaints per ATM (Air Transport
movement) in dependence on the
total number of ATM carried out
during given period of time. As can
be seen, up to about 13 thousand
movements carried out per month,
the average number of complaints
has decreased but after that it has
been increasing more than
proportionally. This has indicated
that the airport has grown in an
unsustainable way according to the
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Figure 10a Economic welfare: U.S. air transport system:
period 1990-1994 (Compiled from Han X., Fang, B.,
1998)
Figure 10a illustrates economic
welfare obtained by the U.S air
transport industry expressed by its
share in the total GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) during the
limited period 1990-1994. As can be
seen, this share has increased
linearly with increasing of the
national GDP, which has indicated
the industry's ability to permanently
upgrade its contributions to the
national economy (from 0.68% in
1990 to 0.74% in 1994 in the total
GDP).
Consequently, the industry has
developed in a sustainable way
during the observed period with
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Figure 10b Internalisation & globalization of UK Trade:
Period 1992-1998 (Compiled from DE-I'R, 2000c)
Figure 10b ilhstrates an example of
contribution of the national air
transport system to globalization
and internalization of the UK trade
sector during the period 1992-1998.
As can be seen, in the country's
import and export, the share of air
transport by value has been rising
with increasing of the total value of
trade. This has indicated the system
ability to gain more expensive
shipments, which in turn has meant
its sustainable development with
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Figure 10¢ Overall employment at U.S. air transport
industry (Compiled from BEA, 2001 )
Figure 10c illustrates development
of employment in the U.S. air
transport industry during the period
i945-200i. As can be seen, the
long-term growth of the number of
employees has been approximately
exponential. It has started
approximately from one hundred
thousands in the year 1945 and
reached about one million and four
hundred thousands in the year 2001,
which has been fourteen-times
increase. There have been the
variations around the general trend
indicating restructming of the sector
after deregulation of the airline
industry in the year 1978 and global
crisis before and after the Gulf war
in 1991. Nevertheless, in the long
term, according to this indicator, the
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Figure 10d Global noise efficiency around 250 largest
U.S. airports: period 1975-1998 (Compiled from BTS,
2001 )
Figure 10d illustrates global noise
efficiency at 250 U.S. main airports.
This efficiency has been expressed
as the proportion of population
exposed to the air transport noise in
dependence on the total resident
population. As can be seen, during
the period 1975-1998, this
proportion has been decreasing
more than proportionally with
increasing of population, from 3%
to less than a half percent.
Certainly, such long-term trend has
been achieved by improvements of
airport and land use planning
resettlement of population
previously lived close to these
airports, improvements of aircraft
operational procedures and
modernization of aircraft fleet.
Consequently, according to this
indicator the system has been
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Figure 10e Global energy efficiency of the U.S. airline
industry: period 1960-1999 (Compiled from BTS, 2001 )
Figure l 0e illustrates global energy
efficiency of the U.S. airline
industry expressed by the average
fuel consumption per RTM
(Revenue Ton Mile) in dependence
on the total annual amount of RTM.
As can bee seen, this consumption
has decreased more than
proportionally with increasing of the
total amount of RTM, from about
1.6 kg/RTM to just about 0.6
kg/RTM (-2.7 times). At the same
time the annual amount of RTM has
increased for about five times. The
main influencing factors have been
improvements in the aircraft design
and fleet use. Consequently, with
respect to this indicator, the system
has developed in a sustainable way
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Figure 10f Global air pollution efficiency of the U.S.
airline industry: period 1970-1998 (Compiled from BTS,
2001 )
Figure 10f illustrates global air
pollution efficiency of the U.S.
airline industry. Similarly as at the
fuel consumption case, this
efficiency has been expressed by the
quantity of CO emitted per RTM
(Revenue Ton Mile) in dependence
on the annual amount of RTM
carried out during the period 1970-
1998. As can be seen, more lima
proportional decrease of this
emission, from about 22g/RTM to
about 10 g/RTM, with increasing of
RTM, from about 16 to about 95
billion RTM rmr annum, has taken
place. The reasons have been the
same as in case of fuel consmnption
including also improvements of
aircraft engines in terms of the
'quality of burning' fuel.
Consequently, according to this
indicator, the system has been
developing in a sustainable way.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The paper has explained the methodology for assessment of the sustainability of air
transport system and its potential application. The methodology has consist_ of the
indicator systems consisted of the individual indicators and their measures. They have
rq_sented the system operational, economic, social and environmental performance. The
particular indicators and their measures have been defined in terms of the system positive
effects and negative impacts and in dependence on the system output, in both monetary and
non-monetary terms. Their relevance for different actors such as users (air travellers), air
transport operators, aerospace manufactmm's, local commtmities, governmental authorities
at different scales (local, national, international), international air transport associations,
pressure groups and public have been also included. In total, fifty-eight individual
indicators and their sixty-eight measures have been defined.
The application of the methodology has included estimation of twenty-six indicators. Due
to the structure of the particular indicators and availability of the relevant data, almost all
cases have related to the U.S. air transport industry while just a few ones have related to the
European air transport industry. The results have shown (and confirmed) that the long-term
development of the system and its particular components has been sustainable with respect
to the most indicators of the economic, social and environmental dimension of performance
from the aspects of the most actors involved. Nevertheless, there have been still some
doubts about unsustainable indicators of the operational dimension of performance such as
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punctuality and reliability of service at airports and airlines, indicators of the environmental
dimension of performance such as air pollution, waste efficiency and noise disturbance at
airports, and indicators of the economic dimension of performance such as labour
productivity of airlines.
Generally, based on the analysed cases, it can be said that the air transport system, with few
exceptions, has shown sustainable development under given circumstances and during
observed period. Stable sustainable trends have been established. However, after September
11 terrorists' attack on the U.S. (2001), the operational and economic dimension of
performance have become of the growing importance illustrating the system and its
components' struggle for survival. The questions about the system future sustainable
development as well as comparison of its with the sustainability of other transport modes as
well as other sectors of the national and international economy by using the same or
modified methodology are waiting for reply.
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Our focusis the evolutionof business strategiesand networkstructuredecisions in the commercial
passenger aviation industry. The paper reviewsthe growth of hub-and-spoke networks as the
dominant businessmodelfollowing deregulationin the latter part of the 20• century, followed by
the emergence of value-basedairlinesas a global phenomenon at the end of the century. The
paper highlightsthe linkbetweenairlinebusinessstrategiesand network structures, and examines
the resultingcompetitionbetweendivergentnetworkstructurebusiness models. In this context we







Taking a snapshot of the NorthAmericancommen:ialpassengeraviationindusti7inthe springof 2003,
the signals on firm survivabilityand industryequilibriumare mixed;some firmsare under severe stress
while others are succeedingin spiteof the currentenvironment.1 Inthe US, we find United Airlinesin
Chapter 11 and US Airwaysemergingfrom Chapter11 bankruptcyprotection.We find American
Airlineshaving just reported the largestfinandal lossin US airlinehistory,while Delta and Norlhwest
Airlinesalong with smaller carrierslikeAlaska,AmericaWest and several regionalcarriers are
restr',¢turingand employingcost reduction strategies.We alsofind Continental Airlinessurvivingafter
L --...'-- -- I.= ..... .J .._._|_
._,vJ,,gu,==; in .,,,u outof _J,_u=,"....... _I in recent years,wi,_ SouihwestAidines continues to be
profitable. In Canada, we find Air Canada inCCAAbankruptcyprotection(the Canadian version of
chapter 11), after reportinglossesof over$500 millionforthe year 2002 and in March 2003. 2
Meanwhile WesUet, like Southwestcontinues to showprofitability,while two new carders, Jetsgoand
CanJet (reborn), have entered the market.
......,.,,,_,_,_- ...=_Europe, the pictureis muchthe same, with,largeful,Lsen,,iceairlines (FSAs hereafter) such
as BritishAirways and Lufthansasustaininglossesand sufferingfinancialdifficulties,while value-
based airlines (VBA's) like Ryanairand EasyJetcontinueto grow and prosper.Until recently, Asian air
b-dVUJmarkei_ wun_per/ormingsomewhatbetter_an in NormAmerica,however the current SARS
epidemic is having a severe negative effecton manyAsianairlines,z
Clearly, the current environmentis linkedtoseveral independentnegative demand shocks that have hit
the industryhard. '=A broad multi-countrymacroeconomicslowdownwas already underway in 2001,
_Thisscenarioistrueinmostother_ as_11;AuslT_,newZealandandtheEU.













prior to the 9-11 tragedy,which gave rise to the 'war on terrorism' followed by the recent military action
in Iraq. Finally, the SARS virus has not only severely diminished the demand for travel to areas where
SARS has broken out and led to fatalities, but it has also helped to create yet another reason for
travelers to avoid visiting airports or traveling on aircraft, based on a perceived risk of infection. All of
these factorshave created an environmentwhere limited demand and price competitionhas favoured
the survivalof airlineswitha low-cost,lowpricefocus.
In this paper we examine the evolutionof air transport networks after economic deregulation, and the
connectionbetween networksand businessstrategies,in an environmentwhere regulatory changes
continueto change the rules of the game.This introductorysectioncontinueswitha descriptive
account and analysisof developmentsin the aviationsectorsince deregulationinthe US. Section 2
describesand contrastsdistinguishingelementsof the two dominantbut divergent businessmodels:
the traditional FSA business model, which is tied to the use of hub-and-spoke networks and the VBA
business model, which utilizes a point-to-point network structure. In section 3 we review and develop
some insights from the economics of networks applied to airline competition and in section 4, we
discuss two issues relating to competition and regulation in commercial passenger aviation: stability in
market structureand the application of competition policy. Some concluding remarks are offered in
section 5.
1.1 The story so far...
The deregulationof the US domesticairlineindustryin 1978 was the precursor of similarmoves by
most other developed economies in Europe (beginning 1992-1997), Canada (beginning in 1984),








capable of survivingunderopen market conditionssubjectto the forcesof compe_on rather than
under economic regulation,e
Prior to deregulation inthe US, some airlines hadalready organizedthemselvesintohub-and-spoke
networks. Delta Airlines,for example, had organizeditsnetworkintoa hub at Atlanta_ multiple
spokes. Other carriers had evolved more linearnetworkswithgenerallyfullconnectivity and were
reluctant to shift to hub-and-spoke fortwo masons.First,.regulationsrequiredpermission to exit
markets and such exit requests would likelyleadto anothercarrierentenngto serve 'public need'.
Secondly, under ,-egulationit was noteasy to achievethe demand sidebenefitsassociatedwith
networks because of regulatorybarriersto ent_j, inthe era of economicregulationthe choice of
frequency and ancillary service competition were a directresultof being conslTained in fare and market
entry competition.With deregulation,airlinesgainedthe freedom to adapttheir strategiesto meet
market demand and to reorganize lt=emselvesspatially.Consequently,hub-and-spokebecame the
dominant choice of network structure.
.']'hehub-and-spoke network structurewas perceivedto add valueonboththe demand and cost side.
On the demand side, passengers gained access to broad geographicandservicecoverage, with the
potential for frequent flights to a large number of destinations.7Large carriers providedlower search
and iransactionscosts/or passengersana reducedthroughlowertimecosts of connections. They also
created travel products withhigh convenience and service levels- reduced likelihoodof lost luggage,
in-flightmeals and bar service for example. The FSAbusinessmodelfflusfavoured highservice levels
which helped to build the market the market at a time when airtravelwasan unusualor infrequent
activityfor many individuals.Buildingthe market notonly meant encouragingmere airtravel but also
expanding the size of the network which increasedconnectivity and improvedaircraftutilization.
In contTastoderegulationwithindomesticborders,intemalJonalaviationhasbeenslowerto introduceunilateral
liberaliza_on.Consequentlythe degreeof regula'donvariesacrossroutes,fares,capacity,entrypoints(aiq)orls)andother
aspectsof airlineoperates dependinguponthe countriesinvolved..The US-UK,German,NetherlandsandKorea
bilateralsarequiteliberal,for example.Insomecases,however,mostnotablyinAustralasiandEurope,therehave been
regionalair b'adepacts,whichhavederegulatedmarkets_ andwithincountries.The openskiesagreementbetween
CanadaandtheUS is similartotheseregionalagreements.
7 Liketelephonenetworks,addinga pointto a hub andspokesystemcreates2nconneclions.
On the cost side the industrywas shown to have few if any economiesof scale,but there were
significant economies of density. Feeding spokes from smaller centres into a hub airport enabled full
service carriers to operate large aircraft between major centres with passenger volumes that lowered
costs per available seat.
An earlyexception to the hub-and-spoke networkmodelwas Southwest Airlines. In the US, Southwest
Airlines was the original 'value-based airline' (VBA) representing a strategy designed to build the
market for consumers whose main loyalty is to low pdce travel. This proved to be a sustainable
business model and Southwest's success was to create a blueprint for the creation of other VBA's
around the world. The evolution has also been assisted by the disappearance of charter airlines with
deregulation as FSA's served a larger scope of the demand function through their yield management
system.
Meanwhile, benefits of operating a large hub-and-spokenetworkin a growingmarket led to merger
waves inthe US (mid-1980s) and in Canada (late-1980s) andconsolidationinother countriesof the
world. Large firms had advantages from the demand side, sincethey were favoured by many
passengersand most importantlyby highyield businesspassengers.They also had advantages from
the supplyside due to economies of density and economiesof stage length.8In most countriesother
than the US there tended to be high industryconcentrationwith one orat mosttwo major carders. It
was also true that in most every countryexcept the US therewas a national(or mostfavoured) carder
that was privatized at the time of deregulationor soon thereafter.
In Canada in 1995 the Open Skies agreement with the US was brought in.9Around this time we a new
generationof VBA's emerged. In Europe, Ryanair and EasyJet experiencedrapidand dramatic growth
following deregulationwithinthe EU. Some FSA's respondedby creatingtheir own VBAs:British
Airways created GO, KLM created BUZZ and BritishMidlandcreatedBMiBabyfor example. WestJet
airlinesstartedservice in western Canada in 1996 servingthree destinationsand has grown
continuously since that time.
8Unitcostsdecreaseasstagelengthincreasesbutata diminishingrate.
9Therewasa phaseinperiodfor selectairportsinCanadaaswellasdifferentinitialrulesfor USandCanadiancarriers.
CanadianAirlines,faced with increasedcompe_on in the west from WesUet as well as aggressive
competitionfrom Air Canada on longer haul mutes, was in a severe financial by the late !990s. A
biddingwar for a rne_=d Air Canada and Canadian was initiatedand in2000, AirCanada emerged the
winnerwith a 'winnerscurse', havingassumed substantialdebt and constrainingserviceand labour
agreements. Canada now had one FSA and three or.foursmaller a.'..!ines,two_of wh_ we.e. VBAs.
Inthe new millennium,some consolidation has begunto occur amongstVBA's in Europewiththe
mergerof, EasyJet and GO in 2002, and the acquisitionof BUZZ by Ryanair in2003. More importantly
perhaps, the VBA model has emerged as a global phenomenonwith VBAcarrierssuchas VirginBlue
in Australia,GOL in Brazil, Germanla and Hapag-Uoyd in Germany and Air Asiain Malaysia.
L_,_Jng = avi._on markets sincethe tam of the :entu_-j,casual obsen,'ationwouldsuggestthat a
combination of market circumstancescreated an opportunityfor the propagationof the VBA business
model- _ a proven biueprint providedby SouthwestAirlines.However a question remainsas to
whethersomething else more fundamental has been goingon inthe industryto cause the largeairlines
and potenlJally larger alliances to falter and fade. Ifthe causal impetusof the currentcrisiswas limited
to cyclical macro factors combined _ independentdemand shocks,then onewouldexpectthe
inst_utlonsthat were previouslydominant to re-emerge once demand rebounds.If this seemsunlikelyit
is because the underlyingmarket environment hasevolved into a new marketstructure,one inwhich
old businessmodels and practices are no longer viable or desirable. The evolutionof business
strategiesand markets, like biological evolution is subjectto the forces of selection.Airlineswhocannot
or do notadapt their business model to long-lastingchanges in the environmentwill disappear,to be
replaced by those companies whose strategies better fit the evolved market sl_-'ture. But to
understandthe emerging s'categic interactions and outcomes of airlinesone must appreciatethat in
thisindustry,business strategies are necessarilylied to network choices.
II II I
2. Network structure and business strategy
The organizationof productionspatially in air transportationnetworksconfersboth demandand supply
side network economiesand the choice of network structureby a carriernecessarilyreflectsaspectsof
its businessmodel and will exhibitdifferentrevenue and cost drivers. Inthissectionwe outline
importantcharacteristicsof the businessstrategy and networkstructuresof two competingbusiness
models: the full service strategy (utilizing a hub-and-spoke network) andthe low cost strategymodel
which operates under a partial point-to-point network structure.
2.1 Hub-and-spoke networks and the full-service strategy
The full service business model is predicated on broad service in product and in geography bringing
customers to an array of destinations with flexibility and available capacity to accommodate different
routings,no-shows and flightchanges. The broad array of destinations and multiple spokes requires a
variety of aircraft with differing capacities and performance characteristics. The variety increases
capital, labour and operating costs. This business model labours under cost penalties and lower
productivity of hub-and-spoke operations including long aircraft turns, connection slack, congestion,
and personnel and baggage online connections. These features take time, resources and labour, all of
which are expensive and are not easily avoided. The hub-and-spoke systemis also conditional on
airport and airway infrastructure, information provision through computer reservation and highly
sophisticated yield management systems.
The network effects that favoured hub and spoke over linear connected networks lie in the compatibility
of flights and the internalization of pricing externalities between links in the network. A carrier offering
flights from city A to city B through city H (a hub) is able to collect traffic from many origins and place
them on a large aircraft flying from H to B, thereby achieving density economies. In contrast A carrier
flying directly from A to B can achieve some direct density economies but more importantly gains
aircraft utilization economies. In the period following deregulation, density economies were larger than
aircraft utilization economies on many routes, owing to the limited size of many origin and destination
markets.
On the demand side, FSA's could maximize the revenue of the entire network by internalizing the
externalities created by compiementarities between links in the network. In our simple example, of a
flightfromA to C via hub H the carrier has to considerhow pricingof the AH link mightaffectthe
demand for serviceonthe HB link. If the service were offered by separate companies,the company
serving AH will take no considerationof how the fare it charged wouldinfluencethe demand onthe HB
link since it has no rightto the revenue on that link. The FSA businessmodelthus creates complexity
as the networkgrows,makingthe system work effectivelyrequires additionalfeatures most notably,
yield management and productdistribution.Inthe periodfollowing deregulation, technologicalprogress
providedthe means to manage this complexity; withlarge informationsystemsandm particular
computer reservationsystems. Computer reservationsystems make possiblesophisticatedflight
revenue management, the development of loyalty programs,effective productdistribution,revenue
accountingand ioad dispatch.Trey alsodrive aircraftcapacity, frequencyand schedulingdecisions.As
a consequence, the FSA businessmodel places relathe importance on managing complexschedules
and pricingsystemswitha focus on profitabilityof the network as a whole ratherthan individualinks.
The FSA businessmodelfavoum a high !eve! of service and the creationof a large servicebundle(in-
flight entertainment,meals, drinks, large numbers of ticketingcounters at the hubetc.) which serves to
maximize the revenue yieldsfrom businessand long-haultravel. An importantpart of the business
service bundle isthe convenience that is created throughfully flexible tickets and highflight
frequencies.Highfrequencies can be developed on spoke mutes usingsmaller feed aircraft,andthe
use ot a hub _ teed trafficfrom spokesallows more flights for a given trafficdensity and cost level.
More flightsreducetotal trip time, withincreased flexibility. Thus, the hub-and-spokesystem leads to
the developmentof feed arrangements along spokes. Indeed these domesticfeeds contributed to the
developmentof internationalalliances in which one airline would feed another utilizingthe capacityof
both to increaseservice and pricing.
2.2 Point-to-point networks and the low-cost strategy
Likethe FSA model, the VBA business plan creates a network structurethat can promoteconnectivity
but incontrast trades off lower levels of service, measured both in capacity and frequency, against





currenteconomicanddemand downturn.VBAs tend to exhibitcommon product and process design
characteristicsthat enable them to operate at a much lower cost per unitof output.1°
On the demandside, VBAs have created a unique value propositionthrough product and process
designthatenables them to eliminate, or "unbundle" certain service features inexchange for a lower
fare. These servicefeature trade-offs are typically: less frequency, no meals, no free, or any, alcoholic
beverages,morepassengers per flight attendant, no lounge, no intediningor code-sharing,electronic
tickets,no pre-assignedseating, and less leg room. Most importantlythe VBA does notattempt to
connectits networkalthoughtheir may be connectingnodes. It also has people use their own time to
access orfeed the airport.11
There are several key areas in process design (the way in which the product is delivered to the
consumer)for a VBA that result in significantsavings over a full service carder. One of the primary
forms of processdesignsavings is inthe planningof point-to-pointcity pairflights,focusing on the local
originanddestinationmarket rather than developing hub systems. In practice, this means that flights
are scheduledwithoutconnectionsand stops inother cities. This could also be consideredproduct
design, asthe passengernotices the benefit of traveling directlyto their desired destinationratherthan
througha hub. Rather than having a bank of flights ardve at airportsat the same time, low-cost
carriersspreadout the staffing,groundhandling, maintenance, food services, bridgeand gate
requirementsat each airportto achieve savings.
Another less obvious,but important cost saving can be found in the organizationdesign and cultureof
the company. It is worth noting at this point that the innovator of product, process, and organizational
re-design is generally accepted to be Southwest Aidines. Many low-cost start-ups have attempted to
replicate that model as closely as possible; however, the hardest area to replicate has proved to be the






Extendingthe "lookand feel" to the aircraft,there isa noticeablestrategy for low-cost airlines.
Successful VBAs focus on a homogeneousfleet type (mostlythe Boeing 737 but this is changing;e.g.
Jet BluewithA320 fleet). The advantagesof a 'common fleet' are numerous. Purchasingpower isone
- wi_ the obviousexceptionof the aircraftitself, heavy,maintenance, parts, supplies;even safety cards
are purchasedin onemodel forthe entire fleet. Trainingcosts are reduced- with only one type of fleet,
notonly doemployeesfocuson one aircraftand become specialists,but economies of density can be
achievedintraining.
The choiceof airportsistypicallyanothersource of savings. Low-cost carriers tend to focus on
secondaryairportsthat have excess capacityand are willingto forego some airside revenues in
exchangefor non-airsiderevenues that are developed as a result of the traffic stimulated from lowcost
airlines. In simplerterms, secondaryairportscharge less for landing and terminal fees and make up
the differencewithcommercial activitycreated by the additionalpassengers. Further, secondary
ai,_-_ortsare less _ngested, allowing for faster bJmti_s and ,'T,'O,re e_lent use of staff and the aircraft.
The averagetaxitimes shownin table 1 (below) are evidence of thLswith respect to Southwest inthe
US and oneonlyhas to consider the significanttaxi times at Pearson Airport in Torontoto see why
Hamiltonissuchan advantage for WestJet.
EssenUally,VBAshave attemptedto reduce the complexity and resulting cost of the product by
unbundlingthoseservicesthat are not absolutelynecessary. This unbundlingextends to airport
facilities as well, as VBAs struggleto avoid the costs of expensive primaryairport facilities that were
designed withfull servicecarriersinmind. While the savings in product design are the most obviousto
the passenger,it isthe processchanges that have producedgreater savings for the airline.
The designof low-costcarriers facilitates some revenue advantages in addition to the many cost
advantages,but it is the cost advantages that far outweighany revenue benefits achieved. These
revenueadvantagesincludedsimplifiedfare structureswith 3-4 fare levels, a simple 'yield'
managementsystem,and the abilityto have one-way tickets. The simple fare structurealso facilitates
Intemetbooking.However,what is clearly evident isthe choice of network is not independent of the
12ItshouldalsobenotedthattheVBAmodelisnotgeneric.Differentlowcostcardersdodifferentthingsandlikeall
11
firmstrategy.The linearpoint-to-pointnetworkof VBAs allows it to achieve both cost and revenue
advantages.
Table 1 below,compareskey elementsof operations for US airlines 737 fleets. One can readilysee a
dramaticcost advantagefor SouthwestAirlinescompared to FSAs. In particular, Southwest is a market
leaderinaircraftutilizationand average taxi times.
Table 1





















Flight AverageStage AverageTaxi CostperAvailable
Hours Length(miles) Timein SeatMile(UScents)
Minutes13
9.8 933 19 5.6
8.9 472 13 4.0
8.8 1,032 25 4.3
7.5 639 22 8.1
7.1 895 26 6.2
6.7 602 21 6.2
6.3 466 24 8.9
6.1 546 22 7.1
If one looks atthe differences in the US between VBAs like Southwest and FSAs, there is a 2:1 cost
difference. This difference is similar to what is found in Canada between West Jet and Air Canada as
well as inEurope. These carders buy the fuel and capital in the same market, and although there may
be some difference between carders due to hedging for example, these are not structural or permanent
changes. The vast majority of the cost difference relates to product and process complexity. This
complexity is directly tied to the design of their network structure.
Table 2comparescostdrivers for FSAs and VBAs in Europe. The table shows the key underlyingcost
drivers andwhere a VBA like Ryanair has an advantage over FSAs in crew and cabin personnel costs,




spoke network isserviceintensiveandhighcost Even distributioncost-savingsare related indirectlyto
network design becauseVBAshavesimpleproductsand use passengers'time as an inputto reduce
airline connect costs.
Table 2
Comparison of Cost Drivers for VBAS and FSAs
Unit Costs in US$ ASK adjusted for 800 km Stagelength (2001)
3Major EU
Flag Carders Ryanair easyjet
Aircraft Ownership 1.2 0.7 1.0
AirportJATC 3.8 1.2 1.0
Distribution 1.9 0.5 0.2
Crew 1.4 0.9 0.8
Total 8.3 3.3 3.0
Source:HypedforHopes:Europe'sLowCostAirlines(McK]nseyQuarterly,No.4, 2002)
In Europe, Ryanairhas been a leaderinthe use ofthe intemet for direct sales and 'e-tickets'. in the
US SouthwestNrtineswas an innovatorin "e-ticketing',and was also one of the first to initiate
bookingson the intemet. VBAsavoidIravel agencycommissions and ticket productioncosts: in
Canada, WestJet has statedthat intemetbookingaccountfor approximately40% of their sales, while
in Furope: Ryanairclaimed an lntemetsales percentage of 9i% in March 2002.14 While most VBA's
have adopted direct selling via the intemet, the strategy has been hard for FSAs to respond to withany
speed given their complex pricing systems. Recent moves by full service carders in the US and
Canada to eliminatebase commissions should prove to be interesting developments in the distribution
chains of all airlines.
To some degree, VBAshave positioned themselvesas market buildersby creaUngpoint-to-point
service inmarkets whereit could notbe warranted previouslydue to lower trafficvolumes at higher
FSA fares. VBAsnot onlyslJmulatetrafficinthe directmarket of an airport, but studies have shown
that VBAs have a muchlargerpotential passengercatchment area than FSAs. The catchment area is




FSA relies on a hub-and-spoke network to create catchment, low-cost carriers create the incentive for
each customer to createtheir own spoke to the point of departure. Table 3 provides a summary of the
alternative airline strategies pursued in Canada, and elsewhere in the world.
Table 3
Descriptionof Strategiesin the CanadianAirline Industry:_
Strategy High Cost, Full Service Low Cost, No Frills
NetworkType Hub-and- Point-to-Point, Point-to-Point, Point-to-Point, Point-to-Point,












































































2.3 Survival of the fittest?
The trendworldwidethus far indicatestwo quite divergent business strategies. The entrenched FSA
carriers' focuses on developing hub and spoke networks while new entrants seem intent on creating
low-cost, point-to-point structures. The hub and spoke system places a very high value on the feed
15Adaptedfrom"AirCanada,Turningon theafter-burnerin ProfitableSkies", April7, 2000, Mark Korol, NationalBank
Financial.
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traffic broughtto the hub by the spokes,especiallythe businesstraffictherein, thereby creating a
complex, marketingintense businesswhere revenueis the key andwhere productioncosts are high.
Inventory (of seats) is also kept highinorderto meetthe servicedemands of businesstravellers. The
FSA strategy is a highcost strategybecause_ hub-and-spokenetworkstructuremeans both
reduced pmduc'dvityfor capital (aircraft)andlabour(pilots,cabin crew,airportpersonnel) and
increased costs due to self-induced congestionfrom closelyspaced banksof a'ffcrafl.16
The FSA businessstrategyis sustainableaslongasno subgroupof passengerscan defect from the
coalition of all passenger groups,andrecognizingthis,cempe_on between FSAs includedloyalty
programs designed to protecteach airline'scoalition of passengergroups- hequent travelers in
particular. The resultingmarket structureof competition between FSAs was thus a cozy oligopolyin
whichairlines competed on pricesfor someeconomyfares, but practicedcomplex price discrimination
that allowed highyields on businesstravel. However,the vulnerabilityof the FSA business model was
•,,,,,,,,,,=tk,_.,_.,,,=,..,jrevealed through_ VBA s.,_ra_ which,{a_J t-.nlck_.vand choseonly those origin-destination
linksthat were profitableand (b) targetedpricesensitiveconsumers.17The potential therefore was not
for businesstravelersto defect from FSAs (loyaltyprogramshelpedto maintain this segment of
demand) butfor leisuretravelers and other infrequentflyers to be luredaway by lower fares.
Figures 2 and 3 present a schemata that helpto summarizethe conb'ibutoryfactors that propagated
the FSA hub-and-spokesystemand made itdominant,followedby the growthof the VBA strategy
along with the events and factors that now threaten the FSA model.
16Airlinesvtereabletoreducetheircoststo somedegreebypurchasinggroundservicesfromthirdpar0es.Unfortunately
theycouldnotdothiswithotherprocessesofthebusiness.
17VBAswillalsonothesitateto exitamarketifitisnotp_ (e.g.WestJet'srecentdecisionto leaveSaultSt.Marie
andSudbury)whileFSAsarereluctanttoexitforfearofmissingfeedb'alTlcandbeyondrevenue.
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Hub-and-spoke networks under threat: the growth of VBA point-to-point networks
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3. The economics of networks and airline competition
In thissection we setout a simple frameworkto explainthe evolutionof networkequilibriumand
showhow it is tied to the businessmodel.The linkage wiltdependon howthe businessmodets
differwith respect to the integrationof demand conditions,fixed andvariable costand network
organization.
Let three nodes {el, 02 ,e3; (0,0), (0,1), (1,0)}, formthe comer coordinatesof an isoscelesdght
tdangle. The nodes and the sidesof the tdanglemay thus represent a simple lineartravel network
that defines two 'short-haur travel links [(el, 02) ((}1,e3) ]and one 'long-haur link((}2, (}3).
In this travel network, the nodes represent points of entryandexit to/from the network,thus if the
network is assumed to be an air travel market, the nodes represent airports rather than cities. This
may be important when considedng congestion or other factors affecting passenger throughput at
airports.
This simple networkstructureallows us to compare three possible structuresfor the supplyof
travelservices: a complete (fully connected)point-to-pointnetwork(all travel constitutes a direct
link between two nodes); a hub-and-spoke network(travelbetween (}1and (}2requiresa
connectionthrough (}2)and limited(or partial)point-to-pointnetwork(Selective direct linksbetween











Figure 3: Alternative network structures
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Inthenetworkstructuresfeaturing point-to-pointravel, the _lity of consumerswhotravel depends
only on a singlemeasure of the time durationof travel and a singlemeasure of convenience.
However inthe hub-and spokenetwork, travelbetween01 and03 requiresa connection at 02,
consequently the time dura_n of travel depends uponthe summeddistancedlc3= d12+ d23=
I+.V_. Furthermore, in a hub-and spoke network,there is interdependencebetween the levels of
convenienceexperienced by travellers. If there are frequent flightsbetween01 and 02 but
infrequentflightsbetween 02 _d FJ3,_en _tra__!lerswi!!experle..nce,de_ys at 02.
There has been an evolving literature onthe economicsof networks ormoreproperlythe
economicsof network configuration.Hendrickset al. (1995) showthat economiesof density can
explainthe hub-and-spoke system as the optimalsystem in the airlinenetworks. The keyto the
explanation lies inthe level of density economies. However,when comparinga point-to-point
network they find the hub-and-spoke network ispreferred when marginalcostsare highand
demand _ lowbut given some fixed costs and intermediatevaluesof variable costs a point-to-point
network may be preferred. Shy (2001) showsthat profitlevels on a fully connected (FC) network
are higherthan on a hub-and-spoke network whenvariable flight costs are relativelylowand
passenger disu'dlitywith connections at hubs is high. What had not beenexplainedwell, untilPels
(2000) is the relative value of market size to achieve lowercosts per ASM versuseconomiesof
density.18
Pels et al. (2000) explore the optimality of airlinenetworks usinglinearmarginal cost functions and
linear,symmetricdemand functions; MC=I-pQ and P=(x-Q/2 where p is a returnsto density
parameter and c¢is a measure of market size. The Pels model demonstratesthe importanceof
fixedcosts in determining the dominance of onenetwork structureover anotherinterms of optimal
profitability.In particular, the robustness of the hub-and-spoke networkconfiguration claimedby
earlier authors(e.g. Hendricks et al., 1995) comes into question.
_8ASM- availableseatmile.
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In ourthree-node network,the Pels model generates two direct marketsandone transfer marketin
the hub-and-spokenetwork, compared withthree direct marketsinthe fully connectednetwork.
Defining aggregatedemand as Q = QD+ QT,the profitsfrom a hub-and-spokenetwork,are:
whilethe profits of a FC network are:
(1)
f)) (2)
More generally, for a network of size n, hub-and-spoke optimal profits are:
I-Im=(n-I(PDQD+_j-_PrQr)-(n-IIQD+(n-2)Qr_--_(QD + (n-2)Qr)2 +f] (3)
and FC profits are:
(4)
Under what conditions would an airline be indifferentbetween networkstructure?The market size
at which profit maximizing prices and quantities equate the profits in each network structure is:
=
fl(2n-1)+ 1+-_
fl (2n - 1 + fl) (5)
where, X= [1- fl(2n - 3)](fl - 1)[2)_(2n - 1+ fl)+/3 - l] (6)
The two possible values of _* implied by (5) represent upper and lower boundaries on the market
size for which the hub-and-spoke network and the fully connected network generate the same level
of optimal profits These boundary values are of course conditional on given values of the density
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economies parameter (0) fixed costs (t), and the size of the network(n). These parameterscan
provide a partialexplanationfor the transition from FC to hub-and-spokenetworkstructuresafter
deregulation.
W'_hrelativelylowretums to density, and low fixedcosts per link,even in a growingmarket,the
hub-and-spoke structuregenerates inferiorprofitscompared with the FC network, except whenthe
market size (¢z)is extremely high. However withhighfixed costs per networklink, the hub-and-
spoke structurebegins to dominateat a relativelysmall market size and this advantage isamplified
as the size of the network grows. Importantly inthis model, dominancedoes not mean thatthe
inferiornetwork structureis unprofitable,in (_) space, the feasible area (definingpmfitabiiity)of
the FC structureencompassesthat of the hub-and-spoke structure.This accommodatesthe
observationthat notall airlinesadopted the hub-and-spoke networkmodel following deregulation.
.__. re the mode!_runsintodifficultiesis inexplaining the._emergence of limitedpoi.nt..-to-point
networksand the VBA model, it is the symmebicstructure of the model that rendersit unableto
capturesome importantelements of the environmentin whi_ VBAs have been able to thrive.In
parlJcular, three importantelements of asymmetry are missing. First, the model doesnotallowfor
asymmetricdemand growthbetween nodes inthe network. W'_ marketgrowth, returnsto density
can increase on a subsetof links t_at would have been feeder spokesin the hub-and-spoke
systemwhen the market was less developed. These links may sUllbe infeasiblefor FSAsbut
become feasible and profitableas independent point-to-point operations,providingan airlinehas
lowenough costs. Second,the model does not distinguishbetween market demand segmentsand
thereforecannot capture the gradual commoditization of air travel, as more consumersbecome
frequent flyers.To many consumers today, air travel is no longer an exoticproductwithan airof
mysteryand an association_ wealth and luxury.There has been an evolutionof preferences
that reflectsthe perceptionthat air travel isjust another means of getting from A to B. As the
perceivednature of the productbecomes more commodity-like, consumers becomemere pdce
sensitiveand are willing to bade off elements of service for lower prices.19VBAs use their lowfares
19To modela sucha demandsystemwe needa consumerutilityfunctionof theform:
U = U (Y,T, V)= W'(Y- P); whereY representsdollarincomeper period andT E [0,1]representstraveltripsper
period.V is an indexofb'avelconvenience, relatedto flight frequency and P is the deliveredpriceoftravel.This
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to growthe market by competingwith other activities.Their low cost structurepermitssucha
strategy.FSAs cannotdo this to any degree because of their choice of bundledproductand higher
costs.
Third,the model does not capture important asymmetries inthe costs of FSAs and VBAs, suchthat
VBAs have significantly lower marginal and fixed costs. Notice that the dominance of the hub-and-
spoke structure over the FC network relies in part on the cost disadvantage of a fixed cost per link,
which becomes prohibitive in the FC network as the number of nodes (n) gets large. VBAs do not
suffer from this disadvantage because they can pick and choose only those nodes that are
profitable. Furthermore, FSAs variable costs are higher because of the higher fixed costs
associated with their choice of hub-and-spoke network.
4. Stability, competition and regulation
It wouldseem that witheach new economic cycle, the evolution of the airline industrybrings about
an industryreconfiguration.Several researchers have suggestedthat this is consistentwith an
industrystructurewith an 'empty core', meaning non-existence of a naturalmarket equilibrium.
Button(2003) makes the argument as follows. We know that a structuralshift inthe composition
(i.e., more low-costairlines)of the industry is occurringand travel substitutesare pushingdown
fares and traffic. We also observe that heightened secudty has increasedthe time and transacting
costsof tripsand these are drivingaway business, particularly short haul businesstrips.As legacy
airlinesshrinkand die away, new airlines emerge and take up the employmentand market slack.
The notion of the 'empty core' problem in economics is essentiallya characterizationof markets
wheretoo few competitorsgenerate supra-normal profits for incumbents,whichthen attractsentry.
Howeverentry creates frenzied competitionin a war-of-attrition game environment:the additional
competitioninduced by entry results in market and revenue shares that producelosses for all the
market participants.Consequently entry and competition leads to exit and a solidificationof market
reduceseachconsumer'schoiceproblemto consumptionf acompositecommoditypricedat$1,andthepossibilityof
takingatmostonetripperperiod.UtilityisincreasinginV anddecreasinginP,thustravellersarewillingtobade-off
conveniencefora lowerdeliveredprice.Diversityinthewillingnesstokade offconveniencefor wouldberepresented
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sharesbythe remainingcompetitorswho then earn supra-normal profitsthat once again willattract
entry.
Whilethereis some intuitiveappeal to explainingthe dynamic nature of the industryresultingfrom
an innateabsence of stabilityinthe market structure,there are theore'dcalproblems with this
perspeclive,z°The fundamental problem _ the empty coreconcept is that its roots lie in models
of exogenousmarketstructurethat/repose (via assumptions)the conditionsof the empty core
ratherthan derivingit as the resultof decisions made by potential or incumbent market
participants.In particular,for the empty core to perpetuate itseff,entrants must be either ill advised
or_"..............==-"..... =""opU '- --" ........... "-'oiitheory,,°.= ou,,,= -,,°_,.,,,_ ,=-,=u,, ,u, raisin. ,,, con_-ast,,,,Jut=. ,.uu_u,u_ organizaU in
economicsis concernedwithunderstandingendogenouslydetermined market sb'uctures.In such
models,the numberof firmsand their market conductemerge as the result of a decisionsto enter
or exit the market and decisionsconcerningcapacity, quantity and price.
Part ofthe generalproblemof modelingan evoMng market structureis to understand that
incumbentsand potentialentrantsto the market construct expectationswith respect to their
respectivemarket sharesin any post-entrymarket. A potentialentrant might be attracted by the
knownorperceived levelof profitsbeing earned by the incumbentfirm(s), but must consider how
i_,ar,y ,-,ewco,-_su,_ b_ey_.aiJ.,i.h,_;. [u iJr_i, p_uduuli. _ddi[iu. iu iJr_ markei,share thai.can
appropriated from the incumbent firm(s). This will depend in pert upon natural (technological) and
strategicbarriers to entry, and on the response that can be expected if entry occurs. Thus entry
onlyoccurs if the expected profitsexceed the sunkcosts of entry. While natural variation in
demand conditionsmay induce firms to make errors in their predi_ons, resulting in enW and exit











In theair travelindustry,incumbentfirms (especially FSAs) spend considerable resources to
protecttheirmarketshares from internaland external competition. The use of frequent flier points
alongwithmarketing and brandingserve this purpose.These actions raise the barriers to entry for
airlinesoperatingsimilarbusinessmodels.
Whataboutthe threatof entryorthe expansionof operations by VBAs? Could this lead to exit by
FSAs?There may be legitimate concern from FSAs concerning the sustainabilityof the full-service
business model when faced with low-cost competition. In particular, the use of frequency as an
attribute of service quality by FSAs generates revenues from high-value business travellers, but
these revenues only translate into profits when there are enough economy travellers to satisfy load
factors. So, to the extent that VBAs steal away market share from FSAs they put pressure on the
viability of this aspect of the FSA business model. The greatest threat to the FSA from a VBA is
that a lower the fare structure offered to a subset of passengers may induce the FSA to expand the
proportion of seats offered to lower fares within the yield management system. This will occur with
those VBAs like Southwest, Virgin Blue in Australia and easyjet that do attempt to attract the
business traveller from small and medium size firms. However, carders like Ryanair and Westjet
have a lower impact on overall fare structure since their frequencies are lower and the FSA can
target the VBAs flights._
While FSAsmay find themselvesengaged in price and/or quality competition, the economicsof
price competition with differentiated products suggests that such markets can sustain oligopoly
structures in whichfirms earn positive profits. This occurs because the prices of competing firms
become strategic complements. That is, when one firm increases its price, the profit maximizing
response of competitors is to raise price also and there are many dimensions on which airlines can
product differentiate within the FSA business model.23
There is no question FSAs have higher seat mile costs than VBAs. The problem comes about






low. This 'myopic'viewignoresthe needto coverthe longrun cost of capital. This inconjunction
with the argumentthat networkrevenuecon_bution justifiesmost all mutes, leadsto excessive
network size andsevere pricediscoun_g. 24However,when economies are buoyant, high yield
trafficprovidessufficientrevenuesto covercosts and provide substantial profit. Intheir assessment
of the US airlineindusW, MorrisonandW'mston(1995) argue that the vast majorityof losses
incurredby FSAsup to that pointwere due to theirown fare, and fare war, strategies. It must be
remembered that FSAsco-existwithSouthwestinlarge numbers of markets inthe US.
4.1 Competition policy and competition between FSAs and VBAs
What responsewouldweexpectfTOman FSA to limitedcompe_on from a VBA on selected links
of its hub-and-spokenetwork? Giventhe FSA focuson maximization of aggregate network
revenues and a cognisancethat successfulVBAentry could steal away their base of economy fare
consumers (used to generatethe frequencies that providehigh yield revenues), one mightexpect
aggressivepricecompet_lJonto eitherprevententryor to hasten the exit of a VBA rival. This
creates a problemfor cohen bureausaroundthe world as VBAs file an increasingnumber of
predatorypricingcharges againstFSAs. Similarly, the abilityof FSAs to compete as hub-and-
spoke carriers againsta competitivethreat from VBAs is constrained by the rules of the game as
defined by competition policy.
In Canada, Air Canada faces a charge of predatorypricingfor its compe_on against CanJet and
WesUet inEastern Canada. Inthe US, AmericanAirlineswon its case in a predatorypricing
charge broughtby three VBAs:VanguardAirlines,Sun Jet and Western Pacific Airlines. In









Morrison(2003) points outthreeimportantdimensions of predatory pricing inair travel markets.
First, demand complementarities in hub-and-spoke networks lead FSAs to focus on 'beyond
revenues'-the revenue generated by a series of flights in an itinerary rather than the revenues
generated by any one leg of the trip. FSA's therefore justify aggressive price competition with a
VBA as a means of using the fare on that link (from an origin node to the hub node for example) as
a way of maximizing the beyond revenues created when passengers purchase travel on additional
links (from the hub to other nodes in the network). The problem with this argument is that
promotional pricing is implicitly a bundling argument, where the airline bundles links inthe network
to maximize revenue. However when FSAs compete fiercely on price against VBAs, the price on
that link is not limited to those customers who demand beyond travel. Therefore, whether or not
there is an intent to engage in predatory pricing, the effect is predatory as it deprives the VBA of
customers who do not demand beyond travel.
A second dimension of predatory pricing is vertical product differentiation. FSA's competition
authorities to support the view that they the right to match prices of a rival VBA. However, the
bundle of services offered by FSAs constitutes a more valuable package. In particular, the
provision of frequent flyer programs creates a situationwhere matching the price of a VBA is 'de
facto' price undercutting, adjusting for product differentiation. A recent case between the VBA
Germania and Lufthansa resulted in the Bundeskartellamt (the German competition authority)
imposing a price premium restriction on Lufthansa that prevented the FSA from matching the VBAs
prices.
A third importantdimension of predatory pricing in air travel markets is the abilitywhich FSAs have
to shift capacity around a hub-and-spoke network, which necessarily requires a mixed fleet with
variable seating capacities. In standard limit output models of entry deterrence, an investment in
capacity is not a credible threat to of price competition if the entrant conjectures that the incumbent
will not use that capacityonce entry occurs. Such models utilize the notion that a capacity
investment is an irreversible commitment and that valuable reputation effects cannot be generated
by the incumbent engaging in 'irrational' price competition. However in a hub-and-spoke network,
an FSA can make a credible threat to transfer capacity to a particular link in the network in support
of aggressive price competition, with the knowledge that the capacity can be redeployed elsewhere
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in the network whenthe competitivethreat is over.This createsa positivebarrierto enW with
reputation effectsoccurringin thoseinstanceswhereentryoccurs.Suchwas the case when
CanJet and West Jet met withaggressivepricecompetition fromAir Canada on flightsfrom
Monkton NB to Toronto(AirCanada andCan,Jet)and Hamilton(WesUet). The FSA defence
against such chargesis that aircraftdo notconstitutean avoidablecost and should notbe included
in any price-costtest of predation.Yet whileaircraftare notavoidablewith respectto the network.
they are avoidable to the extentthey can be redeployedaroundthe network. If aircraft costs
become included in measures of predaUonundercompetition laws, this will limitthe success of
price competition as a competitive responsebyan FSAs respondingto VBA entry.
In the currentenvironment,compeUtionpolicyrulesare notwellspecifiedand the uncertaintydoes
nothing to protectcompetition orto enhance fileviabilityof air travel markets. However there has
been increased academicinterestin the issueand it seems likelythat given the number of cases,
some policychanges willbe made.2sOnce again,the way in whichFSAs have respondedto
competition fromVBAs reflectstheir network model,and competitionpolicydecisions that prevent
_-_,,-,,.,s ........ _, price m_ch._g _,,,__,,,h.,-;,,, ,,_'_,..... ,_........ _,,,,, v, .,u,,_, revenues' w., =eve,'ely con=u=,, u%eset
of strategies an FSA can employwithout causingsome fundamental changes in the business
model and correspondingnetworkstructure.
5 So where are we headed?
In evolution,the notionof selection dynamicsleadus to expect that unsuccessfulstrategies will be
abandoned and successfulstrategieswillbe copiedor imitated.We have already observed FSAs
attempts to replicatethe VBA businessmodelthroughthe creationof fighting brands. Air Canada
created Tango, Zip, Jazz. and Jetz. Few other carriers worldwidehave followed such an extensive
re-branding. In Europe, BritishAirwayscreatedGO and KLM created BUT7, both of which have
since been sold and swallowedupby otherVBAs. Qantas has created a low cost long haul carrier
- AustralianAirlines..Meanwhile,Air New Zealand, Lufthansa, Delta and United are moving in the
directionof a lowprice-lowcost brand.
SeeRossandStanbury(2001)forexample.
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We are alsoseeing attemptsby FSAs to simplifytheir fare structuresand exploit the cost savings
from direct sales over the intemet. Thus there do seem to be evolutionary forces that are moving
airlines away from the hub-and-spoke network in the direction of providing connections as distinct
from true hubbing.
AmericanAirlinesis usinga 'rolling hub'concept,which does exactlyas its name implies. The
purpose is to reduce costs through both fewer factors such as aircraft and labour and to increase
productivity. The first step is to 'de-peak' the hub, which means not having banks as tightly
integrated. This reduces the amount of own congestion created at hubs by the hubbing carrier and
reduces aircraft needed. It also reduces service quality but it has become clear that the traditionally
high yield business passenger who valued such time-savings is no longer willing to pay the very
high costs that are incurred in producing them. However, as an example, American Airlines has
reduced daily flights at Chicago so withthe new schedules it has increased the total elapsed time
of flights by an average of 10 rain. Elapsed time is a competitive issue for airlines as they vie for
high-yield passengers who, as a group, have abandoned the airlines and caused revenues to
slump. But that 10-rain. average lengthening of elapsed time appears to be a negative American is
willing to accept in exchange for the benefits.
At Chicago, where the new spread-out schedulewas introduced inApril, American has been able
to operate 330 daily flights with five fewer aircraft and four fewer gates and a manpower reduction
of 4-5%.2_The change has cleared the way for a smoother flow of aircraft departures and has
saved taxi time. 27It's likely that American will try to keep to the schedule and be disinclined to hold
aircraft to accommodate late arriving connection passengers. While this may appear to be a
service reduction it in fact may not, since on-time performance has improved. 28
26Americanhas alsoreducedits turnaroundatspokecitiesfrom 2.5 hourspreviouslyto approximately42 minutes.
27Asa resultofsmoothertrafficflows,Americanhasbeenoperatingat Dallas/FortWorthInternationalAirportwithnine
fewermainlineaircraftandtwofewerregionalaircraft.At Chicago,the improvedefficiencyhas allowedAmericanto
takefive aircraftoff the schedule,threelargejetsandtwoAmericanEagleaircraft.Americanestimatessavingsof $100
milliona yearfrom reducedcostsfor fuel, facilities andpersonnel,partof the$2 billioninpermanentcostsit has
trimmedfrom itsexpensesheet.The newflightschedulehas broughtunexpectedcost reliefat the hubsbutalsoat the




The evolutionof networks in today'senvironmentwillbe basedonthe choiceof businessmodel
that airlines make. This is tied to evolvingdemandconditions,the developingtechnologiesof
aircraft and infrastructureand the strategicchoicesof airlines.As we have seen, the hub-and-
spoke system is an endogenouschoice for FSAwhile the linearFC networkprovidesthe same
scope for VBAs. The threat to the hub-and-spokenetworkis thethreat to bundledpnxluctof FSAs.
The hub-and-spoke network willonly disappearif the FSA cannotimplementa lower cost structure
business model and at the same time providethe serviceandcoveragethat higheryield
passengers demand. The higher yieldpassengershave notdisappearedthe market has only
become somewhat smaller and certair,ly more fare sense'-re,onaverage.
FSAs have responded to VBAs by tryingto copyelementsoftheir businessstrategy including
reduced in-flightservice, low cost [fighting]brands,and morepoint-to-pointservice. However, the
ability,of FSA to coexist withVBA and hence hub-and-spokenetworks with linear networks is to
redesign their products and provideincentivesforpassengersto allow a reductionin product,
process and organizational complexity.This isa difficultchallengesincethey face complex
.... '_"" ig mpleden'_nds, ,=o=,.,,_ in the des n "_ ..-.._,,._ -.._ ,_.,,_._,_ ;..... _..v,.=_.=.._ ,_,i,.h
is a characteristicof _ product.For example, no-showsare a largecost for FSA and they have to
aesign ttleir systems in sucha way as to accommodatei_ no-shuws. Tilis inuludesuve_-booki_
and the introductionof demand variability.Thisuncertaindemandarisesbecause airlineshave
induced it with service to their highyield passengers.Puttinginplacea set of incentivesto reduce
no-showswould lower costs becausethe complexity would be reducedor eliminated. One should
have complexityonly when it adds value. AnothercoslJyfeature of serving businesstravel is to
maintainsufficient inventory of seats in marketsto meet thetJrnesensi'dvedemands of business
travellers.
The hub-and-spoke structure is complex,the businessprocessesare complex and these create
costs.A hub-and-spoke network lowersproductivityand increasesvariableand fixed costs,but
these are not characteristics inherentin the hub-and-spokedesign.They are inherent in the way
28Intere_ngly, from an airportperspectivethepassengermaynotspendmoretotalelapsedtimebutsimplymoretime
intheterminaland less timeinthe aiq)lane.Thismayprovideopportunitiesfornon-aviationrevenuestrategies.
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FSAusethehub-and-spoke networkto deliverand addvalue to theirproduct.This is because the
processes are complex even thoughthe complexityis needed for a smaller,more demanding,
higheryield set of customers.The redesigningof businessprocessesmovesthe FSA between
cost functions and not simplydown their existingcostfunction but they will notduplicate the cost
advantage of VBAs. The networkstructuredrivespricing,fleet and servicestrategies and the
network structureis ultimatelyconditionalon the size and preferencesinthe market.
What of the future and what factors will affectthe evolutionof networkdesignand scope? Airline
markets with their networksare continuouslyevolving.What tookplaceinthe US ten years ago is
nowoccurringin Europe. A 'modem' feature of networksis the strategicalliance.Alliances
between airlines allow them to extendtheir network,improvetheirproductand service choice but
at a cost. Alliances are a feature associated with FSAsnotVBAs. It maybe that as FSAs reposition
themselves they will make greater use of alliances.VBAs onthe otherhand willrely more on
interliningto extend their market reach. Interliningis made morecosteffectivewith modem
technologies but also withairportshavingan incentiveto offersuchservicesrather than have the
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Despite deregulation on the air-transportation markets, many con-
nections are still operated by a single operator. Regxdation is thus a
central issue in this industry. There is however a great concern for the
(possibly negative) consequences of price regulation on the quality of
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1 Introduction
"Maintaining competition in deregulated airlines markets" is, in the words of
Meyer and Menzies (2000), a key concern of the air-transportation industry.
Despite the deregulation that occurred in the last years, there is still a very
low level of competition on the European market. In 1997, namely five years
after the adoption of the '%hird package" 1 by the European Commission,
almost 85% of the 336 connections over the French territory were run by one
operator and more than 12% by only two. This makes it clear that regulation
is a perspective that cannot be ignored.
Regulation of air transportation services cannot escape the quality issue.
Economies of scale leads naturally the monopolist to provide connections with
a lower frequency than what would be optimal from a social welfare point of
view. And in a regulated environment, it might be feared that firms concen-
trate their efforts on reducing costs at the expense of quality; frequency may
thus be reduced and welfare further deteriorated. The specificity of the ap-
proach consists in addressing simultaneously both distortions: the distortion
in terms of prices and the distortion in terms of frequency. It is shown in
this paper that the socially optimal supply of services as caracterised by" the
price and the frequency can be reached by the means of a simple regulatory
mechanism: a price-cap constraint that depends on the frequency of services.
The air-transportation industry is made of a complex network of travel
services. Within this network, each of the services is in interaction with the
others in order to insure possible connections. Most companies are never-
theless organised according to a star network, that is, with transportation
services that connect a central airport (hub) to the periphery (spoke). The
generalisation of this "hub-and spokes" system makes the management of
each of this services almost independent from the others. As a matter of
t2409/92: Council Regulation of 23 July 1992 on fares and rates for air services (OJ
L 240 of 28 August 1992). This is the last step in the european process that implemented
full deregulation in the sector.
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facts, a large fraction of the passengers may actually pursue its travel and
have a connection. However, as long as there is not a unique final destination
and passengers are distributed m_r se_era! connections, there are no reasons
to favour a specific arrival time. This is in partioflar true on the most impor-
tant routes, for which the frequency of ser_4ces is quite high. As a result, each
of the transportation services can be considered as an independent market.
In the model, we thus focus on a single origin-destination pair. The (ag-
gregate) demand for air transportation services is a function of the price
and the frequency of services. Each (Air-)travel translates indeed in both
monetary and (waiting-)time costs for the passengers. We first caracterise
the first best allocation that can be interpreted as a generalization of the
marginal pricing rules. When compared to the standard monopoly regula-
tion problem there is an additional trade-off. An increase in the frequency
of services induces an increase in operational costs but also in improvement
of consume_a-s' w_faxe. These benefits are e_x]uated by using the well-known
concept "value of time". It is shown that, ff sustainability is not a con-
cern, the optimal allocation is such that the "generalised price" for users
:_ equal to the a'_,_ge _ - "*"*: _ _w-_,arapoz_,on costs. A .... "_step of the analysis
consist in displaying the choices made by a non-regulated monopolist. The
optimal structure introduced before. The study goes on by considering the
second-best opt=m, a more realistic situation where social welfare is max-
imised taking into account the sustainability constraint. This is a modified
Ramsey-Boiteux problem that takes into account the specificities of the air
transportation sector. The model presented here bears several characteristics
in common with the literature on quality regulation 2. The model brings how-
ever several new insights that are not explicitly dealt with in this literature.
In particular we address the implementation problem for the second-best al-
location when quality is taken into account. Regarding the air-transportation
2See I.affont and Tirole (1993, chap. 4).
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sector, Panzar (1979) is the first to address these questions. The issues of air
transportation regulation and public policy are discussed at length by Levine
(1987). The closest model to our analysis is a recent contribution by Brueck-
her and Zhang (2001). Their much more ambitious study calls however for a
priori assumptions on the demand function that we are able to avoid here.
2 The model
The supply of air-transportation services between two airports is caracterised
by the pair (p, f) where p denotes the ticket price and f the frequency of the
flights. The company has to bear fixed costs F and operational costs. Pro-
duction costs. The later are directly related to the frequency of connections
and the nature of the planes. A one way flight with a plane of capacity K
translates into operational costs C (K) on the link that is considered.
In the long run, the company is assumed to adjust the capacity K of the
planes to the total traffic observed X. The relation K = X/f is considered
to hold all along the paper. The framework may however easily be adapted
to situation where planes are not used at full capacity.
We also assume that there are increasing returns to scale: the average trans-
portation cost C (K)/K is a decreasing function of the aircraft size K. This
hypothesis is fully backed by empirical data. As an example, for Airbus A320
category, even when we ignore the fact that bigger planes usually allow to
reach higher distances, the elasticity with respect to capacity of total con-
sumption per passenger is almost constant at -0.84. From a theoretical point
of view, this hypothesis brings an explanation to several facts. First, it ex-
plains why there are no competitors on the connection considered. Second,
it also explains why it is less costly for to companv to offer low-frequency
services with large a&-planes rather than numerous connections with small
capacity aircrafts.
The demand in air-transportation services depends on the price p but also
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on the frequency of connections f. Assuming the ideal departure time to be
uniformly distributed along the time interval that separates two departures,
the ax_rage _aiting time is equal to 1/2f. Denote v the value of time of the
population that is considered. The axerage (waiting-)time costs for services
of "quality" f mounts to u/2f for each passengers flying between the two
cities.
Let S (.) be the (gross) surplus of the representative travellers, a function of
its travel consumption. The net surplus is obtained by taking off all the costs
supported by the travellers: ticket price p and time costs v/2f. We can thus
define the demand function as:
Substitute the demand function into the net surplus to get the indirect utility
function:
-V (p, f) -- S [X (p, f)j - i X _,, f). (2)
The identities (1) and (2) display the fact that the unitary costs of the com-
modity X (one travel) for the passengers amount to the "generalised price"
= p + v/2f. In other words, demand is a function of the whole transporta-
tion costs and not the sole price p. This explains why the observed traffic is
also a function of the value of time p.
3 Social Optimum
In this section, we analyse the first-best allocation, that is the allocation
that ma_cimiT_s the social welfare (the sum of consumers' surplus and firm's
profits). At this stage the company is not required to break-even. We thus
implicitly assume that fixed costs can be financed without efficiency cost
trough a subsidy financed from the general budget. Such a solution is usually
not considered to be realistic. Nevertheless it provides us with an interesting
benchmark.
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Total surplus can be expressed as follows:
I¥1 (X, f) = S (X) - _]X - fC - F (3)
where fixed costs, operational costs but also passengers' time costs are sub-
stracted from the gross surplus. Differentiating (3) with respect to X and f,
and rearranging yields the following first-order conditions:
v
s' (x) : o' (K) + 57' (4)
v = C(K) c'(g). (5)
2f K
Equation (4) evidences the two components of the marginal cost of an ad-
ditional passenger. On the one hand, the (standard) marginal cost of pro-
duction C' (K) as supported by the firm. On the other hand, the time costs
v/2f supported by this additional passenger. Equation (5) evidences the
twofold effect of an increase in frequency. On the one hand, an increase of
the operational costs that is proportional to the unit cost of a flight (thus
the average transportation cost). This is a consequence of the marginal in-
crease in the number of flights. On the other hand, a marginal decrease in
the cost of each flight that follows from the decrease of the capacity K. As a
result, the hypothesis of capacity adjustment yields to the conclusion that,
the optimal (long run) allocation as caracterised by X and f should be such
that:
C(K) (6)
S' (X) = g
In words, the double marginal rule that should govern the choice of X and f
results in a rule where the optimal capacity is defined by the average costs.
Travellers' maximising behaviour implies S' (X) = p + v/2f. Substituting
this expression into (4) and (6) leads to:
p = C'(K), (7)
c(g)
/3 = g (S)
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Expressions (7) and (8) show respectively that first-best allocation can be
decentralized through (i) marginal cost pricing and (ii) a frequency of con-
nections such that the generalised price/3 as supported by the passenger
exactly equals the average transportation cost. Interestingly enough, this in-
duces an efficient setting of the transportation services characteristics. The
(only) travellers are those for which the transportation costs (including time
costs) are smaller than the firms" operational costs.
A consequence of this (optimal) pricing policy is however that the corn-
pan), does not break-even. More precisely, sales will only cover marginal costs
_,,_ ur.ucJ_ wm maoun_ a_ ieas_ to the fixed costs F. Profits may indeed
be written as:
1-I=pX-fC(K)-F=fK[C'(K) C/_)]-F
where C' (K) < C (K)/K from the increasing returns to scale assumption.
Remark that, the higher the value of time v and the higher the traffic level
X, the bigger the losses. By using (5), the profits of the firm at the first-best
optimum can be rewritten as:
p
II = -_X - F.
As a result, the first-best solution is not feasible if the operator faces a break-
even constraint. One has then to consider a second-best solution where prices
are set above marginal cost in order to recover all the costs. This question
is addressed below.
4 Transportation services with a profit maxi-
mising monopolist
The first-best allocation has been computed by considering social welfare
and fully ignoring the issue of profitability. Vqe know turn to the converse
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situation by considering the choices made by a profit-maximising monopolist.
The price p and the frequency f will be such that the profit
H (p, f) = pX (p, f) - fC (X/f) - F
is maximum. This gives rise to the following first-order conditions:
on Ox
= X(p,f)+(p-C'(g))--_p =0
Ono_.f c' Ox f= (p- (K))--_-]--C(K)+ c'(g)=0.
In order to interpret these expressions, it is useful to introduce the price-
elasticity of the demand function (in absolute value):
p OX (p, f)
ex, = X (p , f ) cOp
This value measures the rate of demand decrease that follows from a one
point increase in the price. Note that this parameter depends a priori on the
price p and the frequency f. Since the link between price and frequency are
at the center of the questions addressed in this paper, it is useful to study
the impact on demand of changes in both parameters. For this purpose, we
use equation (1) describing travellers' behaviour to get:
cOX (p, f) v cOX (p, f)
Of 2f 2 COp
We can now re-write the FOC to obtain the following characterization of
the services supplied by a profit-maximising monopolist:




- C' (g). (10)
2f K
Equation (9) shows that the mark-up made by the monopolist is inversely
related with the price-elasticity of demand. In words, the more captive the
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travellers are, (i.e. the less alternatix_es they have so that they are con-
strained to pay their ticket '_,hatever the price"), the higher the profits of
the company. Interestingl3; this weU-..kno_m monopoly pridng formula is not
modified by the possibility of choosing the frequency of connections. Note
however that this does not mean that the price p is independent from the
frequency f : the elasticity ex_ is indeed a function of both parameters.
It may appear surprising that equation (10) does not differ from the equation
(5) that defines optimal frequency at the firs>best. Again, the unchanged
r_de does not mean that value will be the same in both cases. V_qlile the aver-
age waiting time should always be equal to the difference between the mean
cost and the marginal cost, these costs are evaluated for different values of
the capacity, K = X/f. It is nevertheless remarkable to find unchanged the
rule that governs the choice of f. Even the unregulated monopolist sets ] by
taking into account, not only the impact of f on its o_m costs but also the
impact of f on trax_ilers surplus (because of ius effect on the uravel demand).
5 Traffic and frequency complementarity
...... 1: -Since Spence (19,"5) we Imow that a muuul_,,.-t may-under- or over- supply
.... 1_-_. /_.;¢1_ ...... + _ _.I_- ..... 1..1 !_ ..... :.,11 ..... _: ........ "_ ._1 ..... 1; ..... +1_
comp]ementmri_ or substitutability of the quanti_" and the quality. By def-
L_itiozh X and jr will be complement ff the social benefits of quality increase
_th the n_ber of travellers or _ this is equivalent_ if the _l bene-
fits of one travel increase with the _equency. There will be substitutability
otherwise. Formally complementarity is defined by:
0 c'
oxof = ofox = o-7 (g)] > 0 (n)
In other words, X and f are complements (resp. substitutes) if the difference
between the marginal _llingness to pay for a ticket and the marginal cost of
a travel is increasing with the frequency (resp. decreasing). The behaviour of
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the firm will however depend on its capacity to extract the consumer surplus
rather than its value. This leads us to rewrite equatiol_ (11) by using equation
(5) that characterises frequency to obtain:
02W K d [C(K) C' (K)]OfOX f dK
This equation makes it clear that demand and frequency are complements if
the difference between the mean cost and the marginal cost is decreasing with
the plane capacity. Observe that this same difference governs the frequency
choice both at the social optimum and at the profit maximising equilibrium.
Given a frequency of connections f, the demand X and thus the capacity
of the aircrafts K will be lower in the monopoly case than at the first-best.
In case of complementarity, the average waiting time is decreasing with K.
Thus the monopolist will set a lower frequency than what would be socially
optimum. In case of substitutability, the frequency would be higher.
Note that complementarity of X and f is actually a fair assumption since
_ v C" (K).
2X
Thus, in order to have substitutability, one should have a (strongly) decreas-
ing marginal cost: C" (K) < -v/(2X). As soon as it is not the case, traffic
and frequency will be complement and the monopolist will set a frequency f
below what would be socially optimum. This is the assumption made in the
remaining part of the paper.












V_Tenow turn to the so-called second-best, where social welfare
i,' /Y\
-'_o_,:>:,.o,,:_+,,(.,:>=_<.,<>-:_ s_tT)-F
is maximised under the constraint that the firm may break-even. Observe
that, even without any fixed costs F, the assumption made earher according
to which the mean cost C (K)/K is decreasing imphes that the price should
be higher than the marginal cost for the firm to break-even.
Denote L the Lagrangian expression associated _th this problem while
is the multiplier of the break-even constraint. We obtain the followin_ first
order conditions:
OLop = S' (X) - + _-] --_ - X Op,f)
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OL
of
+(I + A) [X (p,f)+(p-C'(K)) O-_p] =0,
S' (X) - p + _ Of 2f 2X (p' f)
+(I+A) (p-C'(K))-_-f-C(K)+-fC (K)
=0.
By using equation (1) that describes travellers behaviour and the various
notations introduced above, this system can be simplified to get
p- c' (K) 1
p 1 +A exv'




Equation (12) shows that the rule that governs the setting of prices at the
second-best is not modified when time costs are taken into account. This
is the standard Ramsey formula. Since the distortion that follows from a
price set above the marginal cost increases with the elasticity of demand, the
mark-up should be inversely related to this price elasticity. It is set in such a
way that the overall distortion is minimised and the firm can recover all its
costs which importance is measured by the shadow price A.
Equation (13) is unchanged with respect to equation (5) obtained for the
first-best. This does not come as a surprise since the equation governing the
choice of frequency was already the same for the un-regulated monopolist.
Remind that this does not mean that the frequency will be identical. In
particular, if X and f are complements, the frequency set by a regulated
monopolist should be higher than the frequency that would be chosen by a
profit-maximising firm. (and lower than the first-best level).
A last remark should be made regarding equation (13). That the multiplier
A is not part of it does not mean that the frequency f is independent of the
fixed costs F. If costs increase, then A increases since the mark-up increases
in order to cover this additional costs. Thus the price p (at second-best) is
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an increasing function of F. More precisely, the price p and the frequency
f at the second-best optimum less and less differ from the values set by a
profit_maximising firm (thus more and more differ from the first-best values).
In other words, a state-owned firm which maximizes social welfare subject
to the break-even constraint but which is relatively inefficient (and thus has
to finance high fixed costs) does not really differ from a profit maximising
firm. _
The implementation of the (second-best) optimal allocation raises several
difficulties. On the one hand the regulator does not usually have a sufficient
knowledge of the market in order to decide what should be the characteristi_
(price and frequency) of each city-pair connection. On the other hand, with-
out any competition and control, the air-transportation company is expected
to offer services with (too) high tariffs at a (too) low frequency. This will push
down the welfare of inhabitants and the profits of the firms in the concerned
cities; and thus hinder the economy of an entire region. Note that a publicly
owned firm would not solve for this problem. As soon as managers' reward is
linked with the firm performance which appear to be desirable feature the
company will adopt a strategy that aims to maximise profits. The problem
is thus fundamentally linked with the _rking of markets, or, in the words
of Spence, with the "divergence between private and social benefits". Again,
facts speaks from themselves. On the Paris-Toulouse connection, for exam-
ple, in the years that follow deregulation in Europe, the number of passengers
raised by one half, the average capacity of the flights has been halved and
the number of moves tripled. The aim of the mechanism proposed here is
3If in addition to fixed costs F, operational costs C (K) are also higher for a public
owned firm, it might be more convenient for the consummers to face a profit-maximising
firm.
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precisely to give the "right incentives" to the firms where deregulation has
not allowed markets to escape a monopolistic situation. However, as already
mentioned, the regulator should not (and cannot) substitute herself to the
company because of obvious asymmetric information problems. We show that
it is nevertheless possible to decentralise the optimal (second-best) solution
by the means of a price-cap conjugated with a suitable "quality reward".




The company is free to use its knowledge of demand in order to choose the
price p and the frequency f on the considered market provided that the
generalised price that travellers have to support does not exceed an upper
bound _. As a result, the quality of services dispose the upper limit for prices.
Put it the other way: tariff setting determines a minimum frequency level.
The first-order conditions of this maximisation program can be written as:
OX
X (p, f l + (P- C' (K l )---_pp - # = 0
(p- C' (K)) aX X , v
--_- - C (K ) + -]-C (K ) + #-_.ff -- 0
where # is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the "price-and frequency"
cap constraint (14). Assume that the regulator fix the upper bound _ in such
a way that
# = X*l (1 + :,)
where X* is the demand at the second-best optimum. The monopolist will
find it profitable to fix p and f such that:
1





In order to implement the optimal solution, it is thus sufficient to compel the
firm to offer services such that their "generalised prices" do not exceed their
second-best optimal values.
Such a regulatory mechanism could appear to be an artificial (and useless)
rewriting of the problem if the regulatory body would not have the necessary
information to fix _. Despite its simplicity, the mechanism proposed here
appears to be perfectly implementable. The optimal solution can be reached
by the means of an iterative mechanism inspired by Vogelsang and Finsinger
(1979) that is based on the sole book-keeping data4 In the remaining part
of the paper, we study how it extends to an heterogeneous population.
8 Heterogeneity of characteristics and regu-
lation
The outlined regulatory process ability to work when travellers are heteroge-
neous is the focus of the present section. To do this we consider a population
of travellers with value of time v distributed over [0, +oo[, according to the
density function g (v) and the cumulative distribution function G (v). The
aggregate demand is thus given _,
X (p, f) = x_ (p, f) g (v) dv
where x_ (p, f) is the individual demand of a traveller with a value of time
v, as defined by equation (1). Note that, at this stage, the _alue of timc v is
the only characteristic that differs across individuals.
Taking into account the very fact that the company cannot offer differ-
ent connection frequencies to the passengers, the computation of the social
4More precisely, one need to observe traffic, prices and profits at each period and for
each connection. The principle consists in adjusting the coe2]icient of the constraint at
each period and one can show that this coefficient will converge to their optimal values.
On this m_mnisms and their limits, see Laffond and Tirole (1993).
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optimum as defined by the first-best leads to almost unchanged conclusions.
Indeed, the optimal allocation is now defined by the system
/]
= aZl , (15)
-_ c (g)
- C' (g). (16)
2f K
where "_ = f+_ v (x_/X) g (v) dv is a weighted average of the x-alue of time.
In words equation (15) states that all traveUers _ should see the marginal
benefits of their travel to equate the sum of the marginal cost of production
C' (K) and their own (waiting-) time costs ,/2f. Equation (16) substitutes
for equation (5) in defining the optimal frequency f. It states that the mean
value of time P to be considered is an average that weights the value of
time proportionally to the relative number of travel xv/X. In other words,
the more people travel, the more their value of time impact on the value p
considered by the social planner.
Interestingly enough, this optimal allocation can still be implemented by the
means of a marginal pricing rule. More precisely, the travellers' behaviour as
defined by (1) implies that S' (xv) = p + ,/(2f) all _. Thus p = C' (K) and
f defined by equation (16) will exactly decentralise the optimum allocation.
Consequently, under the assumption of this model the heterogeneity does
not introduce any source of inefficiency in the setting of the transportation
services. Whatever its value of time v, each traveller use transportation
services up to (and no more than) a level such that her marginal benefits
exactly equates the total (i.e. production and time) marginal cost. Note
that, in contrast to the representative agent case, each traveller will now
support a different generalised price, lo, :
v C (K) v -
2--]= ---k--+ 2---K
In words, the generalised price is equal to the average cost plus the difference
between the their own (waiting-) time and the average one.
5Whatever their value of time v.
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As long as the company sticks to linear tariffs, the profit-maximising
structure of services is defined by the pair (p, f) that solves for the s3,stem:
OX
X (p, f ) + (p - C' (g ) ) -_p = 0
OX X,
(p-C'(g))-_-c(g)+7C (g) = 0
Price is thus defined by the standard formula
p-C'(g)_ 1
p exp'
while the frequency obeys an equation unchanged in its form:
____=c(g) C'(K).
21 K
In contrast to what happens when the regulator sets for f, the average value of
time considered is not proportional to frequent- of use of aXr-trar_po_ation
._n-vices. The firm rather consider the profitabili_" of each type so that _ is
defined by:
= vo--2 g (v)fo+ 0 ./Op
= ,_ g (IA d1_
Jo X ex_
where
This does mean that the value of time is biased '%oward" the more sensitive
tb_pes, i.e. the types with the higher price elasticity- e_.
Not surprisingl); the second-best allocation corresponds to a solution the
lies in-between the first-best allocation and the profit-maximising one. More
precisely, price and frequency are defined by the system:
p-Cx _ 1
p l+_exp'
b__ = _C (g) C' (g).
2f K
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where A isthe '_usual" Lagrange multiplier associated with the break-even
constraint and the value of time P is a weighted sum of the value already
introduced P and p:
I+A "
Such a resultsheds a prioria verynegativelighton the applicabilityofthe
regulatorymechanism proposed above. Informationconsiderationsmakes it
obviousthatsuch a valuecannotbe assumed to be known by the regulator.
Itmakes thusmore strikingthe followingresult:the second-bestallocation
willbe (exactly)implemented by a monopolist submitted to the regulatory
constraint:
where Y is the mean value of time over the plane passengers. The proposed
mechanism does not require the regulator to have more knowledge than the
"social" or "average" value of time.
9 CONCLUSION
The optimal tariffs and optimal frequency of air transportation services is
determined. Despite the complex interaction between price and quality (fre-
quency), the optimal price is exactly defined by the Ramsey-BoReux rule.
The optimal frequency should be such that the time costs equate the differ-
ence between the average and the marginal costs. If quantity and frequency
are strategic complements, a monopoly will setup the prices above the so-
cially optimal value and the frequency below the socially optimal level.
In order for the optimal structure of services to be set up by the mo-
nopolist, incentives should be given both to decrease price and to increase
frequency. This is possible, if the transportation company is submitted to
a regulatory constraint that bears on the generalised transportation costs,
that this the sum of the ticket price and (the monetary value of) the time
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costs. Implementation requires only book-keeping data and the knowledge
of the social or average value of time. It appears thus possible to propose a
regulatory scheme that deal with both p_ri_ and quality aspects.
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A__hs!ra__ct
In the current downaa'n in demand for air travel, major airlines are revising and rationalising
their networks in an attempt to improve financial performance and strengthen their defences
against both new entrants and traditional rivals. Expansion of commercial agreements or
alliances with other airlines has become a key reaction to the increasingly competitive
marketplace. In the absence, for regulatory reasons, of cross-border mergers these are the
principal means by which the industry can consolidate internationally. The failure of airlines
such as Sabena and Swlssair has also enforced restructuring at some of Europe's busier airports.
This paper analyses the developments which have been taking place and attempts to itentify the
implications for airline network _s and the function of different hub airports.
Airlines have rationalised their networks by withdrawing services that feed the hubs of rival
alliances. New ;links have however _ created hthatare made feasible by the alliance support.
The range of services available to passengers in long-haul markets to/from Europe is evaluated
before and after recent industry reorganisation.
Hubs are crucial to interlink the route networks of parmers in an alliance. However, duplication
between nearby hub airports that find themselves within the same airline alliance can lead to loss
of service at the weaker locations. The extent to which the alliance hubs in Europe duplicate or
complement each other in terms of network coverage is assessed and this methodology also
enables the optimal partnerships for kmattached' airlines to be identified. The future role of the
various European hubs is considered under different scenarios of global alliance development.
The paper concludes by considering poss_le longer-term developments. In an environment
where the low-cost carriers will provide a major element of customer choice, it is suggested that
the traditional airlines will retrench around their hubs, surrendering many secondary cities to the
low-cost sector. Further reduction in the number of alliances could threaten more of the
European hubs. For both regulatory and commercial reasons, the end result may be just one
airline alliance - so recreating in the deregulated market the historic rule of IATA.
Keywords
airline, airport, network, hub, alliance, competition
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1. Introduction
The downturn in demand for air travel that followed the terrorist attacks of September llth 2001,
magnified by the weak economic conditions in many major countries and more recently the
looming war against Iraq and the SARS epidemic have made the last two years unhappy ones for
most of the world's airlines.
For almost the first lime, demand for air travel cannot be assumed to follow an ever rising trend.
Airlines have reacted by cutting back the weaker parts of their network and operations and aiming
for more co-operation and consolidation within the industry to curb excess capacity. Many of these
changes were overdue and it is difficult to attribute them directly to the downturn following
September 11th. It has however created a business environment where more radical measures can
be implemented.
The major airlines have moved to strengthen their position in the marketplace by consolidating
operations under one brand. In some cases this involved the merger or take-over of an independent
rival (for example, SAS acquired its Norwegian rival Braathens and American Airlines has taken-
over the ailing TWA). Franchising, whereby one airline licences its product and identity to another
is an alternative method for the major carriers to extend their brand presence while leaving the
commercial risk with the franchisee (Denton & Dennis, 2000). Other secondary forms of
collaboration include joint operations and code-sharing agreements which may be organised on an
ad-hoc route by route basis.
One of the most important developments in the global arena is the emergence of international airline
alliances (Hanlon, 1999). Examples are the Star Alliance, which includes Lufl/mnsa and United
amongst others or SkyTeam which is based around Air France and Delta. These aim to extend the
reach of an individual airline network by linking it with services of partner carriers. This increases
the number of city pairs that can be served compared to the airlines operating individually, enables
joint scheduling and marketing, combination of frequent flier programmes, combined purchasing
and sharing of services and infrastructure. In a downturn of demand, alliances also enable
consolidation of capacity, at both the route and network level.
Alliances, mergers, franchising and code sharing arrangements all have the effect of reducing the
number of carriers operating at an airport which has the potential to diminish competition and
increases the risk to airport operators and communities should the dominant operator change
strategy or go out of business. This paper aims to investigate the impact of this re-shaping of the
airline industry on airline networks in Europe. Specific attention is given to the likely winners and
losers among airports from current airline commercial developments and future strategies are
discussed.
2. Changes in long-haul coverage
The greatest downturn in demand since September 2001 has come in intercontinental markets such
as the North Atlantic and Europe-Middle East. This has accelerated the rationalisation by many
airlines of their long-haul services. In Europe, too many small countries have attempted to maintain
a national 'flag carrier' with an intercontinental presence. The larger airlines often had several
I I III
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-_-,-'.,por_._i, _ _home co, retry _ ..which they fi__v.!on_hau!. It is g__e_ral!y !e_ efficient to split
long-had services between hubs and airlines had already started addressing this problem prior to
September 1lth, with Swissair moving long-haul mutes from Geneva to Zurich and BA deciding to
concentrate on Hcathrow at the expense of Gatwick (Halstead, 2001).
Tables 1 and 2 consider the change m long-haul service at European airports from Summer 2000
(generally acknowledged to be the high-point of the aviation indumy) to Smnmca" 2003. Table 1
takes only the cities with a daily service by the major hub airline (including code-shares). This is a
good yardstick of the principal route network, being the minimum frequency necessary in most
,_dr_ tn compete with the..strongest airlines_ (including those with hubs outside Europe)= Multi-
stop services are included as long as there is no aircraft change involved.
It can be seen that four major airline hubs dominate long-haul services in Europe (BA-London
Heathrow, AF-Paris CDG, KL-Amsterdam and LH-Frankfurt). These have all strengthened their
position over the last three years and now have a very similar level of service with between 42 and
46 daily long-haul flights by the local airline. In some cases, smaller aircraft are used than
previously. BA has rim-down Cratwick and moved services to Heathrow with no net growth. Air
Fmce has expanded rapidly at Paris CDG, particularly increasing the frequency of services to Latin
America.KLM has likewiseatSchipholupgradeda number of sub-dailyroutes(mainlytoAfrica
and LatinAmerica)toa dailyfiequency.Lufthamaremainsheavilyfocusedon theNorthAtlantic
and Asia.ZurichhasconventionallybeentheMmnber five°long-haulhub andnan'owlyremainsso,
aithoughwithlessthanhalfthecoverageofthebigfour.Swisshasnevcrthcicssreinstatedmuch of
theoldSwissairlong-haulnetworkalthoughcontinuedheavylossesmay notmake thissustainable
forvery Int_h longer.Iberiaat Madrid isthe otherone to watch- witha doublingof daily
frequencies to 16 in the last three years, it is the strongest gateway to Latin America. Of the
remaining aixports, Brussels has suffered badly following the demise of Sabem and Copenhagen
_so appears to be declining, Munich and Vienna have ._hown mode_ expansion.
Table 2 includes all long-haul points served, which offers a broader perspective. In some cases these
are services by other airlines, elsewhere they are sub-daily mutes by the hub major. Many secondary
Asian points are served only by the foreign carrier and Caribbeanpointsareoftenservedby quasi-
charter airlines, especially in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. It can be seen that the total long-
haul network has not increased much, as airlines are tending to focus on higher frequencies to major
points rather than maximising the number ofplaces with direct service. Total network coverage has
declined everywhere except London Heathrow and Munich over the last three years. Munich is still
growing albeit slowly. London Heathrow has benefited from the decimation of Gatwick long-haul
operations - whore the total network has halved, the biggestdecline of any featured airportincluding
Brussels (where Sabona went bailing!). Brussels network to Africa has been maintained but with
many small foreign airlines often providing lov_frequency multi-stop service. Asian and North
Atlantic coverage has been badly hit however. Zurich and Rome have also seen signiiicam declines.
It is probable that the underlying reduction in demand is fairly even throughout Europe but some
airlines have benefited more than others from cut-backs by the weaker players. This has enabled Air
France and Luflhansa to gain market share as some of the traffic that used to pass through Gatwick,
Brussels, Zurich, Copenhagen and Rome is spilled elsewhere. KLM is fighting hard to stay in the
big league while BA is carrying fewer passengers in total but more via Heathrow.
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Table1
Dailylong-haulservicesbymajorhubairlinein firstweekof July(including code-shares)
Airport (Airline) Year North Latin Africa Asia Total
America America Pacific
London Heathrow (BA) 2000 14 3 17 34
2003 18 1 6 17 42




















2003 18 6 7 14 45
2000 18 2 3 15 38
2003 20 3 17 43
Munich (LH) 2000 5 - 5
2003 7 - 1 8
Zurich (SR/LX) 2000 12 1 1 9 21
2003 9 1 1 7 18
Milan Malpensa (AZ) 2000 8 - 1 1 10
2003 7 1 1 2 11
Rome Fiumicino (AZ) 2000 4 - 1 1 6
2003 4 - 1 1 6
Madrid 0B) 2000 3 5 1 8
2003 4 11 1 16
Brussels (SN) 2000 7 - 1 1 9
2003 1 1 2
Copenhagen (SK) 2000 4 - 4 8
2003 4 - 2 6
Vienna (OS) 2000 2 - 1 3
2003 2 - 4 6
Source: Compiled from OAG data
Luflhansa has launched an innovative means of providing long-haul service away from its main hub
airports in Germany. This involves using a long-range Airbus A320 configured in an all business
class layout. Current routes include Dusseldorf-New York and Dusseldort:Chicago. Such a strategy
will only work where there is sufficient high yield business traffic to maintain a reasonable load
factor on an everyday basis however.
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Table 2
Long-haul points served by all airlines at any freqtency in first week of July
Airport Year North Latin Africa Asia Total
America America Pacific
London Heathrow 2000 19 5 15 49 88
2003 24 14 20 47 105
London Cratwiek 2000 29 17 17 8 71
2003 19 9 5 3 36
Paris CDG 2000 20 14 30 40 104
2003 18 15 27 43 !03
Amsterdam 2000 20 22 14 42 98
2003 24 20 14 37 95
Frankfurt 2000 30 20 18 57 125
Munich 2000 10 6 7 12 35
2003 10 4 9 15 38
Zurich 2000 13 4 19 27 63
2003 11 3 17 19 50
Milan Malpensa 2000 10 13 13 17 53
2003 8 14 11 17 50
Rome Fiumicino 2000 10 11 14 30 65
2003 8 6 11 29 54
Madrid 2000 8 19 5 8 40
2003 8 16 5 8 37
Brussels 2000 9 - 22 11 42
2003 6 - 20 5 31
Copenhagen 2000 6 2 2 10 20
zuu._ 6 2 2 -_ 19
Vienna 2000 4 - 4 24 32
2003 4 - 3 23 30
Sottrce: Compiled from OAG data
3. Dependence upon a single airline or alliance group
Rather than negotiating with a number of airlines on an equal basis, airports are increasingly likely
to find they now have one very powerful customer. Hub airports have for some years tended to
become nattwal monopolies as the hub airline captures almost all the transfer demand and hence will
be able to support much higher frequencies than would be justified by the local traffic algae - in
some cases the routes would not exist if it were not for the connection traffic. This makes it very
difficult for a competitor to survive unless they are flying from a hub at the other end of the mute.
For example, Luflhatma accounts for 61% of scheduled flights at Frankfim. In the US, more
extreme concentrations are to be found, particularly at the medium sized hubs: USAirways has 88%
of flights at Charlotte and Northwest 80% at Detroit (Airline Business, 2000). Taking a route
example, Ltrfthansa and Alitalia operated one daffy flight each between Frankfurt and Turin in
1989. By 1997 this had increased to four flights per day but they were all by Luflhansa.
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This trend has been exacerbated by airline alliance development (Morrish & Hamilton, 2002). The
key hub to hub trunk links are seeing a rapid increase in operations. For example, Amsterdam-
Detroit which was not served at all prior to the KLM/Northwest Alliance now has 4 flights per day
by Boeing 747 or DC10; Fmnkfia-t-Chicago has gone from 2 flights per day to 4 and Copenhagen-
Munich from 3 to 6. Airports and routes which do not fit neatly into the alliance groupings are liable
to see their service reduced. For example, United has pulled off Washington-Zurich to concentrate
on its links with Luithansa at Frankfurt while Delta, an Air France partner has similarly axed
Washington-Frankfurt. SAS used to serve Hong Kong (now a oneworld hub) from Copenhagen but
this has now lost service altogether in favour of Star Alliance connections via Bangkok using Thai,
or Frankfurt using Lufthansa. Duplication is also likely to be eliminated over time (for example,
Delta dropped its Frankfurt mini-hub to concentrate on links with partner Air France at Paris CDG
instead). The net result is that the share of traffic held by the dominant alliance at a particular airport
tends to be growing rapidly while rival alliances re-deploy output elsewhere.
This poses a potential problem for airport operators. Many airports have traditionally been proud of
the range of airlines serving their facility and will make great effort to attract another brightly
coloured tailfm onto their apron. In the United States, airport expansion has often hinged around
airline requirements. Airlines have also been successful in extracting generous terms from airports
by playing them off against each other to be the chosen location for hub expansion. With many
airports under local government control, there is a vested interest in bringing employment to the
area and obtaining the greatly improved communication links, that could never be justified on the
basis of local demand but can be supported on the back of the hub traffic (Small, 1997).
In Europe, airlines are trimming the large number of point to point services they historically
operated from places other than their major hub. Even at the major hubs, the number of
intercontinental points receiving a direct service is often diminishing as airlines re-structure around
high frequency links to the key overseas hubs, with secondary cities reached through connections on
partner airlines. For example, 20 years ago, SAS used to serve 36 intercontinental points from
Copenhagen, many only once or twice a week with several intermediate stops; it now serves only
eight but as most of these operate at least daily, more flights are actually made in total.
4. Potential winners and losers among European cities and airports from international airline
alliance formation
Most of the global alliances contain one partner in each major region of the world, which
consequently defines the key hubs. In Europe however, there is much more duplication within each
alliance's coverage. The presence of many international botmdaries and the historic constraints these
have posed to traffic rights have created a different pattern of airline networks to the United States.
Many airlines have ended up dominating a number of airports in their home country, although these
are not necessarily all operated as hubs. There is thus considerable repetition in existing airline
networks (e.g. British Airways can carry a passenger from Frankfurt to the US via London
Heathrow, London Gatwick or Manchester), before one starts looking at the impact of alliances. US
experience would suggest there are too many secondary hubs or 'focus cities' in Europe and the
financial performance of these is generally poor compared to the primary hubs. The only rationale
for major airlines to maintain these dispersed operations is because of capacity constraints at the
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majoraLrpoff_(e,g_ H_thmw, E_rankfurt) which prevent consolidation of operations there, or as a
defensive tactic to deter a rival from invading their "oack-yard'. The alliance groupings have led to
further overlap and the post-September llth downturn, together with expansion by low-cost new
entrants such as Ryanair, is likely to spell the end for some of the weaker hubs.
Table 3 shows the extent to which the various combinations of European hub _ duplicate each
other or serve distinct maxkets within each alliance group. The analysis takes only E_ mutes
which have at least 3x per weekday non-stop service by the alliance partners from the named hub.
This is the minimum frequency necessary to achieve a full spread of connections. Only locations
with 20 or more such mutes are included as viable major hubs (giving 20 European hubs in total at
19 airports, Heathrow featm4mg in both the onewodd and Star listings). Under these criteria, the
table shows the number of points that are served from each pair of hubs in the network (e.g.
Frankfurt and Munich have 44 European destinations in common for the Star Alliance) and the
number that are unique to that hub (e.g. the Frankfurt/Frankfurt entry shows there are 9 E_
points that are only seared by the Star Alliance from FmnkKtrt). The total entry represents the total
number of European destinations served from Frankfurt by the Star Alliance (65). This is not simply
a total of the other entries as there are obviously some points that are served from mote than two of
the listed hubs.
in the Star Alliance, the LmZdmnsahubs at Frm_gart and Munich have the dominant position, as
indicated in Table 3(a). There is considerable overlap between these two but Luflhansa operate them
in tandem due to capacity constraints at Fmnkft_ The SAS hub at Copenhagen adds some
•additional coverage mairdy in Scandinavia. Over the last decade, Copenhagen's traffic has stagnated
and SAS has reduced its long-haul presence to the benefit of Luflhans_ However, SAS is now
planning to expand again in this arena. Austrian's hub at Vienna however is almost completely
duplicated by Fmnkftu't (26 common routes out of 30). Vienna's main emphasis is in Eastern
Europe-Western Euro_. where it is the strongest hub with the exception of Fzankfu_ Whereas
.Austrian would be a clear asset to any other alliance it is difficult to identify, its role in Star!
Stockholm Ariancta is _t as a roche gateway to the Swedish domestic market while the
London Heathrow presence is comprised of 14 European trunk routes plus 8 UK and Ireland points
where bmi British Midland has the main Star Alliance presence. Heathrow is likely to be maintained
as a toehold m the largest European met and an irritation to oneworld. In summary then, Vienna
looks superfluous as a hub to the Star Alliance and Copenhagen is in a less than comfortable


























































Paris Lyon Milan Rome Paris TOTAL
CDG MXP FCO ORY
Paris CDG 25
Lyon 23 4
Milan MXP 21 13 1
Rome FCO 17 10 20 4
Paris ORY 12 12 3 2 10
TOTAL 61 31 30 29 24 90







Zurich (Swiss) 31 3
Brussels (SN) 25 20 4
TOTAL 51 36 31 60
Source: Compiled from OAG, December 2002
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T_le .,_,,,an'_shows_ _'or!d _ mo_!'_umitedE,_opeancow._e,_main!yd,.m*,,_,h,._poor level
of frequencies that can be operated from Heathrow and Gatwick. oneworld needs Finnair and Iberia
to cover the extremities of the region, which they do effectively - _ is now the strongest carder
in Mediterranean Europe, although the Barcelona hub is essentially a smaller verskm of its Madrid
operation. The main scope for rationalisation must however come from British Airways' diverse
presence in the UK. Gatwick is being cut back drastically (Air Transport World, 2000) and at
Manchester BMI is launching a major expansion now the second runway is open (British Midland
Industry Affairs, 2000) which is likely to put further pressure on BA. Nevezltmless, half the mutes
from Hcathrow and Gatwick are still duplicated despite BA's recent reorganisation and many of
_ese _s_;,,o_,_ .__ _ s...,ua,_ by BA from Bi.,_ugham _ Manchester. The main mumbling
block for om-wedd is that Heatlm_ is full-up and cannot operate as an effective hub to rival
Ftankfim.
In the case of SkyTeam, Air France has created in the last few years a tremendously powerful hub at
CDG with still more growth potential. Alitalia does not add much to the alliance however: Table
3(c). With a split hub between Milan Malpensa and Rome as well as a residual operation at Milan
Linate, despite dominating a major European market, Alitalia is not a strong partner. Malpensa,
once envisaged as Alitalia's rival to Munich and Zurich now contributes little to CI_ in the alliance
network and Rome with its single ailport and better domestic coverage may once again become the
major italian hub. Air Fmce arguably maintains too many bases in France. Paris Oily is likely to
see its function as a domestic airport progressively eroded as the CDG hub powers ahead, although
they will be anxious to keep any rivals out of the French capital, it is also unlikely that both Lyon
and Clermont Ferrand (where Air France has acquired a small but efficient otmration through the
take-over of Regional Airlines) can remain as duplicated regional hubs in the longer term, only 150
km apart (Ciuinot_ 2000).
Two other .ul.n,-_ h,_.ve f_m.,___ i,_ ,h,. pa__: KLM _.,_4 Nort_hwest__'s .'Wi_' grottping and
Qualiflyer based around Swissair. Although still one of the top three hubs, KLM has seen its strong
position in Europe eroded in the last three years. It has lost alliance and code-share links with
carriers such as Alitalia, Braathens and Eurowings; succumbed to low-cost competition on mutes
such as Stansted and Belfast and cut services such as Nice from 3x per day to 2x per day. Qualiflyer
has now disintegrated following the bankruptcy of Swissair but Swiss and SN Brussels still retain
viable European hubs - with better coverage than Alitalia or Austrian! Swiss is coming back quite
rapidly as a serious force in the long-haul arena also and could prove an attractive alliance partner.
The future role of SN is less clear although Brussels is about the only 'spare' hub airport in NW
Eurt_ where there remains a general shortage of capacity. In Switzerland itself, Crossair's
substantial presence at Euroairport Basle/Mulhouse and Geneva adds little to Swissair's network
coverage and although some of these routes may be viable on a point-to-point basis, it is likely that
much of this capacity could be more lucratively employed from an enlarged Zurich aht_.
An interesting exercise is to allocate the non-aligned parmers to the three major alliances and
investigate where the best fit lies (Table 4). It is also poss_le to see how existing alliance members
such as A_ or lberia might be better off in a different alliance. It can be seen that oneworld
would be the optimal partnership in terms of European network fit for all the non-aligned airlines,
principally due to the poor existing coverage of BA's Heathrow hub. KLM is least suited to Star and
although there is considerable duplication with Air France's Paris CDG hub, it still adds a
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worthwhile 14 points to the SkyTeam alliance which appears to be KLM's current avenue for
discussions. Swiss and SN add little value to anyone except oneworld. If all three of these airlines
joined oneworld it would increase its European coverage by 20 airports to 110 points (still behind
Star). If Swiss and SN only joined oneworld it would add 11 airports, still behind Star and a
combined SkyTeam/KLM.
Table 4
Coverage added by non-aligned airlines when combined with major alliances
Number of European airports with at least 3x per weekday service
Points added to Amsterdam Zurich (Swiss) Brussels (SN)
(KLM)
Frankfurt (Star) 14 3 6
Star Alliance TOTAL 9 1 4
London LHR (oneworld) 25 14 12
oneworld TOTAL 15 8 4
Paris CDG (SkyTeam) 17 7 3
14 4 2SkyTeam TOTAL
Source: Compiled from OAG, December 2002
Table 5 amplifies the changing position in the short-haul coverage of the major European hubs.
Frankfurt and Paris CDG are forging well ahead while Amsterdam slips back. Munich and Madrid
are rising in importance at the expense of Brussels and Zurich although it is noticeable that the







Change in European coverage of major hubs since 1999
Number of European airports with at least 3x per weekday service from each hub
Hub 1999 routes
Frankfurt (Star) 53



















Barcelona (oneworid) * 34 NA
Brussels (SN) 50 31 - 19
20 31 +11
Milan MXP (SkyTeam) 30
Vienna (Star) 28
Rome FCO (SkyTeam) 26






Pads ORY (SkyTeam) 24 24 0
London LHR (Star) 20 22 + 2
Dusseldorf (Star) * 20 NA
Helsinki (Star) 21 20 1
21 * NA
* less than 20 mutes onerated 3x _ weekday
Source: Compiled from OAG data
5. Future of the global alliances and implications for European hubs
The future development of the global airline alliances has potentially significant implications for the
role of different hub airports in Europe and around the world. To date, the alliance groupings have
been in a continual state of flux and we are unlikely to have reached the final form yet (Agusdinata
& de Klein, 2002). The level of integration within many of the alliances is far from perfect however
and it is quite possible that airlines within the same alliance will continue to compete in the way
they have always done, paying tittle regard to the slrategies of their supposed-partners!
Within the current alliances, the odds of United surviving now look considerably better than six
months ago. The Star Alliance is also about to gain US Airways which has resmacmred fairly
successfully (Travel Trade Gazette, 2003). This is likely to strengthen the hand of Luflhansa in
Europe as more North Atlantic capacity is flown to Star hubs. However, the future of Virgin
Atlantic is one of the big unknowns. Despite being 49% owned by Star member Singapore Airlines,
Virgin has remained resolutely outside the major groupings, instead favouring a block space
agreement with Continental. Current interest focuses on the scope for a bmi-Virgin merger which
would give Star a serious presence at London Heathrow and create a 6rmidable rival to BA
(Noakes, 2003). SAS has recently questioned whether it should be continuing in the long-haul
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market and may be the first of the smaller European flag carriers to reduce to a purely short-haul
network, feeding other alliance partners with longer distance traffic (Campbell, 2003).
KLM and Northwest have to decide whether they will expand to create the much vaunted 'Wings'
alliance and find some suitable Asian and Latin American partners (there are carriers in these
regions that may not be entirely happy in their existing alliances). This would be a perfectly viable
grouping, competitive with the other three and would maximise consumer choice and the number of
parallel hubs that can be maintained.
It now seems more likely however that SkyTeam will absorb KLM-Northwest, along with
Continental. As Delta, Northwest and Continental have created a three-way alliance in the US, the
international partnerships are likely to combine also. This is a serious risk for KLM as Air France's
major hub at CDG is too near and too similar for both to prosper. Paris is always likely to be the
bigger and more attractive market to serve in Europe than Amsterdam and one can envisage
Northwest and Continental refocusing there. Alitalia is struggling to find a role in long-haul services
and this also should strengthen the hand of Air France. The other possible destination for Virgin
Atlantic would be SkyTeam, if bmi becomes a rival North Atlantic operator at Heathrow. However,
it is fairly inconceivable that SkyTeam would wish to use London as a hub.
Another possible switch of alliances involves KLM abandoning Northwest and moving to
oneworld. The fit between KLM and BA is relatively good in Europe and with Heathrow capacity
constrained and the Gatwick strategy fated, BA might well prefer to promote Amsterdam as a third
major hub to Paris and Frankfurt. This would appear to offer the best future for Amsterdam and for
maintaining all the major European hubs in the longer term under an outcome of three global
alliances. It is not inconceivable that KLM and Northwest could both move to oneworld as
Northwest has reasonable synergy with American on long-haul routes, if not an ideal fit
domestically. If BA misses out on KLM than Swiss is likely to be its preferred option for filling
oneworld's gap in mainland Europe. However, although Swiss badly needs a partnership, it is
doubtful that anyone will wish to take them on while their finances are still far in the red.
It is difficult to see an obvious route to two global alliances from the current position. This would
seem to require the failure or merger of one of the six US international carriers. A combined Delta-
Continental-United (with Air France and Luithama in Europe) might balance against American-
Northwest-US Airways (with BA and KLM in Europe) but requires splitting the existing
partnerships.
A more likely scenario where mergers start to occur between major airlines is that some airlines will
then find themselves in two alliances and to overcome competition concerns or local monopolies in
certain parts of the world (e.g. Australasia where Qantas is likely to dominate), the fair and easy
solution is to merge the alliances so that we return to one industry alliance (IATA by any other
name) where all the carriers co-operate with each other. This avoids smaller airlines being
disadvantaged and would favour the smaller hubs and the less coordinated or multi-airline hubs




6_ Airlinp _.ervj'_ee at_ second4er cities
It is probable that less air service will be provided at the medium sized cities by the traditional
national flag carriers in the future. These do not offer the network synergies of the main hubs and
are exposed to competition from low-cost airlines when traffic is mainly _aoint to point'. Where
there is room for conventional service, it is increasingly likely to be provided by foreign airlines, for
whomit is a 'spokepoimor ,egiomloperatorsusingsmaUaim 
Table 6 analyses the change in scheduled services at Birmingham and Belfast _onal over the
last three years. It tan be seen that BA has reduced frequencies at Birmingham (and down-sized
aircratL so capacity redaction is even greater), as have most of the other waditional carriers. The
low-cost sector has grown from 4 flights per day to 26. At Belfast International, the eclipse of the
traditional airlines is -almost total. Whereas BA and British Midland still dominated services here as
recently as three years ago, they have moved what is left of their Northern Ireland operation to
Belfast City, stmendering Belfast International to easyJeL
The low-cost airlines will maintain a reasonable level of direct air service from such cities at
competitive fares. They may not be profitable to the ai_rt operator however due to their
unwillingness to pay normal airport charges. The other shortcoming is that they do not provide the
global _sibility of a conventional hub link, as flights cannot be book_ through the GDS, there
is no through pricing or schedule co-ordination. This makes low-cost services almost unusable for
connecting journeys.
Table 6
Service at Birmingham and Belfast _onal July 2000 and July 2003
Airline Birmingham Birmingham Belfast lntl Belfast lnfl
2_000 2_00.3 2000. 2003
_6fi_ Affways* 83 70 22
British Midland* 14 10 12
grifiqh F.uro!man 26 27
Other Traditional 29 28 1 1
Total Traditional 152 135 35 1
easy Jet 7 33
Ryanair 4 3
My Travel Lite 16 2
bmibaby 6
Fresh Aer 7
Total Low-cost 4 26 7 41
Overall Total 156 161 42 42
* including fianchises and c_le-shams
Source: Compiled from OAG data
The Waditi6nal airlines have favoured airports which have kept the low-cost carriers out - this
usually requires either a restrigted runway or high user charges. For example, British Airways have
launched services this Spring from London City and it remains the only London airport other than
Heathrow to be served by most of the Europeam nalional carriers. London City's runway is too short
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to handle 737 jets. Other examples include Southampton, chosen for expansion by British European
(Flybe) who have been chased out of many of their traditional markets and Manchester, where there
is only a minimal low-cost presence, receiving new BA services.
7. Conclusion
The difficult business conditions of the last two years have led to some retrenchment of long-haul
services from European airports. Certain low frequency destinations have been discarded in favour
of higher frequencies on the trunk routes. The four largest airlines have widened the gap with the
rest by continuing to expand intercontinental services at their major hub airports. The greatest cut-
backs have been by British Airways at London Gatwick - as part of the airline's 'future size and
shape' review and Brussels where only part of Sabena's long-haul service has been replaced by other
carriers. Overall however, most of the smaller national carriers continue to stubbornly hang-on in
the long-haul market even though many of them _ losing large amounts of money in doing so.
Swiss has recreated much of the former Swissair network although it has little unique coverage
compared to the larger airlines. Iberia is perhaps the only carrier outside the big four that has a clear
and deferdable niche in long-haul operations with its extensive Latin American network.
Within Europe, most of the hubs have actually expanded in the last three years. One of the few
losers is KLM at Amsterdam, which has become isolated from many of its former feeder partners
such as Eurowings, Braathens and Alitalia. SN at Brussels is also a pale shadow of the former
Sabena operation. Even airlines which have decided to reduce their long-haul presence have
maintained their short-haul networks, such as BA at Gatwick and SAS at Copenhagen.
The low-cost airlines currently have only about 15% of the intra-European market but this is rising
rapidly. In the UK and Ireland they are now over 30% of short-haul scheduled traffic - higher than
in the US domestic market where Southwest has been operating for 30 years! It seems likely that the
natural market share of low-cost airlines operating 'point to point' services, often from secondary
airports may be around a third. Although some of this traffic is new growth, it means that the
traditional airlines are going to have to review their short-haul strategies and withdraw from markets
where they do not have a strong competitive position and do not require long-haul feed. The
example of Belfast International shows how a medium sized market can be dominated by the low-
cost carriers and other places where the majors are likely to be squeezed include Birmingham,
London Gatwick, Brussels, Geneva, Paris Orly, Milan and Nice.
Hubs are not going to go away however. Indeed, for the majors they remain crucial to maintain
some competitive advantage over the low-cost new entrants and to feed the long-haul flights for
which demand is much more dispersed. The main strategic response of the major airlines to
changing industry conditions has been to group themselves into international alliances. This only
brings efficiencies however if accompanied by some rationalisation and identification of
complementary roles. Europe continues to have too many airlines attempting to operate hubs in
close proximity to each other and certain locations such as Vienna, Milan Malpensa and Barcelona
add little to their relevant alliance and appear to be prime candidates for hub withdrawal.
For the cities which find their airport marginalised in terms of alliance strategy or de-hubbed as a
result of airline industry consolidation, the economic consequences are potentially severe. As well
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]r_c;qgrl;,-,_ _m_!oym,_t_. th__al"eiS a pen_alty in tPrm¢of uc-e_gihili13f ta the re_ of Euma_peand the
wodcL Brussels, for example, saw its level of air service collapse on the demise of Sabona_ This then
makes the city less attractive as a location for business, leading potentially to a spiral of decline. In
the US, Boeing recently moved its corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, citing the much
better level of non-stop air service available there. Whereas once geographical patterns of demand
determined the configtw_on of airline networks, now it is the network swamgies of airlines that can
have a profound effect on geographical patterns of industrial location and economic activity.
Although the _ downturn has produced relatively few changes in the _ airline
industry, __y¢.era1 _gnificant deveMpments lie around the c_ner. The EU is about to ,_artnegotiating
air services _ts with outside countries to replace the old bilaterals and there are strong signs
that national _ rules will disimegrate. The biggest restructuring may still be yet to come.
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Competition in the airline industry has been fierce since the industry was deregulated in 1978.
The proponents of deregulation believed that more competition would improve efficiency and
reduce prices and bring overall benefits to the consumer. In this paper, a case is made based on
core theory that under certain demand and cost conditions more competition can actually lead to
ha,--_d:al consequences for industries like _e airline indus_y or cause _ cmp_' core problem.
Practices like monopolies, cartels, price discrimination, which is considered inefficient allocation
of resources in many other industries, can actually be beneficial in the case of the airline industry
in bringing about an efficient equilibrium.
Keywords: empty core, demand, cost, equilibrium, unrestricted contracting competition, airline
/t/_Ul._Olat .IV.
Introduction
US Airline industry is considered a highly competitive industry. However, despite receiving
$5.0 billion in direct assistance from the U.S. government in 2001, the financial stability of the
U.S. domestic airline industry remains substantially in doubt. The recent spate of bankruptcies
filings, first by U.S. Air and then by United airlines, leads one to wonder whether competition is
essentially good for the airline industry or will ultimately prove destructive to the airline
industry. Clearly, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a serious impact on the
industry. However, the industry, particularly the major carriers, was headed toward financial
distress prior to the terrorist attacks. For the quarter ended June, 2001, the industry posted an
operating loss of $70 million, as compared to an operating profit of in excess of $3,000 million
the prior year (Linenberg and Flemming, 2001). Various explanations, ranging from labor issues
to weak business plans have been offered as reasons for the current woes of the U.S. Airline
industry.
In this paper we offer a theoretical explanation for the problems faced by the airline industry
based on core theory. According to core theory in some industries, like the airline industry,
excess competition can lead to an empty core problem or lack of a stable equilibrium. The notion
that competition in the airline industry may be destructive for the airline industry is further
strengthened by what happened in the US airline industry immediately after deregulation in the
80's. At that time price-cutting in the industry was extreme, most firms in the industry were
losing money even though buyers wanted the product and were willing to pay higher than
prevailing prices. The cumulative losses incurred by the industry exceeded the profits previously
earned since the industry's inception. Several carriers failed and ceased operations including
such high profile operators as Pan American Airways and Eastern Airlines.
Specifically, core theory suggests that, under some conditions, non-competitive practices
may in fact have an efficiency-enhancing role in the sense of making both producers and
consumers better off. Core theory also clarifies the notion of efficient competition and
cooperation - that agents in a market may simultaneously cooperate and compete at the same
time.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we provide a brief review of
terminology and definitions for introducing Core Theory. The third section provides an applied
framework so that the abstract concepts of Core Theory are related to standard notions of market
organization. In the fourth section, we identify some symptoms of an empty core and relate it to
the airline industry. Section 5 look at how the airlines have dealt with the empty core problem in
the industry. Section 6 concludes with some policy implications.
Terminology and Definitions
Core Theory concepts are closely related to many standard economics concepts. To keep the
exposition simple, we do not discus these issues. The following definitions are necessary for
understanding Core Theory. A numerical illustration and industry examples are included with the
definitions.
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Avoidable cost: The firm in the industry has the option of avoiding this cost. For example in
the shipping industry the ship can decide to sail or not to sail and hence can avoid the cost
associated with sailing (this decision is separate from cost of purchasing the ship). Similarly
in the airline industry the aircraft may decide not to fly and can avoid fuel and other costs
associated with flying (this decision is separate from the decision to acquire the aireratt).
Sunk cost: Expenditure which cannot be recovered. The cost of purchasing a ship or an
aircraft can be considered sunk cost.
Divisible vs. Indzh,isible demand: Divisible demand refet,s to situations where demand can be
broken down into separate units. For example in ocean liner shipping where small packets
are shipped or as in the case of airlines where each seat on the aircraft can be considered a
separate unit which can be sold at different prices. Whereas in the case of indivisible demand
it is not poss_le to divide demand into different units as in the case of bulk shipping.
Empty core: Situation where there is no stable equilibrium. In some industries competition
leads to an empty core problem.
In general the essential theoretical ideas of core theory can be set forth in this way.
. There are a group of n individuals (or firms) in a market; some of whom are buyers and
others are sellers. They can all trade with each other in a single market, or in sub markets,
or may decide not to trade at all.
. The buyers and sellers can measure the gains from trade. For the buyer it is the
maximum amount the buyer is willing to pay for the quantities purchased less the amount
actually paid. For the seller, it is the amount actually received less the amount the seller
would have been willing to accept.
Following Teiser (i 994), assume that there are three individuals and the first two are
potential buyers of a widget and the third is a seller. The seller S has a valuation of $10
for the widget. Buyer 1 has a reservation price of $12 for the widget and buyer 2 has a
reservation price of $15. Let x denote the return to the seller and yl and y2 denote the
returns to the buyers, respectively. In case the seller sells the widget, he would settle for
no less than $10 which is his option value, so that x lal0. For the potential buyers, yl _t 0
and y2 _t 0 because each can refuse to make a purchase and thereby can ensure a net gain
of zero.
. The buyers and sellers can contract with each other and form groups called coalitions
to maximize their gains from trade. Such a process of contracting can be either
unrestricted or restricted depending on the nature of the Industry. What the members of
the coalitions get is called an allocation.
With three members, there are a total of 23 -1 = 7 possible coalitions, excluding the
coalition with no members. These are {S}, {B1}, {B2}, {S,B1}, {S,B2}, {B1,B2},
{S,B1,B2}. Coalitions with single members are called singletons and coalition with all








An allocation is dominated if some members of the coalitions can do better for
themselves by leaving one coalition and joining another coalition. If the members cannot
do better by leaving their existing coalition then the allocation is undominated.
A buyer or a seller would be member of a coalition as along as they can do at least as
well as they could in any other coalition (it is important to point out that deciding not to
trade or being alone is also a possible coalition).
The approach is to consider all possible coalitions of traders, recognizing that any
coalition of traders will only participate in the market as a whole if and only if they can
do at least as well as they could in another coalition. In the decision of a member as to
which coalition to join, the maximum payoff available in all other coalitions provides the
lower bound.
Core theory considers all possible coalitions, including singleton coalitions. An
implication is that, if a coalition forms instead of singletons, we can surmise that all the
members believed that they were better off than they were being alone (pareto-optimal).
If we have a coalition with all the buyers and sellers in it (called the grand coalition)
then it means that the each buyer and seller feel that this is the coalition which would
maximize their gains otherwise they would not be in the coalition.
The grand coalition should therefore offer to each buyer and seller at least as much as
they could get in any other coalition they can form i.e., it should be a undominated
allocation. The allocation from each possible coalition therefore imposes a lower bound
on the payoff for each member, which must be satisfied for the grand coalition to exist.
Since we include all possible grouping - i.e., singletons, 2-person, 3-person etc. till n-
person coalitions, the grand coalition should satisfy the constraints imposed by all
coalitions.
If there exists no other coalition, which can make at least one person better off
without making another person worse off, then economists call such a situation "'Pareto
Optimum". An allocation is an efficient allocation if it is a Pareto optimal allocation.
It follows that any coalition, which survives all the restrictions imposed, by all the
coalitions is a pareto-optimal solution.
If such a "grand coalition" exists which is an efficient allocation for all concerned,
then we say that a core exists. The core therefore consists of all the undominated
allocations.
A grand coalition is a market in which all buyers and sellers are present. If a grand
coalition is the core, then all members choose to be in the market-like many to many
relationship rather than forming sub-markets or groups.
The core may sometimes have either one allocation or many allocations. It is also
possible that there may not be any allocation in the core. This is called an empty core.
The empty core implies that there is no stable coalition. Whatever coalition can be
formed, there is always an incentive for some subgroup to benefit by leaving it.
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Whenthecoreis empty,there is no pareto-optimal situation. In the specific context, it
means that members may switch among multiple coalitions opportunistically. Telser
(1987) uses the word "chaos" to describe this situation.
The Framework of Core Theory
In the last section we set out the basic definitions and a simple theoretical ideas of core
theory with example. In this section we attempt to describe the basic framework of core theory,
which can be used to analyze the organization of economic activity within and across firms. To
do this, it is necessary to relate the abstract concepts from the above section to standard notions
of competition.
Telser (1987) applies the above concepts to market organization. The fi'amework uses two
basic constructs: the status of contracting and the status of the core. Contracting can be either
restricted or unrestricted. If contracting is unrestricted, it means that economic agents (buyers
and sellers) are free to form any coalition without any outside interference. There are occasions,
however, when contracting is restricted. The restrictions can take the form of limits on the terms
of the contract and may also specify who may enter into a contract. In other words contracting is
not totally free and open to all. For example, pure competition is an example of unrestricted
contracting while monopoly, cartel etc. can be viewed as restricted contracting.
The core can be either empty or non-empty. We say core exits if there is an undommated
allocation. If there is no undominated allocation, the core is empty - this means that there is no
single allocation, which is acceptable to all members and any coalition of the members. The
implication of an empty core is that the market leads to a potential loss to many of its members.
Telser's (1987) primary contribution is to identify that sometimes, the core may not exist.
Prior to Telser (1987), the idea that a core may not exist was not considered a possa'bility. Since
_t.A_t_a.t vvAt.t.t_JLa_ t, Lt_._ Av.av,,,ta _.n_ _J_L.tlj_y _sv.x_ LUagU_ty
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possibility of the core being empty. For example, under standard theory, one would argue that
unrestricted contracting would lead to a more competitive and efficient market. Under the core
theory, it would be contingent on the existence of the core.
The two types of contracting and the two states of the core then give rise to four poss_le
situations sammmrized by the Figures 1 and 2 below. Standard forms of market organization
always assume that a core exists so that only the first row is considered.
Core
Exists












Any solution is efficient,
because a perfectly
competitive solution is not
possible.
Cell 1" Core exists- Unrestricted contracting
A core is not empty if there is a feasible set of allocations acceptable to all participants and
all coalitions of participants. A nonempty core, according to Telser (1987), combines the
"optimal mixture of cooperation and competition". The cooperation implicit in a nonempty core
is "self-enforcing because no one can gain by rejecting the return received as a member of the
grand coalition". The first cell also requires unrestricted contracting so that any member can
form a relationship with any other member, with no external compulsions. The first cell is
consistent with the standard notion of competitive equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium is
efficient in the sense that the total surplus is maximized or, equivalently, there are no deadweight
losses. Even though most existing research focuses on this cell, we feel that this should be seen
as an ideal or alternately, a limiting case.
Cell 2: Core Exists - Restrictions on Contracting
If the core exists and restrictions are in force, this causes departures from perfect competition
and concepts from various theories of imperfect competition become the analytical tools.
Examples are monopoly, which is known to cause an inefficient equilibrium. A cartel is another
example of restrictions in which firms in an industry jointly set outputs or prices. A
noncooperative equilibrium may also fall into this category because, at least in theory, the only
legal entities are singletons. This requirement imposes restrictions in the sense that firms cannot
form n-member coalitions as they please. The effect of these restrictions is to prevent the market
from moving towards a competitive and efficient equilibrium. The question arises as to how
these restrictions are sustained. Telser (1987) suggests that a third party could sustain these
restrictions. The market alternatives in this cell would be inefficient compared to the perfectly
competitive equilibrium when core is nonempty and contracting is unrestricted.
Cell 3: Empty Core-Unrestricted Contracting.
The core may not exist (empty core) for several reasons such as non-convexities,
indivisibilities and externalities. Telser (1987) characterizes this as a "chaotic" situation.
Observable symptoms of chaos are extreme price-cutting with most firms in the industry losing
money, while at the same time buyers want the product and are willing to pay higher prices than
those prevailing in the market. For example, soon after deregulation in the airline industry,
excessive price wars led firms to make losses, even though consumers were prepared to pay
higher prices. Both airlines and consumers were worse off due to excessive competition -
airlines lost money and consumers could not find the service at any price. This leads to
undesirable outcomes for most of the participants.
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Cell 4: Empty Core- Restricted Contracting
When the core is empty, restrictions have to be imposed in order to restore equilibrium.
Without such restrictions, there is no equilibrium. A monopoly is a possible restriction, which
restricts contracting by limiting the competition to one single firm, or a singleton. A cartel, a set
of firms who make decisions jointly is also a restriction, because it reduced the number of
possible coalitions. Likewise, vertical integration (buyers take over sellers or vice-versa) imposes
restrictions on coalition formation. Long-term contracts, price discrimination practices and








when N is large)
Figure 2: Impact of Competition on Contracting
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Symptoms and Conditions for Empty Core
The symptoms of empty core are described by Telser (1987) using the word "'Chaos".
According to Telser, there is chaos when "price cutting is extreme, most firms in the industry are
losing money, and yet it is plain that buyers want the product and are willing to pay higher prices
than those currently prevailing."
Telser (1987) identifies some conditions under which the core can be empty. For private
goods, which are continuously divisible, there is an "implication" of an empty core if and only if
there are constant or increasing returns to scale. For industries with U-shaped average costs
(called Viner industries), core may generally be empty. Sjostrom (1989) suggests that avoidable
costs could lead to an empty core. Pirrong (1992) suggests large avoidable costs as well as finely
divisible demand as possible causes for an empty core. Specifically, he states "core is frequently
empty when demand is finely divisible but production costs are not". On the other hand, when
the number of traders is large, a core will almost always exist. The core theory is, therefore,
appropriate for markets involving few traders and one or more of the conditions discussed above.
Explicit modeling is usually necessary to identify an empty core. Figure 3 contains a graphical
representation of the arguments.
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The abovediscussionshighlight that the unrestrictedability to contract and re-contract
amongbuyersandsellerswithin anindustryis a necessaryconditionfor an empty coreto exist.
It is this unrestrictedability to contracthat allowspricesto bebid downto non-profitable levels.
Further thesediscussionsimply thenecessityof excesscapacity. To the extent that oneor more
producershave excessoperatingcapacity,attractingadditional customersby lowering price,
provided such price is abovemarginal cost, createsadditional operating profit (or reduces
operatingloss)for the individualproducer.However,the gametheory aspectof the empty core
dictatesthatascustomersmoveawayfrom a producerin pursuit of a lower price, that producer
itself will reactby lowering its price. This processcontinuesto repeatand may result in an
empty core. Restrictionsontheability to contractshort-circuitthis process. The stronger,more
permanentthe_restrictions,the lesslikely the coreis to be empty.Sjostrom(1989) and Pirrong
(1992) haveapplied core theory to the shippingindustry. Coyle (2000) uses core theory to
explain the electricpowergenerationindustryin a deregulatedenvironment.. Nyshadhamand
Raghavan (2001) offer core theory as an alternative explanation to Daamsgard (1999)
explanationasto whyanelectronicmarketdid not form in theair cargomarket in Hong Kong.
Sjostrom(1989)looksto theimpositionof artificial restrictionsin differing circumstancesin
orderto distinguishbetweenrentseekingbehaviorandemptycoreresolution.
Pirrong(1992)suggeststherequirementof variabledemandfor thecore to be empty since"it
is usually costminimizingto build severalplantsandperiodically idle oneor severalin response
to changesin demand,"and "it may be optimal to operatesomeof the active plants below
capacity". Sjostrom(1989)recognizesvariable demandascontributing to the potential of an
emptycore. However,headdressesthevariability of demandin the contextof discontinuitiesin
thesupplycurve. In effect,thegreaterthevariability of demand,themore likely it is for demand
to entera discontinuousregion. Sjostromalsorecognizesthat variability in cost canhave the
sameeffect by shifting the supplycurve and causingdemandto again fall into a region of
discontinuity. Further,Sjostromalsorecognizesthatan industryslumpcanbe sufficient to result
in an empty core. While this may be consistentwith Pirrong's requirement for demand
variability, Sjostromsuggeststhatsucha slumpmayalsoresult from increasedcosts. Thus, the
important featureis the effect of excesscapacity, not necessarilythe cause of that excess
capacity.
Sjostromaddressesadiscontinuousupplyfunction in thecontextof differing coststructures
betweenfirms andtheincurrenceof sunkcostsfor individual firms. Sjostromtheorizesthat with
greaterdifferentialsin coststructuresthe lessdiscontinuousthe supply curve. Thus, the more
similar the cost function of individual firms, the more likely an empty core is to exist. As
capacityof existingfacilitiesis reached,new firms enteronly if demandincreasessufficiently to
justify incurring sunkcostsat entry. Thus, the incurrenceof sunk costs to createadditional
capacitycreatesdiscontinuitiesin thesupply_function.
The mostrecognizedsufficient causeof a discontinuoussupply curve is the existenceof
avoidablecosts. That is, onceoperatingcapacityhas beencreated(sunk costs incurred), its
actual operationmayrequirethe incurrenceof large avoidablecosts,regardlessof the level of
capacity utilization. A resultingU-shapedcost curve createsa supply discontinuity at a price
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equal to minimum average cost due to indifference to produce at this point (Sjostrom, 1989).
The greater the avoidable cost, the greater the discontinuity.
A further condition implied by the discontinuous supply curve relates to the size of firm
capacity to the market in general. The greater the size of individual capacity relative to the
market, the more likely the core will be empty (Sjostrom, 1989). Pirrong (1992), on the other
hand, addresses the scale issue from the demand perspective. The more finely divisible demand,
the more likely an empty core is to exist. Pirrong views this resulting from increased
competitive options. Viewed from the context of the discontinuous supply curve, indivisible
demand reduces the likelihood that demand wocld fall within a discontinuous region of the
supply curve.
The discontinuous supply curve indicates that demand elasticity impacts the status of the
core. Perfectly elastic demand results in a horizontal demand curve, eliminating the potential for
demand to fall within a discontinuous regi'on of the supp. ly function_(Sjo._mm, !989). _As a
result, the market accepts any quantity that can be supplied at the given price. As a result,
competitive pricing reactions are not necessary to fill capacity.
The U.S. airline industry substantially satisfies all of the various conditions, both necessary
and sufficient, consistent with the formation of an empty core. The operation of a scheduled
airline is in a sense similar to the ocean liner industry described by Pirrong (1992). Just as an
ocean liner, an airline at least in the short run, has sizeable fixed avoidable cost. While the large
investment in a commelx,'ial -aircraft represents a sunk cost, its operation includes significant
avoidable costs including fuel, labor and maintenance costs. Once however, the airline has
committed to a particular fleet and schedule it cannot change output without incurring substantial
adjustment cost.
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mc uumur, i oi miles flown increases, now'ever, technoio_cai constraints impiy that, distance
flown can be increased only by reducing aircraft capacity. Further, cost per passenger falls as the
number of seats filled on an aircraft raises up to full capacity. Taken together this implies that
marginal cost starts increasing well before the payload at maximum range is reached.
The airline industry has generally operated with excess productive capacity. Further airlines
tend to cut prices to short-run marginal cost in the face of excess capacity that will occur due to
variations in demand which pushes prices below that required to operate an efficient set of
schedules. Recently significant capacity has been idled (parked in the desert) by the industry.
This is exacerbated by the existence of the hub and spoke which magnifies these adjustment cost.
(see Antoniou (1998)).
On the demand side an airline faces seasonal and cyclical demand. In addition, short-term
shocks brought about by events like 911, for example, further increases the volatility in demand.
Thus matching capacity to demand in the airline industry moves it towards an empty core or
an unstable equilibrium. Under these conditions imposing competition on this industry will only
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make the situation worse. The next section looks at how the participants in the industry have
come up with noncompetitive solutions to overcome the empty core problem.
Figure 3: The Theoretical Model
We summarize the theoretical model in a proposition form.
Pl:Unrestricted contracting among agents can have different effects on efficiency depending
on whether or not a core exists
PI.1. (Core Exists) When Core exists, competition leads to high efficiency.
P1.2. (Core does not Exist) When the Core does not exist, competition leads to lower
efficiency
Whether or not a Core exists depends on demand and cost conditions
P2: If an industry has a finely divisible demand, then the core may not exist.
P3: If an industry has large, avoidable costs then core may not exist.
Resolving the Empty Core: The Case of the Airline Industry
An important contribution of Core theory is the means of resolving an empty core. When the
core is empty, restrictions on contracting are beneficial and can create an equilibrium. Such an
equilibrium may be inefficient compared to a competitive equilibrium, but is an improvement
over the chaotic situation that will persist if core is left empty.
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Button (1996) differentiates the conditions where collusion or the adoption of cartel-like
characteristics by an industry occurs as a result of rent-seeking behavior (i.e. decreasing market
efficiency) or resolution of the empty core (i.e. increasing market efficiency and stability). The
notable differences lie in the elasticity of demand, volatility of supply/demand, and barriers to
entry. Industries with legal barriers to entry and a smaller number of participants have a higher
tendency toward collusion for rent seeking purposes. Industries which have more inelastic
demand, variable supply/demand, and a smaller number of participants are more likely to have
an empty core, in which case they tend toward collusion in order to resolve the empty core,
particularly during rccessionary periods.
Many methods exist to resolve the empty core through the implementation of restrictions on
conWacfing. We will discuss some attempts in the airline industry to resolve the empty core
problem.
Mo_nopo_/Cart.e! Fo._rmatio__.n.
First, the U.S. airline industry has adopted certain characteristics similar to cartels. An
interesting practice among US Airlines is for them to share fare information with one another on
a nearly real time basis through an intermediary called ATPCO
_kctp://www.atpco.net/index2.htm). The ability of US airlines to respond .mpi_y to fare cuts by
competitors comes l_om the data provided in the ATPCO system. Membership in ATPCO is
voluntary but interestingly, most airlines choose to become members of ATPCO and post their
fares regularly m ATPCO. ATPCO states that they collect fare mtbrmation from over 550
airlines and distribute it to global distribution systems (GDS) such as Sabre, Amade_Systean
One, Galileo and Worldspan. ATPCO believes that it "creates efficiencies in this process by
permitting each airline to submit its information via ATPCO, thereby giving each CRS/GDS the
opportunity for a single source of fare related data." This practice of sellers signaling their
pricing intentions is somewhat unusuai and it may be construed as an uncompemive practice
with intent to coiiude. To the extent that A_CO is a voluntary, body, airlines would not have
joined the organization unless they thought they were better off. In the context of the core theory,
this is an attempt by the airline industry to address the problem of empty core.
More recently, the industry has moved toward more direct cooperation amongst competitors
through the implementation of code-sharing agreements that allow airlines to coordinate
schedules and capacity. The U.S. Department of Transportation has approved such an agreement
between United Airlines and US Airways (October, 2002), and Delta, Northwest and Continental
are pursuing a similar agreement. These agreements potentially allow individual airlines to
coordinate schedules and capacity, and adopt characteristics of cartels further reducing
competitive practices within the industry.
Price Discrimination
The U.S. airline industry relies heavily on a sophisticated form of price discrimination called
revenue management. Revenue management systems allow airlines to use historical data on load
factors on a flight as well as real time load factors to adjust prices for different classes of fares.
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This results in different customers paying different prices based on the time and even the channel
of purchase, apart from the fare class. While many observers would disagree with the practice of
an airline seat being sold at widely different prices, many researchers argue that airlines cannot
be profitable unless they do so. It is also argued that, if price discrimination was banned and
airlines were forced to offer the same price, many airlines might suffer losses and some might
even stop flying. If this is true, this may have a contrary effect of making consumers, who could
have paid higher prices, worse off. This is another example of how noncompetitive practices like
price discrimination can lead to an efficient equilibrium.
Long-term Contracts Deferred Rebates
Virtually every major US airline has implemented a frequent flyer program. These programs
are designed to increase customer loyalty and effectively increase the cost of "re-contracting".
Accordingly, these frequent flyer programs function as a long-term contract between the airline
and the individual consumer, which contract provides a deferred rebate in the form of free
flights, upgrades to first class, and enhanced levels of service. The benefits of these programs
improve with increased purchasing and protect the airlines most valuable customers, the frequent
traveling business passengers who typically pay a much higher fare under the revenue
management systems.
Instances such as these lead us to look at the notion of 'efficiency' from a broader
perspective. Under the broader perspective, maximizing the total surplus (producer plus
consumer surplus) may lead to higher efficiency and lower deadweight loss to the society. Under
some conditions, non-competitive market structures and practices such as monopolies, cartels,
restrictions on transactions among industry members, deferred rebates, price-discrimination etc.
may have an efficiency-enhancing role.
Conclusion and Pofiey Implication
In this paper we use core theory to examine the airline industry. Core theory helps explain
why, for industries with certain cost and demand conditions, a competitive equilibrium may not
exist. In such cases, a pareto-optimal outcome for all members does not exist, resulting in an
empty core. Unrestricted contracting, enabled by enforcing competition in industries like the
airline industry creates more "chaos" when the core is empty.
Some financial economist have questioned the need for government aided competition and
have raised concerns about the lax bankruptcy laws (see Wruck, K.H. (1990)) which have
enabled inefficient ill'ms to survive in the industry in an effort to promote and preserve
competition. The Economist (2002) predicts that due to the protection afforded to it by the
bankruptcy laws, U.S Air and United airlines can push through changes like lower fares and
wages easily. This will have the effect of lowering prices through out the industry as other
airlines try to preserve their market share, pushing the entire industry towards an unstable
equilibrium.
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McWilliams, A. (1990), argues that current antitrust laws have to recognize that some
industries are subject to the empty core problem or an unstable equilibrium. If antitrust laws do
not recognize the empty core problem it can lead to business practices as prevalent in the airline
industry today, which are inconsistent with our common sense notion of competition. Practices
like monopolies, cartels, price discrimination, which are considered inefficient allocation of
resources in many other industries it seems can actually be beneficial in the ease of the airline
industry in bringing about an efficient equihbrium.
Thus government "bail out" of the industry, lax bankruptcy laws and stricter antitrust
legislation to aid competition can be potentially damaging to the industry. Surprisingly enough,
to solve the problem (i.e., resolve the empty core), the theory suggests that additional restrictions
may be placed. The resulting equilibrium is often more efficient compared to the alternative
outcome of an empty core which results from unrestricted contracting.
This is a pre "hminary investimation of the existence of empty core problem in the airline
industry. The next step would be to develop a model and test the ideas of core theory for the U.S.
airline Industry.
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Abstract
Using a unique feature of air cargo transshipment data in the Northeast Asian region, this
paper identifies the critical factors that determine the transshipment route choice. Taking
advantage of the variations in the transport characteristics in each origin-destination
airports pair, the paper uses a discrete choice model to describe the transshipping route
choice decision made by an agent (i.e., freight forwarder, consolidator, and large
shipper). The analysis incorporates two major factors, monetary cost (such as line-haul
cost and landing fee) and time cost (i.e., aircraft turnaround time, including loading and
unloading time, custom clearance time, and expected scheduled delay), along with other
controls. The estimation method considers the presence of unobserved attributes, and
corrects for resulting endogeneity by use of appropriate instrumental variables.
Estimation results find that transshipment volumes are more sensitive to time cost, and
that the reduction in aircraft turnaround time by 1 hour would be worth the increase in
airport charges by more than $1000. Simulation exercises measures the impacts of
alternative policy scenarios for a Korean airport, which has recently declared their
intention to be a future regional hub in the Northeast Asian region. The results suggest
that reducing aircraft turnaround time at the airport be an effective strategy, rather than
subsidizing to reduce airport charges.
2
An Air Cargo Transshipment Route Choice Analysis
1. Introduction
Asian countries experienced the strongest growth in the international air cargo business
after the recovery of the recent financial crisis. In 1999, the Asian region enjoyed export
volume rising by 30.3 per cent, and cargo revenues by 45.2 !mr cent. The Republic of
Korea saw particularly strong growth in export volumes and yields, and the region's two
main airports - Hong Kong and Tokyo - were the second and third busiest freight
handlers in the world. This trend is likely to sustain as China's economy consistently
olWILD utuu _utry togrows the WTO, uesp_teJ ....... _oont economic slowdown, and the
influential Japanese economy spiraling downward.
Due to the surge in deraand, along with the freer international aviation market in the
Northeast Asian (hereaRer NEA) region, the NEA countries start contemplating on
aggressive competition to attract new airfreight carriers. Their efforts are reflected by the
current and future expansion plans released by those countries. China has announced that
they will expand PuDong airport to 5 million tonnages from the current capacity of 0.75
million within the next two decades. The capacity of Japan's Kansai airport is planned to
increase more than double. Korea also has made considerable investments: They have
constructed a new international airport at Incheon, and two seaports at Busan and
Kwangyang.
There is an important implication for a country to become a global or regional transport
positive feedback link exists between the acfi_ty of multinational corpomfiom (MNC's)
and the success as a transport hub in the recipient country. A transport hub attracts MNCs
to concentrate their logistics and distribution functions in the country. Such high value
added activities increase not only their employment, and their domestic income, but also
traffic volumes passing through the hub airport. At the same time, the increase in the
transport volume at the airport reinforces the incentives of other MNCs to locate their
logistic centers in that country. Those countries that intend to develop hubs hence face a
"chicken and egg" problem: Whether to entice MNCs first by creating an incentive
scheme, or to increase the transport volume first to become a hub, and then attract MNCs.
While several existing studies investigate determinants of MNCs location choice
(surveyed in, for example, Caves, 1996; Oum and Park, 2002), a severe lack of empirical
studies on this topic remains.
The purpose of this paper is to offer the first empirical study to analyze the determinants
of international air cargo traffic flows with an application to the NEA region. Obviously
whenever a direct shipping route is available, holding a line-haul rate fixed, a freight
forwarder prefers to choose direct rather than transshipment. In order to analyze the
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tradeoff between values of time and money from the eyes of freight forwarders,
consolidators, or large shippers, we solely focus on the transshipment route choice in the
analysis. This limited scope of our analysis, however, does not bias estimation results,
because the majority of origin-destination (hereatter O-D) shipment volumes go through
a transshipment port in the NEA region. A unique feature of our air freight transshipment
data in the NEA region in the year of 2000 provides us with an interesting experiment as
to the identification of critical factors determining the freight flows. The data contain
aggregated air cargo transshipment volumes originating from and destined for the NEA
area, along with airport characteristics and airfreight fares. The paper uses a discrete
choice model of an agent (i.e., a freight forwarder, a consolidator, or a large shipper) who
makes a routing choice, and identifies critical determinants of transshipment freight
flows. The analysis incorporates two major factors, monetary cost (such as line-haul cost
and landing fee) and time cost (i.e., aircraft turnaround time, including loading and
unloading time, custom clearance time, and expected scheduled delay), along with some
other controls. The estimation method considers the presence of unobserved attributes,
and corrects for the resulting endogeneity by use of appropriate instrumental variables.
The paper finds that transshipment volumes are rather sensitive to the time cost than
monetary cost: The reduction in the aircraft turnaround time by one hour would be worth
the increase in the airport charges by more than $1000. This finding implies that it would
be more effective to promote airports by reducing aircraft and air cargo turnaround time,
rather than reducing airport user charges.
Using the estimation model and results, the paper conducts simulation exercises to
measure the effect of airport's price and non-price policies on the transshipment volumes.
The paper focuses on Korea in particular to investigate the impact of their counterfactual
policy changes. Two policy alternatives are considered, one for airport charges, and the
other for aircraft turnaround time. The simulation exercises find that, a landing fee would
have to be cut half in order for Seoul to increase its share by 20%, while the 30%
improvement of the aircraft turnaround time would do the same job. This finding
suggests important policy implications to airport authorities or local governments:
Investing money for reducing turnaround time at an airport is an effective strategy, rather
than subsidizing the airport to cut user charges. When capital is in short supply for
investment, it may make sense to raise airport charges, and then to use their operating
profits for capacity expansion and automation including electronic data interchange
(hereafter EDI) system.
A growing body of theoretical work finds the causal relationship between MNC location
patterns and transport network structure. Two major strands in the literature reflect the
nature of the chicken-egg problem discussed above. One strand is to examine the designs
of transport networks when the economies of density exist. Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan
(1995) find that the economies of density often lead to hub-and-spoke networks. Oum,
Zhang, and Zhang (1995) find that the hub-and-spoke system may be used as entry
deterrence, while Berechman and Shy (1996) show that it can also accommodate entry if
the passenger's time value and aircraft capacity constraints are taken into account. The
other strand focuses on how industrial location patterns emerge under the given structure
of transportation networks. The work includes Krugman (1993), Konishi (2000), and
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Fujita and Mori (1996). Mori and Nishikimi (2002) analyze the interaction between the
two forces. The paper makes a contribution to the empirical side mostly concerned with
the first group of the literature.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes air freight business. This section
also introduces a data set and important explanatory variables. A discrete choice model
discussed in Section 3 uncovers determinants of the transshipment volumes originating
from and destined for the NEA region. Section 4 presents estimation results. Section 5
conducts simulation exercises focusing on a Korean airport. Section 6 concludes the
paper's findings.
2. Air Freight Business
This section describes the international airfreight business surrounding the NEA region,
and introduces major variables that likely influence the air cargo transshipment activities.
Many of the discussions on institutional features of air freight business are taken from
Rigas Doganis (2002).
The logistics of moving freight is more complicated than that of moving passengers. It
involves packaging, preparing documentation, arranging insurance, collecting freight
from the shipper, facilitating customs clearance at origin and destination, and completing
final delivery. This complexity of the job has encouraged the growth of specialist firms
that carry out these tasks on behalf of the shipper and provide an interface between
shippers and airlines. In this paper, we consider freight forwarders, consolidators, or large
sMt'q?ers as decision makers with re._e_s *_ air _axgo routLng choice. For simp!iciW, we
reter these three agents altogether as "freight forwarders," unless the use of this term
Air freight business is inherently competitive. This is because most freight, except for
emergency freight, is indifferent to the routings made to move from its origin to its
destination. A shipper is not concerned whether a shipment goes from New York to
Kuala Lumpur via Tokyo, Shanghai, or Hong Kong with several hours of transshipment
at one of those airports, provided that the shipment arrives at Kuala Lumpur within the
expected time. Few passengers would put up with such a journey. Thus, in most cases, a
freight forwarder can use numerous routings and airlines to get its destination. The
flexibility in routing choices ensures inter-airport as well as inter-airline competition that
is absent for passengers on the same route.
Airfreight transshipment is a very important aspect of the air cargo industry in the NEA
region. Figure 1 shows direct and transshipment shares of air cargos delivered between
North America and the NEA countries in the year of 2000. Roughly 70 % of airfreight
reaches final destinations via one or more transshipment points. Anchorage has the
highest share of transshipment air cargoes originating from the North America, because
many U.S. airlines use short- or middle-haul aircrafts to collect their freight to
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consolidateat Anchorage,andthenuselong-haulaircraftsto deliver to the NEA region.
Tokyo takeshalf of the transshippingshareswhen freight is shipped from the NEA.
Figure 2presentsthesharedatabetweenEuropeandtheNEA area.A high shareof 60 %
of the cargotraffic from theNEA region andEuropeis transshippedon the way to the
destination.Again the table showsthat Tokyo plays a dominant role in the freight
transshipm_t.
We focuson the air cargomovementbetweenorigin anddestination gateway airports,
rather than their real origin anddestinationpoints, primarily becauseour data do not
containthe record on wherethe shipmentcomesto and goes from gateway airports.
Table 1 listsmajor airportsandtheirmaincharacteristicsrelatedto the airfreight traffic in
the NEA region.By limiting our analysison the air cargomovement betweengateway
airports only, we implicitly assumethat there is no alternative routing choice that1
involvesinter-modalmovement. This shouldnot imposeanyseriousproblem, however,
assuchinter-modalmovementsareratherlimited in airfreighttransport.
Table 1 lists the airportsunderour studyin descendingorder of landing fees for Boeing
747-400with thegrosstakeoffweightof 395 tones.A casualobservationon the landing
fees informsus that the U.S. airportstend to have lower landing fees than the Asian
airports.Japaneseairportshavethehighestlandingcharges:Narita airport chargesUSD
9,700,roughly19timeshigherthanAtlantathathasthelowestchargesin our sample.
The numberof runways ranges from 1 at Kansai to 6 at Chicago O'Hare, and all the
airports in our sample are able to accommodate B 747-400 as indicated by the length of
runways 2. Anchorage has the largest cargo handling capacity, whereas Beijing has the
smallest cargo handling capacity, though significant capacity expansion is expected over
the next two decades. Singapore has by far the largest cargo terminal space. The variables
in the last two columns, throughput and average hours for loading/unloading and customs
clearance, are detailed later in this section.
Conditioned on the choice of transshipment, freight forwarders must consider several cost
factors to decide which airport to stop over in order for them to minimize the total
shipping cost. The cost factors are roughly grouped into two categories: monetary cost
and time cost. Monetary cost is equivalent to the sum of airport charge and freight line-
haul rate. Line-haul rate is aircraft operation cost, and depends on the distance of each
route, and the number of required transshipment. In many cases, transshipment is made
only once, and our data contains only such case.
Time cost comprises following four factors: cruising time (which must be highly
correlated with the route distance), loading and unloading time, and customs clearance
and other processing time.
1 Inter-modal movement refers to the use of more than mode of transport. For example, for shipments from
New York to Kuala Lumpur, some shippers may transport by air via Hong Kong, whereas others might fly
their shipments to Singapore first, and then truck to Kuala Lumpur.
2 B747-400 requires runways with a minimum length of 2800 meters.
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The next three subsections examine each of the factors in detail. Section 2.1 describes
monetary costs, and Section 2.2 time costs. Section 2.3 discusses other possible
unobserved factors that may influence the freight forwarders transshipment route choice.
2.1. Monetary Costs
This subsection discusses two main components of the monetary costs: (A) line-haul rate
and charges.
A. Line-haul rate:
The data on line-haul rates used in this paper are the list price by route published by
!ATA (_e tmt,_-"",,.,,,_--,malAh- Tran__,ort Association), TACT book 200i. Pnce is a key
element of airline services. The actual transaction fares are sometimes discounted from
the list fares, especially for large freight forwarders, and the extent of discount reflects
the degree of bargaining power. The actual transaction fares are made confidential, and it
is very difficult for researchers to obtain such data. Thus we use the listed line-haul rates
in the est_,ation.
The distribution of all the line-haul rates in the data set_is presented in Figure 3. There is
a dear trend that the line-haul rates increase with distance. The unit-distance rate
indicates economies of scale with distance, indicating the presence of fixed cost. Notice
that short-haul shipping is within the Asia region, the medium-haul is mostly the
shipment to and from the U.S., and the longest is with Europe.
B. Airport Charge:
Another significant element of freight costs is landing fee. Freight forwarders have to pay
share of landing fee based on the weight of their airfi'eight. While airlines have tried to
hold down the increase in landing fees in particular countries acting through IATA, an
individual airline has little scope for negotiating better rates for itself.
Airport clmrges are shown in Table 1, and were briefly discussed earlier in this section.
Many Asian airlines have relied heavily on cargo revenue, and dedicated cargo carriers
do not play a big role in Asia, unlike those in the United States. For instance, EVA
generates 39.4% of its revenue from the cargo business, and Cathay Airline generates
26.4%, while the United Airlines generates only 5.2% from air cargo. Though several
airlines, such as Korean Air and China Air own dedicated cargo aircrafts, much of
airfreight is still carried in the belly of passenger aircraft.
The level of airport charge depends partly on the costs at the airport and partly on
whether the airport or the government is trying fully to recover those costs or even make
a profit. As a result, airport charges (landing fees) vary enormously across different
7
airports. The highest landing fee is chargedat $USD 9,700 by Narita International
airport,Tokyo, andthelowestis at$USD512by Anchorage.Becauseof the limited data
availability of landingfees,weusetheB747-400landingfeeasa representativeairport
charge.The useof the landing feedatais not completelysatisfactoryin that they arenot
able to capturethedifferencesin the load factor.If thesemissingvariablesare roughly
correlatedwith theairport size,thenwe couldusearandomcoefficientmodel introduced
by BrownstoneandTrain (1999).Theirmethodallowsusto interactthe landing feewith
the airport size with an explicit distributional assumptionon freight forwarders'
heterogeneity.Thoughthe applicationof thismethodis beyondthe scopeof this paper,it
wouldbean interestingextensionfor futureresearch.
2.2. Time Costs
This subsection lists three important elements of the time costs: (A) cruising time, (B)
loading/unloading and customs clearance time, and (C) the time cost caused by scheduled
delay.
A. Cruising Time
As easily expected, cruising time is closely determined by the route distance. Thus, the
variable, line-haul rate, takes care of the cruising time in the estimation.
B. Loading and Unloading (L/UL) Time, and Customs Clearance Time
In many countries, aircrafts have to go through the customs, even though the cargoes just
pass through a transshipping port. They also spend time to load and unload their cargos at
the airport. A freight forwarder has to consider these time costs upon its choice of a
transshipment route. If the average customs clearance time takes too long at some airport,
a freight forwarder is likely to avoid the route given the other features of the airports. The
data on the sum of U/UL time and customs clearance time are presented in Table 1. It
appears that the sum of these time costs does not vary across the airports.
C. Scheduled Delay 3
The air cargo service is enhanced by more frequent departures and greater likelihood of
the reloaded cargos on preferred flights. The data contain the numbers of air passenger
trips per week by airport for both incoming and outgoing flights by route. We use the
idea of Douglas and Miller (1974), and calculate the expected scheduled delay as the
inverse of the frequency. The expected schedule delays in arrival and departure are
different across city pairs. We calculate the expected maximum hours of scheduled delay
by taking a sum of scheduled delays on arrival and departure.
3 Though UPS and Fedex started operating at Incheon airport in Korea, charter flights are not yet popular in
the NEA region. Thus we solely focus on scheduled flights in this paper.
Freight forwarders would shy away fi'om choosing the airport with longer expected
scheduled delay, holding the attributes of the other airports constant. The scheduled delay
indicates how many hours on average an air cargo has to wait at the airport before
catching the next flight. During the waiting period, the freight has to be reloaded, and
clear the customs. For some route, the customs clearance takes so long that the freight has
to stay more than the minimum expected scheduled delay time. If this is the ease, the
freight has to be held at the airport until the next available scheduled flight. Therefore, we
calculate the expected total time cost at a particular airportj as follows:
(nij+l)*(expected scheduled delay)ij > (L/UL time + custom clearance time)j >
nij*(expected scheduled delay)ij
where n_ is the number of scheduled flights that have to be missed for route i at airport j
in order for the airfreight to complete being reloaded and processing customs clearance.
The first term of the above equation, (nij÷l)*(expected scheduled delay)_, is defined as
the time cost, the length of time that the _rcrafl has to stay at akqx_rtj on route i. The data
on frequency are by O-D ports pair. The time cost is obtained as the expected maximum
hours of stay at the airport, that is, the sum of the scheduled delays of two routes, one
with the origin, and the other with the destination. The stmamary statistics of this variable
are in Table 2.
2.3. Throughputs
Throughput is the total volume of traffic m'ocessed through an aimnrt This is a_n
important determinant in explaining the transshipment route choice in two ways. First,
the import volume increases with the size of hinterland demand, and thereby more
aireratLs stop over and drop off fright Lh__.t_oo,_ th,_ de____n-d. Secondly, ,h,_ ,h_nughput
size serves as a good indicator of the attractiveness of the country in the eyes of MNCs
who are looking for new subsidiary locations. The literature on economic geography
(surveyed in, for example, Fujita, Kmgman, and Venables, 2000) finds the agglomeration
effects of MNC's location choice. We use the amount of throughput as a proxy for the
size of hinterland demand. Table 1 shows the throughput data by airport in the year of
2000. High throughputs in Hong Kong and Anchorage are mostly due to freight
transshipment, and that in Tokyo may be due to the size of domestic demand.
2.4. Casual Observations across Variables
This subsection provides simple correlations between the transshipment volumes and
critical explanatory variables. Section 4 formally estimates such relationships with a
discrete choice model.
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We selectfive airports as important transshipmentpointsin the airfreight traffic in the
NEA region: Beijing, Bangkok, Osaka, Shanghai,Seoul, and Tokyo. We include
Bangkok,becausethis is atransporthub for airfreightbetweenthenorthandsouthAsian
regions.Therefore, Bangkok may not be in the samecompetitionas the rest of four
airports.Hong Kong hasto be excludedfrom thedata,thereasonbeing that no dataare
availableon the airfreight flows with inland China. SinceHong Kong is virtually a
gatewayport to China, it is not desirablefor us to usetheHongKong data without the
data of Chinese cargo freight.
Figure 4 is a scattered diagram indicating the relationship between transshipment shares
and landLn_g fees (in_ unit of USD) for the selected airports. We calculate the
transshipment share for a particular airport by first calculating the proportion of the
transshipment volume passing through the airport in each pair of origin and destination,
and then averaging them over all the combinations of origin and destination. Thus this
transshipment measure is based on the sub-population of the O-D freight volume, and
does not take into account the direct shipment.
The figure illustrates that, except for Tokyo, there is a negative correlation between
landing fee and transshipment share. Tokyo has a high share with high landing fee,
making itself distinctively different from other airports.
Figure 5 presents how the transshipment share is related to aircraft turnaround time. The
figure reveals, again save for Tokyo, a positive relationship between the share and
turnaround time. One might think that this relationship appears odd because longer
turnaround time increases the share. The figure, however, should not be interpreted as the
causal effect of time. Rather the figure indicates that the turnaround time, or service
frequency, may be endogenous: The increase in share would exacerbate congestion,
forcing the aircraft turnaround time longer. In the estimation, we carefully control for this
endogeneity by using appropriate instrumental variables.
Both Figures 4 and 5 find that Tokyo's Narita airport is very different from other airports:
Tokyo has a high share yet with highest landing fee and shortest aircraft turnaround time.
Historical reasons place Tokyo as rather an outlier in the figures (Hansen and Kanafani,
1990). The introduction of jets into commercial service and high economic growth in
Japan provided Tokyo with the only major Asian destination with the United States in the
late 1950s. Tokyo's dominance continued to grow with Japan's strong local market and
the liberal fifth freedom rights of U.S. airlines out of Tokyo. The last two decades have
witnessed that Tokyo's dominance is slowly changing, but still Tokyo has enjoyed sitting
on the laurel from the past. In account of this Tokyo's historical perspective, we create a
dummy variable to deal with Tokyo differently from the other airports.
2.5. Unobserved Variables
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We have discussed two major factors, monetary and time costs, which likely change the
relative transshipment shares. Other factors may also likely influence the freight
forwarder's route choice. We discuss three such factors in this subsection: congestion, the
Lnter"_fional aviation reg-alation, and technology advance in custom admimstrafion.
Although we do not have data of these three variables, there is a concern with resulting
endogeneity problem that presumably bias estimation results. We discuss the source of
the endogeneity problem in this subsection, and a correction method in Section 4.2.
(1) Congestion
Congestion !,:kely correlates _ith scheduled delay, because, an airport becomes crowded
with the number of scheduled flights, given the limited capacity of the airport and
efficiency of the customs clearance. This congestion factor, since unobservable, would
likely remains in the error term obtained from estimation. We therefore concern with a
correlation between the error (which is partly reflected by congestion) and the
explanatory variable, scheduled delay. In the estimation, we correct for this possible
endogeneity as discussed in Section 4.
(2) Bilat_al Air Services Agreements and Inter-airline agreements
Over the years, each country has signed a so'ties of bilateral air services agreements with
other countries aimed at regulating the operation of air transport services. Although a
liberal type of bilateral agreement (i.e., the Bermuda type) has become more widespread,
as we see in the recent Hong Kong's experience, the agreement sometimes does not
preclude airline pooling agreements, which effectively restrict capacity competition. Nor
- - --'r .... ,: " l.,u,..,,,,.,',_ ut.t, uau,r.utl.l.y Off _UYK;ILLLI.II_/d.I._ tO
_:___a type o_ to J_t increases inm-event foreign_ t-_rri_-_ _mm i_q_odu_mg a _'_,, '" ""
fiequuat,-ies (See C'neung, et. ai, 2002, tor the recent case in China). Many features of a
state involvement in aviation are not clearly observable.
Bilateral air services agreements and inter-airline agreements influence the airline
frequencies to be operated. In countries where more than one national carrier operates
international services, the country's own licensing or regulatory controls may influence
the sectors on which their airlines operate. Since we do not have an appropriate measure
of this state involvement in aviation, these aspects of regulation may be captured by the
unobserved variable, _. Therefore, there is a concern for possible endogeneity in that the
expected scheduled delay (calculated from the frequency data), and the error may be
correlated one another. We discuss a set of instruments to correct this endogeneity
problem in Section 3.2.
(3) Advance in Customs Administration
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Historically, revenue raising was a major function of customs administration. Importance
of this role diminishes as tariff barriers are reduced. Instead, customs administration plays
an important role in attracting international airfreight. Unpredictable delay in customs
clearance, or unexplained changes in the classification of goods disrupt efficient logistic
flows, and thus hinder the hub development in air cargo transshipment. The technology,
such as EDI system, makes the customs procedure simplify by computerizing the
shipment information, and makes it efficient by allowing for pre-clearance of the
shipment. Some airports, such as Singapore, created a bonded zone area so that the
transshipment goods can avoid customs. Though customs clearance in many airports is
yet processed manually, some other airports strive to simplify the processes.
Unfortunately we do not observe the extent of efficiency achieved by each of the airports
regarding customs clearance process. Since the efficiency of customs is often measured
by time, the concern might arise on the correlation between the unobserved customs
efficiency and the time cost variable. Similarly, if the airlines realize that freight
forwarders has a higher willingness to pay for the airports that have efficient customs
administration, and there are routes in which such airlines have some degree of market
power, they might increase the line-haul fare to raise their revenue. This generates
another concern for the endogeneity with the line-haul cost variable. A set of instruments
to correct the endogeneity issue is discussed in Section 4.2.
3. Estimation Model
This section introduces an estimation model to describe the route choice process made by
freight forwarders. The choice model is derived from a random utility discrete choice
model of freight forwarders. Since we do not observe the route choice of individual
freight forwarders, we aggregate individual forwarders to obtain a behavioral model of
transshipment, while still allowing for heterogeneity across the forwarders.
Each freight forwarder, i, is assume to maximize the following indirect utility function by
choosing the route, j, among a set of alternative transshipping routes in a particular
origin-destination gate ports pair:
u,j = Zxj / k +E,j,
k
where uij is the freight forwarder i's utility from choosing the routej to ship freight from
the origin to the destination. The utility can be interpreted as a negative of the
transshipping cost. The vector, Xj, includes the variables that reflect the freight
forwarder's transshipment route choice. A k-the component of this vector is denoted by
Job. The previous section discusses that the monetary and time costs are the two most
important determinant factors in the route choice. The time cost variable indicates how
many hours for which a representative air cargo has to stay at a particular airport. For
monetary costs, we use following two measures: line-haul fare, and landing fees. Detailed
description of the variables is found in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. We also include as
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explanatoryvariables a size of hinterland demand (i.e., throughput), and the Tokyo
dummy interacting with line-haul cost, landing fee, and time cost. As discussed in
Section 2.3, the explanatory variables do not cover all the important factors affecting the
transshipping routing choices made by freight forwarders. We therefore include an error
term, _., to capture such unobserved (to the econometrician) factors with zero mean. The
other error term, _,/, determines the slope of the transshipping route demand curve. We
impose the asstmaption on _j that generates a standard logit structure. In order to obtain
consistent estimates of the parameters, fl, our estimation method should take care of the
possible endogeneity problem, i.e., the correlation between some explanatory variables
and 4- We discuss a mecrLhodfor _g the cndogeneity bias in Section 3.2.
3.1. The Logit Model
... ,,,,, ,_-._,_, a ,or-,_muer chooses a transshipment point to maximize its utility
(or minimizes its shipping cost). The standard conditional logit model provides a closed
form choice probability. The share for route j with in a particular combination of the
origin and destination ports is given by:
Sj = / ., o
The share of the route _i is denoted by. s,..., and Or,v r,_ is all_............the. rran_hipr_ngr ,_ rn,,*,_ i,_ a
• ,,., v ........ _ ,u,., ,_,,_,,,_uou _,l._,m. A mg-wanszormauon eids an aggregate
linear regression model for the route j (The previous work, for example, Berry (1994),
uses this technique):
In
where jeOo_t). Since the inside the log-transformation is highly nonlinear, we look at the
within estimates by subtracting two share equations of the routes j and / within the same
O-D pair. This procedure removes a common component affecting the routes within the




This is ourbaseestimationmodel. Notice that the constantterm is cancelledout in (1).
The identification comesfrom the variations in transshipmentcharacteristicsin each
combinationof airports.We could use the ordinary least squaredmethod (OLS) to
estimatethis model,however,we are concernedaboutthe possiblecorrelationbetween
someexplanatoryvariables(i.e., Xjk - Xtk) and the unobserved error (i.e., _'k - _lk). The
next section explains the sources of this endogeneity, and the method to correct the
problem.
3.2. Identification
There are concerns for endogeneity in that some explanatory variables in (Xjk-Xtk) may be
correlated with the difference in the unobserved attributes, (_e-_tk). This section discusses
the sources of endogeneity, and a method to correct the problem. One source of the
possible endogeneity comes from the missing variables we discussed in Section 2.4. We
are concerned about the possible bias from missing three variables: congestion, aviation
regulation, and customs efficiency. All these missing variables could correlate with the
service frequency, which we used to create a time cost variable. Furthermore, unobserved
customs efficiency might also correlate with line-haul fare, through airlines market
power: Some airlines may be able to charge a high freight fare with a route with efficient
customs procedure, because the route would attract forwarders who concern on shipping
time. The correlation of the unobserved attributes with the explanatory variables would
generate a biased estimate without the use of appropriate instruments.
In the estimation, we thus use instruments that would correlate with the endogenous
variables, but not with the unobserved attributes. We consider two sets of instruments.
The first set of instruments used in the estimation is related to airport characteristics:
length of the runways (m), and cargo terminal areas (m2). We expect that these
instruments control for endogeneity of time costs. The length of the runways indicates
what type of aircrafts can land on the airport. Enough runway length is required for B747
to land and take off, and thereby this instrument may correlate with the frequency of
particular aircraft types, and therefore time cost. The cargo terminal areas may correlate
with U/UL time, though the sign of correlation is ambiguous: If the terminal areas are
large relative to the size of throughput volume, there may be economies of scale to
making U/UL process shorter, leading to a negative correlation between these two
variables. If there are diseconomies of scale, a sign would be positive. Those two
variables may likely be exogenous to congestion, aviation regulation, and customs
efficiency. Thus they can serve as instruments in our estimation.
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Thesecondinstrumentregardingfor the line-haulfare is theroute distance.As discussed
in Section3.1, the line-haul cost is highly correlated with the distance. In particular,
Figure 3 observes the strong relationship between distance and fare: Longer the distance,
the faster the line-haul fare drops by a declining rate. In order to capture this nonlinear
relationship between the fare and distance, we include the distance variable up to the
second order polynomials in a set of instruments.
In a model with exogenous airport characteristics, the characteristics of other competing
airports are also appropriate instruments. With some regional market power by airport,
the transshipment volume depends on the relative attractiveness to the other airport
characteristics. Holding the characteristics of a particular airport constant, the airport
would lose transshipment freight share as a characteristic of other airports improves. The
characteristics of other airports are thus related to the service frequency, but since
characteristics are assumed to be exogenous, they are valid instruments. In the present
_hldv w_ in_lnd_ in the, cot nt'in_,nrmo,nte _h,_ _,_n ,-,¢ r.h_,-,_,_t,_4,.44,-o ,-,¢,h,_ ,-,_1_..- aJFpu--'T*_tS
in the NEA region, we assume that Anchorage does not face with effective competition
from the NEA area.
4. Estimation Results
This section examines estimation results of the model (1). The definition of the variables
and summary statistics are presented in Table 2. The previous subsection discusses that
line-haul rate and turnaround time are likely endogenous in the estimation. Thus we use
two-stage least squared method (hereafter 2SLS) in the estimation.
Table 3 shows the estimation result. The table shows two different specifications. The
_,.,A4_n4._ _1_4_ -'_ "1..._. *- ,1--1 -...2"_I.. _._.- __.3 ..... :.,L. . -'.. 1-'_ _ 1_ __ , _'_
,alJvv,tu'_.u'.,J,U_ uJttz_.,,t /dtl glOW I.O Ur_l.Jt WlLIJ LLItI_ Ig_JLIUUI_UIIIg;IL,y III I,LIIK;-_ _rdj_. lill_
specification, (B), treats line-haul rate as an endogenous variable, the other specification,
(D), uses a proxy variable, distance, to substitute for the line-haul variable. As we
discussed in the Section 2.1, the line-haul cost and distance closely correlate with each
other. Since a geographical distance between airports is exogenous, (D) does not require
instruments for the line-haul rate. Note that we still need to control for turnaround time.
The model (D) is typically called a gravity model, and frequently used for forecasting
traffic flows. For each of the specifications, (B) and (D), we provide the results from
OLS, for the purpose of comparison ((A) and (C) respectively).
Tokyo's Narita has been a dominant airport since the 1950s with huge hinterland
demand. In order to control for this historical dement discussed in Section 2.5, we add
the Tokyo dtmamy for the variables of landing fee, turnaround time, and line-haul rate
(for the models (A) and (B)), or distance (for the models (C) and (D)). We use
instruments specific to Tokyo, in order to control for endogenous variables interacting
with this dunamy.
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Table 3 finds that the model fits are not impressive at the first glance: The model explains
only up to 46% of the variation in the dependent variable. Note, however, that the
obtained results are within estimators: We obtain the estimators using the variations only
among routes given each O-D pair. Provided that some of our data only vary by airport,
but not by route, we consider that the results are satisfactory. For the 2SLS estimation,
the table also shows averaged first-stage F-statistics for the explanatory power of the
instruments, conditional upon the included exogenous variables. The F-statistics indicate
that the instruments are not weak. The statistics for over-identifying restrictions (the J-
statistics) test the validity of instruments conditional on there being a set of valid
instruments that just identify the model. The statistics shown in the table would not
generally reject the hypothesis that some of the instruments are orthogonal to the
unobserved error term with the 99-percent confidence level.
The comparison of the first two results, (A) and (B), shows that the endogeneity problem
appears to be significant in the estimates of line-haul rate and turnaround time. The line-
haul rate has a positive coefficient in the OLS result, whereas it is negative (but not
significantly different from zero) after controlling for the endogeneity. This result
indicates that the line-haul fare may be positively correlated with the variables that we do
not observe in the data. We also expect that the turnaround time variable has an upward
biased estimate if not appropriately controlled, because, for example, the unobserved
congestion effect may be positively correlated with the time variable. The result from the
2SLS confirms our prediction: The turnaround time coefficients are lower in 2SLS by
40%.
The coefficients of the landing fee and throughput variables are both significantly
different from zero in (A), but not in (B) even though they have the same signs. The
throughput variable shows that after controlling for all the explanatory variables, the
transshipment airport exhibits economies of density on average. This interpretation is,
however, clouded by the effect of congestion.
The Tokyo dummy estimates indicate the extra effects of those variables relative to the
other airports. Tokyo dummies are positive both for line-haul cost and turnaround time.
The magnitude of the estimates are high enough that the transshipment share through
Tokyo increases with line-haul cost and turnaround time. Some of these odd results are
already manifested in the preliminary inspection of the data shown in Figures 4 and 5.
The specifications (C) and (D) estimate the gravity equation. Both estimation results are
similar to the previous results that use the line-haul rate as an endogenous variable;
however, the standard errors are considerably improved. Though the two 2SLS results are
qualitatively the same, the absolute values of the coefficients in landing fee and
turnaround time in (D) is larger than those in (B).
The comparison in the magnitudes of the landing fee and time variables show that the
monetary cost is not so important a determinant factor as the time cost. The estimation
result (B) indicates that, holding the other airport competitors' characteristics, and
focusing on airports other than Tokyo, if an airport is able to reduce the aircraft
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turnaroundtime by 1 hour, that effect would be worth the increase of the airport charges
by $1361 ($1146 based on the estimates from (D)). This result implies that the time factor
would play more effective role in influencing the transshipping volume, rather than the
landing fee itself.
In light of the allocation in the airfreight cost, our estimation result makes sense. For the
world's airlines as a whole, airport user charges (that is, airport charges and en route
facility charges) acamunt for just over 5 percent of their total costs. The proportion
generally rises, but by small amount, for international airlines operating relatively short-
haul sectors, where landings occ_ more frequently. For some airlines, such as KLM, the
proportion dropped to just below 5 percent, while for US carriers it was generally 2-4
percent.
On the other hand, usually the airfreight business deals with the commodities with high
value-added, which would be time sensitive. Most goods being shinped by air have a high
value-to-weight ratio. Since cargo rates are generally based on weight, the higher the
value of an item in relation to its weight, the smaller will be the transport cost as a
proportion of its final market price. This tendency for high-value goods to switch to air
transport is reinforced if they are also fragile and liable to damage or loss if subject to
excessive handling. The estimation results capture this nature of the time-sensitive
airfi'eight business.
5. Simulation Exercises
The previous section estimates what factor determine t_he _eigh.* fnrwa_rd_er_'s choice of
transshipment mutes, l--he estimatmn results reveal that the aircraft turnaround time plays
a rather imoortant role in the route choice, rnad_ hy _ei_'gh t fo_.v_d,._:s. -rr, .... ,_....
- _ _ aLataL_, ]_IL_,'¢ Jt_.rlbll_
section estimated that the reduction in the turnaround time by 1 hour is worth the increase
in airport charges by more than $1000.
Based on the estimation results in Table 3, this section examines what alternative policies
would be most effective for an airport to increase transshipment volumes. We are
particularly interested in Korean airports, since Korea recently declared their intention to
become a regional logistic hub in the NEA region. Obviously there are many policy tools
for the country to achieve such a goal: designing tax incentives for MNC logistic centers,
establishing protection of intellectual property rights, setting transparent regulatory
environments, and so forth. This paper considers only two of such policy tools. One is
airport charge, including landing fee and airport navigation charge. The other is aircraft
turnaround time, due to a reduction in loading and unloading time, simplification of
customs clearance procedure, and an increase in flight service frequency. We use the
estimates from the specification (D) in the following exercises, however, those from the
specification (B) provides a similar result.
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Figure 6 showshow the transshipmentvolume would changewith the reduction of
airport chargesat Seoulairport.We askthe following questionin this simulation: How
much transshipmentvolumewould increaseif the airport userfee were reducedby 10%
or 30%from the actual.Wecalculatethecounterfactualtransshipmentvolumes basedon
the assumptions,andcomparethemwith the actualvolume. Partly due to the fact that
Seoulairport chargesalreadya lower landing fee,the impactsof airport charges would
not be very significant even if the fee were cut by 30%: The increase of the volume is
11.7%, mostly switched from Kansai airport in Osaka. This result makes sense in view of
the geographical proximity between the two airports (we takes into account the
geographical differences by including the O-D distance variable in the set of
instruments).
The counterfactual policy scenarios with respect to aircraft turnaround time are examined
in Figure 7. We ask how much transshipment volume would increase if the turnaround
time were reduced by 10% (i.e., 14 minutes) and 30% (i.e., 40 minutes) from the actual
level. The turnaround time in Korea averaged over routes was 2.25 hours. As expected
from the estimation results in the previous section, the impacts of this alternative policy
would be significantly large: The volume of transshipment through the airport increased
by 18.3% if the turnaround time should be shortened by 40 minutes.
The simulation results illustrate that a slight reduction of turnaround time would have a
great deal of impact on the transshipment volume for airport. A policy of reducing airport
charges may not be a most efficient strategy to attract more airfreight volumes from other
Northeast Asian airports.
The Northeast Asian region experienced the strong growth in the international air cargo
business after the recovery of the recent financial crisis. Due to this surge in demand,
along with the freer international aviation market, the countries in the Northeast Asian
region have started contemplating on aggressive competition to create hub airports.
With the use of the unique feature of the air cargo transshipment data in the Northeast
Asian region, this paper identified the factors essential to become a transport hub airport.
The paper used a discrete choice model to explain the transshipment flows in the data set.
It also addressed the endogeneity issue by utilizing the appropriate instrumental variables.
The estimation results found the importance to correcting for the endogeneity. They
indicated that transshipment volumes are more sensitive to the length of the aircraft
turnaround time: The reduction of the aircraft turnaround time by 1 hour would be worth
the increase in airport charges by more than $1000 per aircraft. Simulation exercises with
respect to the alternative policy scenarios for the Korean airport also confirmed this
result. The paper's findings contained important policy implications to airport authorities
in the Northeast Asian countries. The paper suggested that investing money for reducing
turnaround time at airports be an effective strategy, rather than subsidizing airports to
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reduceuser charges. When capital is in short supply for investment, it makes sense to
raise airport charges, and then to use their profits for capacity expansion and automation
including EDI system in order to reduce turnaround time.
One avenue of the future research is to collect disaggregated data by industry product
and/or by air cargo type and to check the robustness of our finding. Another avenue of
checking the generality of our results is to do a similar work for transshipment hub
location competition for North America and Europe.
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FIGURE 1
Direct and Transshipment Shares of Air Cargo:
North America - Northeast Asia
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CHARACTERISTICS FOR MAJOR AIRPORTS
2000
Landing tee Runways Capacity Length of Cargo Terminal Througpu_ Average hours
P_ (USD) (#) (KTp,,_pa_) R.._ I") k,e_(m^2) (KT) fo_UUL &Customs
AtJanta 512 4 1000 3600 47740 272 4.5
Anchorage 606 3 4000 3800 111000 1884 5
Los Angeles 1007 4 3100 3650 185901 1023 5
Bangkok 1114 2 902 3700 115969 868 5
London 1552 3 1500 4000 94000 1402 4
Chicago 1576 6 2000 3g00 180451 750 4
Seoul 2249 2 2700 3750 183158 1891 5
Frankfurt 2872 3 1600 4000 22000 1710 4
S_japom 2819 2 2500 4000 640000 1705 5
Paris 4485 4 2000 4215 299000 1611 4
..N_. y_nd( 4646 4 2000 4400 106480 1339 5
Amsterdam 5144 4 1500 3500 270000 1267 4.5
Bei_ng 5547 2 300 3800 72800 557 5
Shanghai 6084 2 1750 4000 146200 613 5
Sydney 6292 3 1500 3962 140000 590 5
HongKosg 6905 2 3000 3800 28000 2001 5
_-,_.,_ g'J71 1 i400 3500 111940 864 4.5
Tokyo 9700 2 1380 4000 311300 1842 5
TABLE 2
DEFINITIONS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE VARIABLES
AJrfreight in the Northeast Asian Region, 2000
Descriptions Mean Std. F_n'or Mm Max
Dmmdem Vada_e
The volume share % on route j m ff_e total transshipn_nt volume in the O-D pa_ 22.14 25.89 0.00001 100.00
k_kq_mdentVar_blee
ShippkK3 Rate (USD) 92.53 32.59 16.34 176.64
Landing Fee (USD: B747-400 with the weight of 395 tons) 52.88 31.02 6.06 93.71
A_'craflturnaround Time (hours) .......... ,_B_, _. ,-.,
...... _,_--, _, _,P_-, _,, _,,_! 1.18 0.58 0.56 1.89
instrummnts
Length of the Rummy (meters) 3.73 0.17 3.50 4.00
Cargo Terminal Area (squared meters) 13.32 3.95 7.28 18.32
Distance from the origin port to the destination port via transshipment port (miles) 0.97 0.40 0.12 2_07
Sum of the competitors' runway length (metros) 45.04 623.49 0.00 9480
Sum of the compeffiors' cargo terminal area 4.55 62.75 0.00 900
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TABLE 3
Route Choice Estimation Results
(A) (B) (C) (D)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Base Base Gravity Gravity
Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std. Est. Std.
Line haut cost 0,008 -- 0.003
Landing Fee -0.025 _ 0.005
Turnaround Time .-0.109 _ 0.005
Throughput -0.658 _ 0.256
Distance
Une haul cost for Tokyo 0,011 * 0.006
Landing Fee for Tokyo -0.019 0.089


















-0.017" 0.005 -0.039 " 0.018
-0.107 " 0.005 -0.179 " 0.056
-0.273 0.242 -1.336 * 0.790
•0.216 0.218 0.30 0.58
-0.020 0.072 -0.079 0.222
0.184 -- 0.056 0.545 0.470





Dependent Variable = In(sj) - In(sk), where j and k are in the same pair of ongin and destination.
The landing fee coefficients for Tokyo is muffiplied by 1000 for presentation.
First-stage F statistics provide the average explanatory power of the instruments, conditional on the included exogenous variable.,
J stahstics provides an overidentifying restriction test.
Significance at the 95-percent confidence level.
" Significance at the 99-percent confidence level.
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Abstract
The aim of this communication is to study wSth a new scope the conditions of the equilibrium
m an air transport_ market where t_n_ rz_mnmtitixto_x _;,-1;,_,,o o.,,_ vl.,_.,_uuts.':-- x._at,u_-_t_tuxxue-:-" is
supposed to adopt a strategy maximizing its profit while its estimation of the demand has a
fuzzy nature. This leads each company to optimize a program of its proposed services
(frequency of the flights and ticket prices) characterized by some fuzzy parameters. The case
of monopoly is being taken as a benchmark. Classical convex optimization can be used to
solve this decision problem. This approach provides the airline with a new decision tool
where uncertainty can be taken into account explicitly. The confrontation of the strategies of
the companies, in the ease of duopoly, leads to the definition of a fuzzy equilibrium.
This concept of fuzzy equifibrium is more general and can be applied to several other
domains. The formulation of the optimization problem and the methodological consideration
adopted for its resolution are presented in their general theoretical aspect.
In the case of air transportation, where the conditions of management of operations are
critical, this approach should offer to the manager elements needed to the consolidation of its
decisions depending on the circumstances (ordinary, exceptional events,..) and to be prepared
to face all possibilities.
Keywords: air transportation, competition equilibrium, convex optimization , fuzzy
modeling,
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of the competition between operators in a transportation market has been done in
several situations and under multiple hypotheses, the approach here treats this problem in the
case where the estimation of demand is fuzzy.
The decision making and the choice of the strategies of an operator either when he is
monopolistic or when there is a competition with other operator(s), need an estimation of his
share of the market. This estimation of the demand is in general obtained through econometric
regressions based on historic data and through statistical methods. In such a case, a crisp
function depending on the explicative variables is obtained. Some authors[l] have recently
proposed to use _ modeling techniques to represent the uncertainty, related with the
demand. In this paper, the operators supply decision making process under a fuzzy estimation
of demand is investigated and a fuzzy equilibrium situation is considered.
But before the study of the competition, and in the section II, the case of monopoly has been
treated in both crisp and fuzzy estimation of demand function.
II. MONOPOLY: CHOICE OF PRICE AND SUPPLY
Let consider first a transport market where only one operator is acting. This operator has to
choose the level of its supply Q and its price p, in order to maximize its profit _. The market
is characterized by a demand function Dip) and the operations cost which is supposed to be a
function of the level of operator's supply Q and is denoted C(Q). The satisfied demand is
given by: min{D(p), Q} and the profit is equal to" Ir = p.min D(p_(_. Here the demand
is supposed independent of the supply level and is assumed to depend only on the price.
When an estimation b(p) of the demand function is available, the program of the operator is:
Maximize p.min /) (_C(-_
p,Q
In this part, two cases are treated: first, the classical case, in which demand is considered as a
crisp perfectly known function, is recalled. Then the analysis of the case of a fuzzy
estimation of the demand function is developed
A. Demand as a crisp function
It is assumed, in this first part, that/9(p) is a crisp function and that the cost function is also
exactly known by the operator.
The illustration of the displayed concepts will be achieved in the linear case (linear demand
and cost functions).
Illustration:
For simplicity, these demand and cost functions are assumed to be linear:
O(p) = D 0 - A.p , for O<Pmm <p<p_ <Do/A ,
where O 0, )_, Promand Pm_xare strictly positive parameters.
And C(Q)=c 0+c.Q for0<Q_<Q_,
where c, c0 and Qmax are strictly positive parameters, c0 is the fixed cost, c is a constant
marginal cost and Qm_x is the supply capacity of the operator. It is supposed in this study that
the lower and upper bounds ofp and Q are never reached. The program of the company is:
I
r p,QTwo cases are considered, depending on the nature of the satisfied demand:
D i-"case: D(p)_<Q
In this case, the demand is considered to be not limited by the level of supply but by the price
level and the profit of the operator is given by: _r(p,Q) = p.D(p)-C(Q), for a given price p.
7z decreases when Q increases (for a given p) so the couple (p,Q) achieving the maximum




The resolution of such a program is more or less
expressions of the demand and cost functions.
hard de pending on the respective
Application to the linear case:
In this case, optimality is obtained from the first and second order Lagrange conditions.
The first order Lagrange's condition : i_ / i_p=0
Leads to a unique solution: p* = c / 2 + D O/ 2_
and since the second order condition
_27r/ Op2 = -22 < 0
is always satisfied, this value of price p* is optimal for this program.
The corresponding level of supply is equal to:
Observe that this equality supposes that Do > xc. The optimal profit can then be written as:
_* = ((D0 -_)/2) 2/z-c0 (1)
,,, ,oM




Application to the linear case: here the assumption D(p) >_Q, implies an upper limit for p:
p < (Do-Q) / X. When p increases and Q stays unchanged, the profit increases so the optimal
value for p is equal to its maximum allowed value that is to say: p* = (Do - Q) / 4 .
Then the profit can be expressed as a function of Q, only; and it can be maximized with
respect to the level of supply. The optimality conditions lead to the same expression for the
expected profit as in the first case as expressed in (1).
B. Fuzzy estimation of demand:
In this subsection, the estimation of the demand adopted by the company is considered as
fuzzy. For a given price, /3(p)is for simplicity assumed to be represented by a trapezoidal
fuzzynumber.Figure:fig.1sketchesuchafunction by showingfor the interval PI_
"level curves" of B(p): 02 and D._ are the curves for which the degree of membership
becomes equal to 1, D_ and 04 are the curves for which the grade of membership starts from
zero (see figl '). For consistency reasons, these four functions are supposed not to intersect on
the domain pi_ •
D(@) _ _ Implvl_vble
For every price p in the allowed domain, the membership function _ of the demand d,
represented by fig. 2. is defined as follows:
f d_Ol(p ) ifOl(p)<_d<_D2(p )
O2(P)- Ol(p)
1 if D 2 (p) < d < D 3 (p)
d-D4(p) if D3(p)< d < O4(p)
D3 (P) - D 4(P)
0 if d<Dj(p) or d > Da(p)
The fuzziness of demand propagates to the profit of the operator and when this latter chooses
the couple (p,Q), he should get a fuzzy estimation of his profit _.
Let _p,e be the fuzzy estimation of the satisfied demand corresponding to (p,Q):
_-p.o =min(/)(p),O) ; the membership function of _p.e is denoted_ p'° , this membership function
is deduced from the one of B ( p ) :
_f,e(s)=_(s) if s<Q,
l.t:'e (O) = [min bt_ (d),max /_ (d) l
k a_e d>-e J




Then the fuzzy estimation of the profit of the company corresponding to the couple (p,Q) is
given by:
_(p, Q) = p-_ P'P-C(Q)
And the membership function pf,0(r_) of _(p,Q)is obtained from the one ofs as follows:
= ,,o[(n +C(Q))/p]
To every, feasible couple (p,Q), corresponds a fuzzy set representative of the distribution of
the estimate of the corresponding profit. To solve its decision problem, the company has to
choose a couple (p, Q). It is not possible to compare directly fuzzy numbers, however, since
demand is expected m be represented by a convex _ set, it will be the ease also for the
profit and different possibilities appear to rank convex fuzz 3- sets: ranking according to the
baryeenter of the fuzzy set, or by more sophisticated methods as in [3] . In a simpler
consideration, and when the fiu2y numbers are normalized, which is the ease here (in fact,
here for every (p,Q), there exists at least a _rsuch as uff ,o (_r)= 1 ( 7r/_ = 1 _ _) (as shown
memahe_hin ;_ _rnm! in!.
A
in this case, the calcuiation of the expected profit maposes the consideration of five different
profit subsets configurations: depending on the shape of the membership function of _ as it is
sketched by the five figures 3.
• 14 ease: Q _ D, tP) ; ( a trapeze, fig.3a)
• 2_t case: o._(p)<_Q<_O,(p);(apcntagon, fig.3b)
• 3rd ease: D2(p)<_Q<o,(p), ( rectangulartrapeze, fig.3c)
• 4 th case: D, (r ) -<Q < o 2 (p) ; (a union of a triangle with a vertical segment, fig.3d)
• 5thcase: Q _<D_(p), (a vertical segment, fig.3e).
The expected profit is here taken as the barycenter of the fuzzy base of n.




has been found, a fuzzy estimation of the best expected profit is given by the membership
function /_"°* (_r).
An alternate approach, a conservative one, could be, instead of trying to maximize the profit,
to minimiTe the poss_%le loss, according to rigA. It is possible to assign too, to each couple
(p, Q), a measure of this risk.
Application to the linear case: for simplicity, these four functions are assumed to be linear:
D(p)= Dio -A.,p, i • 1,2,_ Pmin <P<-Pma_ (seefig. 5)
here D io and ;t _ are positive parameters. (D_o)t_ 4 and ( D io /)_)l_i_4 are taken













m. COMPETITION UNDER DUOPOLY
Here, it is supposed that two companies are operating on the same market. Each company i
(ie {1,2}), attracts a demand Di depending on the prices Pl and p2 of both companies and
produces a supply level denoted Qi which costs to it Ci(Qi). These operators are supposed not
to co-operate but to compete playing a Coumot game. The 'Cournot' equilibrium of a such
game is studied in this section. The case of crisp demand functions of the two operators is
revisited in a first part and then the case of fuzzy estimation of the demands is treated in the
second part
Every firm i (i e {1,2})will suppose that the parameters Pj_i and Qj_i are known, and will
choose its price Pi and supply level Qi that maximize its profit ni depending on these values.
When an estimation of the demand function D_(p_,p_) is given, the program of the
company i is then
f max p,.min /),(_Q, - C,(--------_
Pi ,0,
Pj_i and Qj_i are taken as known.
the case of crisp demand functions of the two operators is revisited in a first part and then the
case of fuzzy estimation of the demands is treated in the second part.
A. Demand as a crisp function."
It is assumed in this first part that /_(Pl,P2) and /)2(pl,p2)are crisp functions and the cost
functions C1(Q1) and C2(Q2) are exactly known by the operators
Application: demand and cost as linear functions:
Here again, the demand and cost functions of both companies are assumed to be linear:
Di(p,,Py) =Dio -)'i.Pi +g,Pj, for O<#_(pj)<p,<-fl.,_(p:)<D,o/_+(_/,_)pj, i_ 1,2
where Dio,A._tzi(<,_), 'Pm and p_ are strictly positive parameters fori _ 1,2 -.
Ci(Q,)=qo+ci.Q, for O<Qi <<-Q_,_ , i¢ 12-.
where c_ cio and Q_,_ are strictly positive parameters, cio is the fixed cost, ci is a constant
marginal cost for the firm i and Q'.... is its supply capacity. It is supposed here that the lower
and upper bounds of pi and Qi are never reached. The program of the ith company (i _ 1,2 -)
becomes:
p, ,Q_
where (pj. ,Qj) is the solution of the program of the other company O-_i).
Two cases are considered, depending on the nature of the satisfied demand by firm i:
1st case: Di(p_ pj)-_Qi
in this ease, the demand is considered to be not limited by the level of supply but by the price
level. The profit of the company i is given by:
r i((Pi,Q_') / Pj ) = prDi(Pi, Py_4)-Ci (Qi ) .
xi decreases when Qi increases (for a given Pi) SO the couple (Pi, Qi) achieving the maximum
profit for this case takes place when Qi is exactly equal to Di(pi, pj).
The problem reduces here to:
f l Ilax Pi..Di(Pi,Pi_i)-C: (D_(pi p:=_))
L p: is as given
2 _ case: Di(pi,pj_)->Q.i
In this case, the satisfied demand is limited by the level of supply and the program of the
company becomes:




In both cases, the resolution of the associated program and the study of the existence of an
equilibrium are more or less difficult, depending on the respective expressions of the demand
and cost functions. The relationship between p_ and p/ could be studied for different levels
of market share (MS_ = D,/(D, + Dj))(respectively for different levels of profit rt_).
Isomarketshare(resp. isoprofit) curves could be dressed.
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Application to the linear case:
As it has been shown in the first section, when the functions are linear,
same solution:
Pi* = ci /2+(Di o + laip j ) / 2A i
Qi*= (Dio +glPj --A'iCi)/2
for i, j _ 1,2 ,+_
The ith optimal profit can then be written as:
_i*=((Oio +_iPj -)_ici)/2) 2 /_i -Cio (1')
In conclusion, the ith optimal program is such as:
pi*=(ci+Dio /_,i+(#ti /_i)Pj)/2 , Qi*=(Dio+ktipj-Aici)/2
where j e 1,2
/t corresponds to a Coumot equilibrium which is also here a Nash equilibrium.
p[ =(q + D_o/_ +(bt 112_)p2)/2 and p[ =(c2 +D:ol_2 +(#2/_)p,)/2











MS, = Di(p,,py)/(D,(p,,pj)+ Dj(p,,pj))
= (D,o - A.i.p , + p, pj)/(D,o + Djo - _.,.p, + p:p, - _.j.pj + ll,pj)
= (MS, (I.t, - As ) - lz,)pj = (MS, (lay - A,) - Aj )p, + D,o - MS, (D,o + Dso )
rci = p,D, (pi, p j) - C(Q,)
re, = ( p_ - q )( D_o -Aip, + p,p j ) - C,o
for p, _ ci, p j = (A,p2i + (D,o - _.ici )pi +re, + C,o+ ciDio) / pi(p _-c, ). for a given level of profit
rc_. The figure below sketches the isoprofit cruves giving relationship between p2 and p l.
r
/
I I I I I I !
P
Isoprof'u curves
B. fuz_v Demand functions
In this subsection, the estmmtion of the demand adopted by each company is considered as
fuzzy. For a given couple of prices (Pl,P2), b,(Pi,P2)iS assumed tO be represented by a
trapezoidal fuzzy number. On the domain p _ _ , some "level mappings" of
z_ (p_, p2 ) can be pointed out:
± . --
• For coherency, these sets cannot intersect.
Application." to the linear case."
Here the level mappings are such as:
k k k
/9,.'(p,, p j) = D; - Z;p, + l_,pj, (i,j_i)_ 1,2 L, kE a, bTL_
here D_, J,*and !1_(< 2,k.) are positive parameters. (l_, )kE_ and (D_ / ;_)_ are taken
as increasing sequences so that these functions do not intersect, it is also assumed that for
every k _ a, br_, the rate Xf / bt_ is a constant equal to a reala, (>1). The firm i will take the
price and the supply level of the firm j as known and it will face a program analogous to the
one treated in the example given in the case of monopoly. And it is the same for the firm j.
Does this situation have an equilibrium?
A first approach of this problem consists tofuzzify solutions found hi the crisp case(see fig. 7):
p? = (c, + D,o 1_.,+ (p, l_.,)p.)i2 , P'2 = (c: + J.o I_.2+ (_ I_)p,)12
Q_ = (b_) + fi,p. -[hc,)12. Q_ = (D. + fi.p, -A..c.)!2
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with 1);o, f_; and f£, are fuzzy parameters (as described here D;* and )+*+are positive
parameters, k k(D_ ),_ _,_vl{ and (D_+ /3., )k, _.b_g are taken as increasing sequences)
_+ ___+_
2 z+t_




Another approach is to consider the problem as in the first part of the paper (case of
monopoly) where a fuzzy profit is considered. Through defuzzyfication (for example as a
barycenter depending on the shape of the membership function of the satisfied demand,..) one
expected profit can be obtained for each firm i associated with the pairs ( p,, Q, ) and
( P i, Q j ), i_j : _r ," ( p , , Q , , p j _, , Q j _, ) • It can be then maximized with respect
e*
to Pi,Qi, an optimized profit will be obtained • 7ri (Pj,i,Q j+,i) and the
couple ( p [ ( p ?_ _, Q j _ ; ), Q / ( p j _ i, Q j _ ) ) realizes this maximum and then the firm
will expect a fuzzy profit _i ( p +"( p j _, Q j _ ), Q +"( p j _+, Q j _ ) ) .
An eventual equilibrium could be defined by the confi'ontation of these expressions of
solutions:
f ,
(P, (P2,Q 2),Q ,*( P2,Q 2))
( P_ (P,,Q ,),Q 2 ( P,,Q ,))
In this approach the values of the prices and the levels of supplies are defined in a crisp way
and to them are associated fuzzy profits as in the case of monopoly. But in the first approach,
for every couple of prices correspond two degrees of membership and then for each company
a fuzzy profit is associated.
IV. CONCLUSION
A new approach of the resolution of the decision problem of firms has been introduced.
Several domains can use it especially airlines to choose their frequency and ticket prices. The
main advantage of this 'fuzzy' approach is to let the firm be prepared to all possible events
and to take into account the optimistic as the pessimistic attitudes when estimating the
expected demand addressed to the firm.
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ABSTRACT
This research is concerned with developing passenger demand models for international
aviation from/to Egypt. In this context, aviation sector in Egypt is represented by the
biggest and main airport namely Cairo airport as well as by the main Egyptian international
m_r .'-_r-r_Z_ .-._r_a_! V _._:_;_ .'r'l_ .-_....... _.... ._ ----:-: .... -!: ......... ,_-. _ ._,_,._St2_n _
aviation demand, namely, total number of int__ern,fiona! fiig, bt_ ,,,-io_._,fi.._..._..,_, from_ mad
-"-'_'-a "- "-:-- -: ......... " ..... umb fp ing Egyptair intemati,._,.,_,._,._ _,, _,_, ,_t,o,t _ w_tt n_ totna n er o assengers us onal
flights originating from and attracted to Cairo airport. Such demand variables were related,
using different functional forms, to several explanatory variables including population,
GDP and number of foreign tourists. Finally, two models were selected based on their
logical acceptability, best fit and statistical significance. To demonstrate usefulness of
developed models, these were used to forecast future demand patterns.
Key Words: Passenger, International Flights, Demand Models, Cairo Airport, Egyptair
1. INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this research is to develop demand models for passenger aviation from/to
Cairo airport. In pursuing this objective, the research starts by drawing a conceptualisation
of the main factors affecting passenger demand for international air transport from/to
Egypt. In addition, another conceptualisation is drawn portraying the factors influencing the
selection of Egyptair, as a potential international carrier, by passengers. Following this a
data collection exercise is conducted, whereby historical data, spanning over the 11 years
1990 to 2000, concerning aviation demand variables as well as other explanatory variables
thought to affect this demand is collected and compiled from several sources.
Demand variables include number of international flights (scheduled or unscheduled) as
well as number of passengers using international Egyptair flights (scheduled or
unscheduled) originating from or attracted to Cairo airport. Demand variables are
historically plotted in an effort to determine the most proper and representative ones. On
the other hand, a number of explanatory variables affecting demand are also selected,
namely population, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), number of foreign tourists,
GDP/Capita, number of Egyptian pilgrims, number of Egyptian immigrants, as well as
number of Egyptians working abroad. A correlation matrix is then computed to obtain
values of Pearson correlation coefficient showing the extent of relation between demand
variables and the selected explanatory variables. The matrix demonstrates the collinearity
between population and pilgrims as well as between GDP and GDP/capita. In addition the
matrix shows the illogical negative sign of correlation coefficients relating demand to other
explanatory variables such as number of Egyptian immigrants or Egyptians working
abroad. Based on these analyses, it is decided to develop demand models relating air
passenger demand to population, GDP and number of foreign tourists.
These dependent and independent variables are utilized to calibrate single as well as
multiple variable models, using different functional forms, in an effort to represent changes
in air passenger demand. All of the calibrated models are subjected to a number of logical
and statistical tests. To establish goodness of fit and statistical significance of the calibrated
models two statistical indicators are computed namely the R 2 and the F-statistic. Finally,
models including population and number of foreign tourists as independent variables are
selected as being the most logical and statistically significant models. The research
concludes with a demonstration of the usefulness of the selected models in terms of ability
to predict future passenger demand levels.
2. FACTORS AFFECTING PASSENGER DEMAND FOR TRAVELLING BY AIR
FROM/TO EGYPT
A conceptualisation of the main factors affecting the demand for travelling by air from/to
Egypt is depicted in figure 1. Aviation demand to/from Egypt is composed of Egyptian
passengers as well as of foreign passengers. It can be represented by the number of
international flights to/from Egypt or by the number of passengers using international
flights to/from Egypt. Ten factors were identified as affecting the demand generated by
Egyptian nationals and attracted to other countries. Three can be grouped under socio-
economic factors. These include population size, GDP, and GDP/Capita in Egypt. The
increase in any of these factors is expected to generate more demand for travelling by air.
One factor is related to a pillar of the Islamic religion, namely performance of Haij
(pilgrimage). Each year, and according to quota, Saudi Arabia grants a number of Haij
visas equivalent to 0.001 of the Egyptian population. Egyptian pilgrims travel to the holy
cities of Makkah and Madina in Saudi Arabia in order to perform Haij. Haij takes place
once a year during the Arab month of Zou Al-Haija. In addition, Omra another Islamic
ritual and a smaller version of Haij, can be performed at any time of the year but its peak
season is during the Arabic month of Ram . Egyptians are known to be very frequent in
travelling to Siradi Arabia to perform Omra. The other sixth factors are all related to
attractions abroad, including:
• Egyptians immigrants L,avelling to/from countries of immigration such as USA,
Australia.
• Egyptians working abroad and travelling to/fi'om working destinations, such as Saudi
Arabia and other gulf countries.
• Egyptian tourists visiting other countries, especially in summer when lots of Egyptians
travel to countries such as Turkey, UK and Greece.
• Egyptian businessmen travelling to countries to conduct business meetings and
arrangements
• Diplomats and officials representing Egypt abroad.
• Egyptian graduate students, academics, and scholars travelling to other countries for
higher education, research and exchange programs.
On the other hand, five factors were identified as affe,,,'qgng the demand generated by foreign
nationals and attracted to Egypt including:
• Foreign tourists attracted to Egypt to visit historical and archaeolo_cal Egyptian
heritage°
• Foreign nationals, probably expatriate, working in Egypt.
• Foreign businessmen travelling to Egypt to conduct business meetings and
arrangements.
• Foreign diplomats and officials representing foreign countries and international bodies
within foreign diplomatic missions based in EgypL
• Foreign graduate students, academics, and scholars travelling to Egypt for higher
education, research and exchange programs.
The most important of these five factors is the number of foreign tourists expected to visit
Egypt. It is well known that the majority of foreign tourists arrive to and leave from Egypt
by air.
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3. FACTORS AFFECTING EGYPTAIR MARKET SHARE OF PASSENGER
DEMAND ON FLIGHTS FROMfrO EGYPT
Some generic insights on the choice of air carrier, flight and fare classes were developed by
Proussaloglou and Koppelman (1999). In this section, a conceptualisation of factors
affecting the modal selection by passengers travelling on international flights from/to Egypt
is shown in figure 2. The figure demonstrates the process involved in the selection of
Egyptair versus other international carriers by travelling passengers. It is obvious that some
passengers are by default Egyptair captive either due to their patriotic character, or due to
Egyptian government regulations necessitating the use of the national carrier or due to
monopoly of certain routes by Egyptair. On the other hand, the majority of passengers
would have the choice of selecting Egyptair versus other alternative competing airlines. In
this context, price and level of service related characteristics affecting the utility of
4
competing airlines govern passengers'modechoice.Suchcharacteristicscould include
factors such as promotions, safety and security records, comfort, convenience, regularity,
pun_dality, schedule coverage, luggage safety, crew hospitality and friendliness, onboard
entrainlment facilities, designated airport facilities, etc.









- Corm'oft - uomtm_
- Convenience - Convet_nee
- Crew HotmMttlity & Friendliness





by Nationally in Aeeordnn_ [ Due to Monopoly
Patriotic with Govta-tmlg [ofa CertainRoute
/
/
- Crew, Hospitality & Friendliness i
-On bo,ml_ Fm:fl/ties /
- Schedule Coverage [
Denmnd on Inm, muional Egyptair Nights from/to Egypt
_ (Presented _, No of Passcng_'s !
Figure 2: Conceptualisation of Factors Affecting Egyptair Market Share of Passenger
Demand on International Flights from/to Egypt
4. DEPENDENT AND EXPLAN'TAORY VARIABLES FOR DEVELOPING
DEMAND MODELS FOR PASSENGERS TRAVELLING FROM]TO CAIRO
AIRPORT
The core of the research lies in developing demand models for international flights from/to
Cairo airport as well as for passengers using Egyptair international flights from/to Cairo
airport. Based on the conceptualisation, depicted in figure 2, of factors affecting demand, a
data collection exercise was conducted. Historical data, spanning over the 11 years 1990 to
2000, concerning aviation demand variables as well as other variables thought to affect this
demand was compiled from several sources, see ECAA (2001), Egyptair (2001), NBE
(2001), and IMF (2000).
In another research, a different approach was pursued in terms of developing separate
models for each demand variable, see Reda, 2003.
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Demandvariables include number of international flights (scheduled or unscheduled) as
well as number of passengers using international Egyptair flights (scheduled or
unscheduled) originating fi'om or attracted to Cairo airport. Demand variables were
historically plotted in an effort to determine the most proper and representative ones, see
figures 3 and 4. Several observations were noted, first that demand in 1990 was relatively
high, being the year just before the second Gulf war. Demand dropped significantly in
199 l, due to the Gulf war and its dramatic effect on tourism and aviation sector in Egypt. In
this context, it was decided to drop data points tmrtaining to these two years from the
development of the models. The other noted observation is that generated as well as
attracted demand for both scheduled and unscheduled trips are almost similar in magnitude.
_'lhis demonstrates the aviation phenomenon of passengers usually using return tickets on
international flights. Based on these analyses, it was de_ided to add total departmcs and
arrivals of international flights from/to Cairo airport and use the sum as the dependent
variable representing passenger aviation demand from/to Cairo airport. Similarly, it was
decided to use total number of passengers using Egyptair international flights from/to Cairo
airport as the dependent variable representing passenger aviation demand on Egyptair.
Historical data on a number of explanatory variables thought to affeet demand was also
compiled, namely, population, GDP, GDP/Capita, number of Egyptian Haij pilgrims,
number of foreign tourists, number of Egyptians working abroad, as well as number of
Egyptian immigrants. A matrix was then developed containing values of Pearson
correlation coefficient and its significance in an effort to demonstrate the extent of
correlation between demand variables and selected explanatory variables, see table 1. The
matrix shows the collincaritybetween population and Haij pilgrims as well as between
GDP and GDP/capita. This was expected as the number of yearly pilgrims is determined in
accordance with Saudi quota being 0.001 of population of Muslim countries. In addition the
xr_*',iolM_ o*t,d n,_'_k_,- _'f" l_m,_+go_ ...,-,.1.;--..k.^.A ...... 11 _: .._..m.;a_.
on these analyses, it was decided to develop demand models relating demand variables to
population, GDP and number of foreign tourists.
Table 1" Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Variables Representing International
Passenger Demand from/t( Cairo Air tort (CA) and Some Explanatorz Variables



































































i i I Logic 
from/to CA i
GDP in Current Prices Using Local Currency i.e. Egyptian Pound (L.E.) Currently 1US$ ---6 L.E.
Sig.= Significant i.e. the hypothesis H0 stating that the two variables are independent is rejected.
5. DEVELOPING PASSENGER DEMAND MODELS FOR INTERNATIONAL
AVIATION FROM/TO EGYPT
Traditionally, econometric models are utilised in the forecast of air transportdemand.
Recently fuzzy" models, see Profillidis (2000), models based on artificial neural networks,
see Alekseev and Seixas (2002), as well as models based on scenario forecasts, see Cline
(1998) were developed for the air transport passenger demand forecasting. In this section
selected demand and explanatory variables were utilized to calibrate two types of
econometric models. The first type is single variable models, where four functional
relations, namely linear, logarithmic, power and exponential functions, were tested to
obtain a best fit. This was done using SPSS software, see Norusis (1999). The result of such
modelling exercise is summarised and compared in table 2 as well as being detailed in
figures 5 through 10. All of the calibrated models were subjected to a number of statistical
tests. To establish the goodness of fit and statistical significance of the models, two
statistical indicators were computed, namely the R 2 and the F-statistic, see table 2. It is
obvious fi'om the table that number of foreign tourists visiting Egypt represents the best
fitted explanatory variable and that the power function was the best non linear function in
terms of simulating the dependency of annual total international flights from/to Cairo
Airport on annual number of foreign tourists. On the other hand, the table also shows that
the logarithmic function was the best function in terms of simulating the dependency of
total international passengers using Egyptair from/to Cairo Airport on annual number of
foreign tourists.














RE =0.73, F = 18.7
Sig. = 0.003, Sig.
d.f. =7
Y=4E+061n(X)-7E+07
R 2 =0.68, F = 14.8





R 2 =0.74, F = 20.3
Sig. = 0.003, Sig.
d.f. =7
Y=7740561n(X)-2E+07
R2 =0.68, F = 14.9





R 2 =0.82, F = 32.7
Sig. = 0.001, Sig.
d.f. =7
Y=887533 ln(X)- 1E+07
R 2 =0.77, F = 22.9
Sig. = 0.002, Sig.
d.f. =7
The previous models have a significant limitation in terms of modelling demand as a
function of a single explanatory variable. These variables are either representative of
Figure 5: Exponential Model Relating Total International Flights from/to Cairo Airport as a
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Figure 6: Exponential Model Relating Total International Flights from/to Cairo Airport as a
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Figure 7: Power Model Relating Total International Flights from/to Cairo Airport as a
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Figure 8: Logarithmic Model Relating Total Passengers Using Egyptair International
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Figure 9: Logarithmic Model Relating Total Passengers Using Egyptair International
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Figure 10: Logarithmic Model Relating Total Passengers Using Egyptair International
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6. APPLICABILITY OF DEVELOPED MODELS IN FORECASTING FUTURE
DEMAND
In this section, the two selected models will be used to perform a short term forecasting of
expected demand in terms of number of international flights as well as number of
passengers using Egyptair imemational flights. In order to carry out such forecasts,
expected future values for explanatory variables should be first obtained. In this context,
two time series models were developed to simulate the changes in population in Egypt as
well as in number of foreign tourists visiting Egypt with respect to lime. The population
model was based on an 11 points data set spanning from 1990 to 2000, while the tourists
model was based on a 9 points data s_, spanning from 1992 to 2000. It was assumed that
the second Gulf crisis did not affect the population growth but definitely affected the
pattern for number of tourists visiting Egypt and that was the reason for ignoring the 1990
and 1991 data points for the tourists model. The two models took the exponential form as
follows:
[Population in Egypt = 5E+07 * e°-°2190"_) with 1990 as the base year
[Foreign Tourists V°miting Egypt = 2E+06 * e °_mgO'_) with 1992 as the base year
The above models were used to forecast expected population and number of foreign tourists
in 2004 and 2005. These forecasts are shown in table 4. These forecasts were then fed into
the selected models displayed in table 3 and forecasts of lmssenger aviation demand
represented by number of international flights as well as number of passengers using
Egyptair were obtained, see table 4. These were averaged from annual into daily forecasts
and further more into arrivals and departures, see table 4.
Table 4: .applicability of Developed Models in Forecasting Future Passenger Aviation
Demand from/to Cairo Airport
Forecasts
Population in'Egypt
Foreign Tourists Visiting Egypt
Total International Flights from/to Cairo Airport (Annually)
Passengers Using Egyptair International Flights from/to Cairo
Aeport (Annually)
Total International Flights from/to Cairo Airport (Daily)
Passengers Using Egyptair International Flights from/to Cairo
Ain, ort (D_y)
Total International Flights from Cairo Airport (Daily Departures)
Total International Flights to Cairo Airport (Daily Arrivals)
Passengers Using Egyptair International Flights from Cairo
Airport (DaffyDepartures)
























The usefulnessof suchforecastslies in their potential utilisation in resourceplanning in
termsof airportcapacityandsufficiencyof resourcesaswell as in termsof fleet purchase
by Egyptair. Suchdemandforecastscan be also used as input into Cairo airport and
Egyptaircostandrevenuemodels.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of this research was to develop demand models for passenger aviation
from/to Cairo airport. In pursuing this objective the research developed two conceptual
frameworks, the first pertaining to factors affecting the passenger aviation demand to/from
Egypt, while the second was related with factors influencing the selection of Egyptair as a
potential international carrier by passengers. Historical data spanning over 11 years from
1990 to 2000 representing demand as well as other explanatory variables were collected,
and compiled from several sources. These were plotted and correlated in an effort to
determine which are the most representative, appropriate and suitable data points and
variables to be included in models' development. Data points for the two years 1990 and
1991 were ignored due to the effect of the second Gulf crisis. Two demand variables were
selected, namely total international flights from/to Cairo airport as well as total number of
passengers using Egyptair international flights from/to Cairo airport. In addition, two
explanatory variables were also selected to represent demand of Egyptian nationals i.e.
population and GDP as well as one variable selected to represent demand of foreign
nationals i.e. number of foreign tourists visiting Egypt. These variables were then used to
develop several single and multiple variable models with different functional forms.
Finally two models were selected based on their logical acceptability, best fit and statistical
significance. In an effort to demonstrate the applicability and practicality of the developed
models, these were utilised to forecast future expected passenger aviation demand from/to
Cairo airport. The usefulness of such forecasts lies in their utilisation in resource planning
in terms of airport capacity and sufficiency of resources as well as in terms of fleet
purchase by Egyptair. Such demand forecasts can be also used as input into Cairo airport
and Egyptair cost and revenue models.
In conducting this research several issues were revealed. These will form the basis for
further future research. First, several factors identified as affecting demand were not
considered in the models' development due to unavailability of data. Second, the developed
models are representative of Cairo airport only. Despite that Cairo international airport is
the major and most dominant airport in Egypt, however other airports do exist and are
currently playing important roles. For example Hurgadala airport is currently attracting
direct charter flights transporting foreign tourists. In this context, the developed models
should be expanded to include distribution factors of potential demand to/from other
airports in Egypt. As a matter of fact a national plan for developing an integrated airport
system ought to be pursued. Such direction can be guided by efforts conducted by other
countries such as UK, see DETR (2000) and USA, see USDOT (1999) & (2000). Third, no
mode choice models were developed to simulate the process involved in selection of
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Egyptair versus other international carriers. In this context, with the availability of data,
binary and multinomial logit models could be developed. Fourth, and in accordance with
the viewT, oint of Graham (1999), the effects of dereg-alafion and h-_sfimfional reform have
to be considered in air passenger demand forecasting.
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